# EPSS vs CVSS: every page as markdown A reference on CVSS v3.1 and v4.0, EPSS, the CISA KEV catalog, SSVC, NVD and vendor ratings, with the KEV Lag Ledger: 318 KEV additions from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09, computed from CISA, NVD and FIRST data. --- # CVSS says how bad. EPSS says how likely. KEV says it already happened. REFERENCE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** In the twelve months to 9 Nov 2026, CISA added 318 CVEs to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, a median 10.5 days after NVD published them. On the day of listing 75.8 percent of the 260 with a score had EPSS below 0.1 and 10.4 percent a CVSS score below 7. - Median days to listing: 10.5 - Listed within 7 days: 45.3% - EPSS below 0.1 on listing day: 75.8% - CVSS below 7: 10.4% *Figure: Histogram of days from NVD publication to KEV listing* ## The KEV Lag Ledger in numbers - **Additions:** 318 (2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09) - **Median days, NVD publication to listing:** 10.5 - **Listed within 7 days:** 45.3% - **Published over a year before listing:** 17.3% - **CVSS below 7:** 10.4% - **Median EPSS on listing day:** 0.0066 (260 with a score that day) - **EPSS below 0.1 on listing day:** 75.8% - **Known ransomware use:** 29 ## The latest ten additions | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-102895](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895) | GPUStack GPUStack | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-04 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2026-116779](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116779) | SignalWire FreeSwitch | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-05 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0130 | | | [CVE-2026-123158](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123158) | OpenBSD OpenSSH | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-05 | 4 | 8.1 | 0.0101 | | | [CVE-2026-123218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123218) | IBM Aspera Faspex | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-07 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2026-19868](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19868) | SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN | 2026-11-06 | 2026-11-06 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2024-27834](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27834) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-11-04 | 2024-05-14 | 904 | 5.5 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-119977](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119977) | WordPress WordPress Core | 2026-11-03 | 2026-10-31 | 3 | 8.1 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-111357](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111357) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-10-15 | 15 | 7 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-118527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-11-03 | -4 | 4.3 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76418](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418) | Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software | 2026-10-29 | 2026-10-28 | 1 | 8.6 | 0.0057 | | Newest first. CVSS from NVD; EPSS from FIRST on the KEV dateAdded. Fetched 2026-11-10. ## Platforms by how they turn exploitation evidence into a priority ### Rank 1: Brinqa (6.9) 260+ connectors, vendor count Brinqa's clearest documented strength is breadth of ingestion (260+ integrations) paired with a customer-configurable risk score and KEV and EPSS connectors. [Read the profile](/signals/brinqa/) ### Rank 2: Nucleus (6.9) FedRAMP authorized, 183 listed integrations (vendor says 200+) Documented strength: a 183-entry integration catalog plus FlexConnect and a FedRAMP Moderate authorization. [Read the profile](/signals/nucleus/) ### Rank 3: ServiceNow Vulnerability Response (6.5) FedRAMP authorized ServiceNow documents KEV and EPSS integrations inside Vulnerability Response and customer-built risk calculators with weight percentages. [Read the profile](/signals/servicenow-vr/) ### Rank 4: Qualys (5.8) FedRAMP authorized, 100+ connectors, vendor count Qualys documents a catalog of 100+ connectors with a Generic CSV importer and InstaScan matching new advisories to inventory within minutes, plus FedRAMP High for its Government Platform. [Read the profile](/signals/qualys/) **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Brinqa leads at 6.9; Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9. The two totals are an exact tie, and the tie-break committed before scoring (the higher evidence score, 9 against 7) puts Brinqa first. Brinqa gains on exploitation evidence (9 against 7 at weight 40, +0.80); unifying sources (9 against 7 at weight 15, +0.30); automation (8 against 7 at weight 15, +0.15) and proof (7 against 6 at weight 5, +0.05); Nucleus wins back seeing exposure before the scanner (6 against 0 at weight 15, +0.90) and public sector readiness (9 against 1 at weight 5, +0.40). ## Where each is strongest - **Unifies every source:** Brinqa (9 of 10). - **Prioritizes on exploitation evidence:** Brinqa, ServiceNow Vulnerability Response (9 of 10). - **Automation at enterprise scale:** Brinqa, ServiceNow Vulnerability Response (8 of 10). - **Sees exposure before the scanner:** Nucleus, Qualys (6 of 10). - **AI under governance:** Nucleus, Brinqa, Qualys, Tenable, ServiceNow Vulnerability Response, Phoenix Security, ArmorCode (7 of 10). - **Public sector readiness:** Qualys (10 of 10). - **Proof:** Brinqa, Tenable (7 of 10). ## The scoring systems - [CVSS v3.1](/scores/cvss-v3-1/): CVSS v3.1 scores how severe a flaw is in itself, not how likely anyone is to exploit it - [CVSS v4.0](/scores/cvss-v4-0/): CVSS v4.0 adds a Threat group and sharper nomenclature, but the score the NVD shows is still mostly the Base score - [EPSS](/scores/epss/): EPSS gives a daily probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, and most KEV entries score low on the day they are listed - [CISA KEV catalog](/scores/cisa-kev/): The CISA KEV catalog is the one list of vulnerabilities with evidence of exploitation, and it lists after the fact, not before - [SSVC](/scores/ssvc/): SSVC is a decision method, not a score: it turns a few decision points into an action such as defer, scheduled, out-of-cycle or immediate - [NVD](/scores/nvd/): The NVD is the reference database for CVE records, and since April 2026 it enriches only a prioritized part of them - [Vendor priority ratings](/scores/vendor-priority-ratings/): Vendor ratings such as VPR, TruRisk and the Nucleus Threat Rating are proprietary scores; publish their scale and method before ranking by them - [Public exploit and malware evidence](/scores/exploit-evidence/): Public exploit code shows a flaw can be attacked, but only observed exploitation shows that it is ## Picks by situation - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) ## Why one number is not enough A vulnerability program ranks work by numbers, and each number answers a different question. CVSS states how severe a flaw is. EPSS states the probability that a CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days. The CISA KEV catalog states that exploitation has been confirmed. SSVC turns a few answers into an action. The NVD carries the records, and vendor ratings add proprietary views. Any one of them, used alone, leaves a gap that the others fill, and each has a published source an auditor can open. The KEV Lag Ledger puts figures on the gaps. Of 318 CISA KEV additions between 2025-11-10 and 2026-11-09, the median was 10.5 days from NVD publication to listing, 45.3 percent were listed within 7 days, and 17.3 percent had been published more than a year earlier. 