# SSVC is a decision method, not a score: it turns a few decision points into an action such as defer, scheduled, out-of-cycle or immediate

SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** SSVC, Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization, was developed by CERT/CC and is used by CISA. It maps decision points such as exploitation, automatable and technical impact to an action, not a number. CISA has published SSVC data in CVE records through Vulnrichment, and NVD began showing it on 2026-06-17.

- **Maintained by:** CERT/CC; CISA publishes SSVC data as an Authorized Data Publisher
- **Scale:** None; the output is a category, for example Defer, Scheduled, Out-of-cycle, Immediate
- **Current version:** NVD schema ssvc-v2.0.3 (deployed 2026-06-17); CISA outcome group cisa:BOD2604:1.0.0
- **Updated:** Decision trees are versioned; CISA scores per CVE in Vulnrichment
- **Answers:** The action a stakeholder should take on a vulnerability, and how fast

## What it is

The CERT/CC documentation describes SSVC as a methodology for prioritizing vulnerabilities based on the needs of the stakeholders involved. It states the contrast with other systems directly: unlike systems that rate technical severity or exploitability, SSVC rates vulnerabilities on risk to the concerned stakeholder, using a stakeholder-defined decision model. It also states that it is not a one-size-fits-all solution.

The output is an action category. For suppliers and deployers the overview defines four: Defer (do not act at present), Scheduled (work during regularly scheduled time), Out-of-cycle (act more quickly, potentially with extra resources) and Immediate (use all possible resources, potentially pausing normal operations). The overview adds that Defer means do not act at present, not do not act at all, and suggests resolving deferred items in due time, perhaps within 90 days.

The documentation distinguishes the roles. Suppliers decide how to respond to a flaw in their own product, deployers decide how to respond to a flaw in software they run, and coordinators decide about triage and publication. A vulnerability management program is a deployer, so the deployer tree and the CISA Response Timeline are the relevant ones.

## Decision points

A decision point is a question with a small set of answers. The overview lists supplier decision points (Exploitation, Utility, Technical Impact, Public Safety Impact) and deployer decision points (Exposure, Automatable, Human Impact). Each combination of answers maps to an outcome through a decision tree or table that the stakeholder can change.

Because the tree is explicit, an auditor can read it. There is no formula to recompute, but there is a table to inspect: every outcome traces to named answers. That is the main advantage over a score, and the cost is that someone must answer the questions for each vulnerability or accept answers from a publisher.

Writing the tree down is also the control. The CERT/CC pages describe how to customize decision points and how to treat items that land on the same priority. A program that adopts the CISA tree unchanged can cite it; a program that edits it should keep the edited table under change control.

## What CISA publishes

The CISA Vulnrichment repository describes its process: CISA takes each CVE through an SSVC scoring process, adding Exploitation, Automatable and Technical Impact. CVEs rated Total Technical Impact, Automatable, or with Exploitation of Proof of Concept or Active get further analysis, including CWE and CVSS data where the CNA has not supplied them. CISA states that it never overwrites the CNA's own container.

On 2026-06-17 the NVD began including SSVC data from the CISA Authorized Data Publisher in its feeds and API, under schema ssvc-v2.0.3, with a Computed SSVC Score showing how the priority was decided. NVD said the deployment touched approximately 95 percent of existing records, each with a new change log entry. A program that syncs from the NVD received this data without a separate integration.

## The federal use: BOD 26-04

BOD 26-04 (2026-06-10) says its remediation timelines table is informed by SSVC. The CERT/CC page for the CISA Response Timeline names four binary decision points: In KEV, Publicly Exposed, Automatable and Technical Impact. These yield five outcomes: Fix on system upgrade, 60 days, 14 days, 3 days, and 3 days with a forensic investigation.

The KEV feed on 2026-11-10 shows the effect: of the 92 entries added from 2026-09-01, 70 carry a 3 day due date and 22 a 14 day one.

Note what the KEV row does in that tree. In KEV is one of four binary points, so the 16 combinations produce the five outcomes. A KEV listing alone does not fix the timeline for a federal agency: exposure, automation and technical impact also count. For a non-federal program the same structure is a reasonable template, with the deadlines changed to its own service levels.

## SSVC and EPSS

The SSVC documentation has a page on using EPSS: EPSS probability as an input to the Exploitation decision point, and EPSS percentiles as an amplifier. This is the documented way to combine a probability with a decision tree without multiplying scores, which FIRST's Using EPSS page warns against.

In the KEV Lag Ledger, the Exploitation answer for a new CVE is the hard part: 58 of 318 KEV additions had no EPSS value on the day of listing, and 197 of the 260 that did sat below 0.1. A tree that relies on a high EPSS to reach Out-of-cycle or Immediate would route most of those entries to a lower category, unless KEV membership overrides it. The CISA tree does that by making In KEV a decision point.

## Limits

SSVC needs inputs that a vulnerability database cannot supply for you: exposure, mission impact and safety impact are about your assets. CISA supplies the vulnerability-side answers; the asset-side answers come from your inventory.

The method is also relatively new for most programs and has less tooling than CVSS. Document the tree you adopt, its version, who set each branch, and when it was last reviewed. The CERT/CC documentation provides a calculator and an explorer for this.

A practical start is to answer the four CISA questions for the KEV entries in your own inventory, compare the outcome with your current priority, and look at the entries where they differ.

## Comparisons with this system

- [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/)
- [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/)
- [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/)

## Sources

- CERT/CC, SSVC documentation: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/ (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CERT/CC, SSVC overview (outcomes and decision points): https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/tutorials/ssvc_overview/ (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CERT/CC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CISA, Vulnrichment repository README: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment (read 10 Nov 2026)
- NVD news (2026-06-17 SSVC deployment): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04, archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20261110120100/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/ssvc/