10.4 percent scored below CVSS 7.0. On the listing day, the median EPSS was 0.0066, and 75.8 percent of the 260 listings with a score were below 0.1. A program that ranks by a CVSS cutoff of 7.0 misses one in ten confirmed exploited vulnerabilities; one that ranks by an EPSS threshold of 0.1 misses three in four on the day they are listed. KEV, in turn, confirms exploitation only after it has begun. ## Read next - [Comparisons](/compare/): every pair, and all three together - [The Signal Matrix](/signals/): which platform exposes which signal - [Guides](/guides/) - [Glossary](/glossary/): 35 terms ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON, version 2026.11.09: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0 (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST EPSS API: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ --- # 318 KEV additions, a median 10.5 days after publication KEV LAG LEDGER, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** 45.3 percent of the 318 additions were listed within a week of NVD publication, but 17.3 percent had been public for over a year. 45.9 percent scored CVSS 9 or above. The full table below links each CVE to its NVD record; the CSV is on the datasets page. The KEV Lag Ledger takes every entry in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with a dateAdded in the 365 days to the catalog release of 2026-11-09. That gives 318 additions, from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09. The catalog comes from the CISA JSON feed. For each entry, the NVD API 2.0 supplies the CVE's published date and its CVSS base score, taking v3.1 first, then v3.0, v4.0 and v2, and the NVD primary source first. The FIRST EPSS API supplies the EPSS score and percentile for the CVE on the day CISA listed it. Days from publication to listing means the KEV dateAdded minus the NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. It is the time a CVE was visible in the NVD before CISA confirmed exploitation, not the time since the first attack. Eight additions have a negative value because CISA listed them before the NVD published the record. 58 additions had no EPSS value on their listing day, usually because the CVE was new, so the EPSS statistics use the 260 that did. The ledger holds only exploited CVEs, so it measures how many of them a signal would have flagged and not how many other CVEs the signal would also have flagged. - **Additions:** 318 (2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09) - **Median days, NVD publication to listing:** 10.5 - **Listed within 7 days:** 45.3% - **Published over a year before listing:** 17.3% - **CVSS below 7:** 10.4% - **Median EPSS on listing day:** 0.0066 (260 with a score that day) - **EPSS below 0.1 on listing day:** 75.8% - **Known ransomware use:** 29 *Figure: Histogram of days from NVD publication to KEV listing* *Figure: KEV additions by month* ## Monthly editions - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/): 9 additions - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/): 20 additions - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/): 17 additions - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/): 28 additions - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/): 26 additions - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/): 31 additions - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/): 21 additions - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/): 23 additions - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/): 26 additions - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/): 31 additions - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/): 43 additions - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/): 36 additions - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/): 7 additions ## By vendor - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/): 42 additions - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/): 21 additions - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/): 12 additions - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/): 11 additions - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/): 11 additions - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/): 9 additions - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/): 8 additions - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/): 7 additions - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/): 6 additions - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/): 6 additions ## Every addition | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-102895](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895) | GPUStack GPUStack | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-04 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2026-116779](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116779) | SignalWire FreeSwitch | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-05 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0130 | | | [CVE-2026-123158](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123158) | OpenBSD OpenSSH | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-05 | 4 | 8.1 | 0.0101 | | | [CVE-2026-123218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123218) | IBM Aspera Faspex | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-07 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2026-19868](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19868) | SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN | 2026-11-06 | 2026-11-06 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2024-27834](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27834) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-11-04 | 2024-05-14 | 904 | 5.5 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-119977](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119977) | WordPress WordPress Core | 2026-11-03 | 2026-10-31 | 3 | 8.1 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-111357](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111357) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-10-15 | 15 | 7 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-118527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-11-03 | -4 | 4.3 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76418](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418) | Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software | 2026-10-29 | 2026-10-28 | 1 | 8.6 | 0.0057 | | | [CVE-2026-97229](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97229) | GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition | 2026-10-29 | 2026-10-13 | 16 | 10 | 0.1843 | | | [CVE-2026-41709](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709) | Broadcom VMware ESX | 2026-10-28 | 2026-07-30 | 90 | 2.7 | 0.0030 | | | [CVE-2026-46300](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46300) | Linux Kernel | 2026-10-28 | 2026-05-23 | 158 | 7.8 | 0.1019 | | | [CVE-2026-111497](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111497) | Google Brotli | 2026-10-27 | 2026-10-22 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.5548 | | | [CVE-2026-48356](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-10-27 | 2026-07-14 | 105 | 9.3 | 0.3058 | | | [CVE-2026-109618](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618) | PHP Group PHP | 2026-10-26 | 2026-10-21 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.9998 | | | [CVE-2026-109619](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109619) | PHP Group PHP | 2026-10-26 | 2026-10-21 | 5 | 8.1 | 1.0000 | | | [CVE-2026-110447](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110447) | Collabora Collabora Online, Built-in CODE Server | 2026-10-23 | 2026-10-14 | 9 | 9.8 | 0.0123 | | | [CVE-2026-114625](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114625) | Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator | 2026-10-23 | 2026-10-22 | 1 | 9.9 | 0.0056 | | | [CVE-2026-106931](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106931) | EG Secure Solutions SiteGuard Server Edition | 2026-10-20 | 2026-10-14 | 6 | 7.8 | 0.0066 | | | [CVE-2026-110936](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110936) | Siemens Software Center | 2026-10-20 | 2026-10-15 | 5 | 6.7 | 0.0014 | | | [CVE-2026-96652](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96652) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 4.3 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-96654](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96654) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 6.5 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-96655](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96655) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 4.3 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-96656](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96656) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 7.2 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2025-61624](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61624) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-10-16 | 2026-04-14 | 185 | 6.5 | 0.0058 | | | [CVE-2026-102764](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102764) | BeyondTrust Remote Support | 2026-10-16 | 2026-10-15 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-21589](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21589) | Atlassian Multiple Products | 2026-10-15 | 2026-10-05 | 10 | 7.5 | 0.0278 | | | [CVE-2026-0322](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0322) | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-14 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-105133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105133) | Ahsay AhsayCBS | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-04 | 10 | 7.3 | 0.0038 | | | [CVE-2026-105134](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105134) | Ahsay AhsayCBS | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-04 | 10 | 10 | 0.0184 | | | [CVE-2026-76519](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76519) | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-104935](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104935) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-13 | 2026-10-13 | 0 | 8.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-96951](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96951) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-10-13 | 2026-10-13 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2015-3306](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3306) | ProFTPD ProFTPD | 2026-10-08 | 2015-05-18 | 4161 | 10 | 0.9675 | | | [CVE-2015-5477](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5477) | ISC BIND | 2026-10-08 | 2015-07-29 | 4089 | 7.5 | 0.9128 | | | [CVE-2016-3081](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3081) | Apache Struts | 2026-10-08 | 2016-04-26 | 3817 | 8.1 | 0.9335 | | | [CVE-2021-3199](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3199) | ONLYOFFICE Docs | 2026-10-08 | 2021-01-26 | 2081 | 9.8 | 0.0822 | | | [CVE-2023-22894](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22894) | Strapi Strapi | 2026-10-08 | 2023-04-19 | 1268 | 4.9 | 0.0166 | | | [CVE-2026-88779](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88779) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-10-04 | 2026-10-04 | 0 | 7.5 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-102489](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102489) | Zammad GmbH Zammad | 2026-10-02 | 2026-09-30 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0058 | | | [CVE-2026-102490](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102490) | Zammad GmbH Zammad | 2026-10-02 | 2026-09-30 | 2 | 7.8 | 0.0026 | | | [CVE-2026-104286](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104286) | Fortinet FortiMail | 2026-10-01 | 2026-10-01 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76504](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76504) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-09-30 | 2026-09-30 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-86950](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86950) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-09-29 | 2026-09-28 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0081 | | | [CVE-2026-88771](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88771) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-27 | 2026-09-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-88772](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88772) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-27 | 2026-09-27 | 0 | 8.1 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-65660](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65660) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-09-25 | 2026-08-11 | 45 | 8.8 | 0.0122 | | | [CVE-2026-67279](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67279) | MikroTik RouterOS | 2026-09-25 | 2026-09-05 | 20 | 6.5 | 0.0071 | | | [CVE-2026-87902](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87902) | WordPress Core | 2026-09-25 | 2026-09-22 | 3 | 8.1 | 0.0288 | | | [CVE-2026-5430](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5430) | WSO2 Multiple Products | 2026-09-24 | 2026-08-06 | 49 | 10 | 0.0037 | | | [CVE-2026-71362](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71362) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-09-24 | 2026-08-11 | 44 | 9.1 | 0.0233 | | | [CVE-2026-85102](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85102) | Check Point Multiple Products | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-09 | 13 | 9.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2026-93616](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93616) | Check Point Multiple Products | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-22 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-93952](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93952) | Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-22 | 0 | 10 | 0.0042 | | | [CVE-2026-94127](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94127) | F5 BIG-IP APM | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-22 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-7273](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7273) | Zyxel GS1900 Series Switches | 2026-09-21 | 2026-06-16 | 97 | 8.8 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2025-39682](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39682) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2025-09-05 | 378 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | | | [CVE-2025-39964](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39964) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2025-10-13 | 340 | 5.5 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-53266](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53266) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2026-06-25 | 85 | 8.8 | 0.0012 | | | [CVE-2026-58704](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58704) | Google Pixel | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-15 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0011 | | | [CVE-2026-76460](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76460) | Cisco Identity Services Engine | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-16 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-87886](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87886) | Acronis Backup | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-17 | -1 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76461](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76461) | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | 2026-09-14 | 2026-09-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42016](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42016) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-09-11 | 2026-07-27 | 46 | 8.8 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-42018](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42018) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-09-11 | 2026-08-12 | 30 | 7.5 | 0.0035 | | | [CVE-2026-84869](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84869) | ConnectWise ScreenConnect | 2026-09-11 | 2026-09-08 | 3 | 9.9 | 0.0038 | | | [CVE-2026-85706](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85706) | GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition | 2026-09-11 | 2026-09-12 | -1 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-67277](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67277) | MikroTik RouterOS | 2026-09-10 | 2026-09-05 | 5 | 8.2 | 0.0043 | | | [CVE-2026-86060](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86060) | MikroTik RouterOS | 2026-09-10 | 2026-09-05 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2025-25249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25249) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-09-09 | 2026-01-13 | 239 | 9.8 | 0.0076 | | | [CVE-2026-19490](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19490) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-09 | 2026-08-19 | 21 | 9.8 | 0.0337 | | | [CVE-2026-20079](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20079) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) and Security Cloud Control (SCC) Firewall Management | 2026-09-09 | 2026-03-04 | 189 | 10 | 0.3595 | | | [CVE-2026-87491](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87491) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-09-09 | 2026-09-09 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0029 | | | [CVE-2026-75650](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-07 | 1 | 10 | 0.0068 | | | [CVE-2026-81963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81963) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-08 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-85880](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85880) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-08 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-86218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86218) | N-able N-central | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-06 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0041 | | | [CVE-2026-85046](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85046) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-09-04 | 2026-09-03 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0046 | | | [CVE-2026-48710](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48710) | Kludex Starlette | 2026-09-02 | 2026-05-26 | 99 | 6.5 | 0.0210 | | | [CVE-2026-49869](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49869) | Kestra Kestra OSS | 2026-09-02 | 2026-06-26 | 68 | 10 | 0.0099 | | | [CVE-2026-59822](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59822) | BerriAI LiteLLM | 2026-09-02 | 2026-07-08 | 56 | 8.2 | 0.0052 | | | [CVE-2026-82329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82329) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-09-02 | 2026-08-28 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0124 | | | [CVE-2026-83548](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83548) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-01 | 1 | 10 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-83549](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83549) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-01 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0092 | | | [CVE-2026-9586](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9586) | Sangoma Switchvox | 2026-09-02 | 2026-07-17 | 47 | 9.8 | 0.0109 | | | [CVE-2026-81578](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81578) | PaperCut NG/MF | 2026-08-31 | 2026-08-28 | 3 | 9.8 | 0.0039 | | | [CVE-2026-82078](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82078) | PaperCut NG/MF | 2026-08-31 | 2026-08-28 | 3 | 9.1 | 0.0046 | | | [CVE-2023-49105](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49105) | ownCloud ownCloud | 2026-08-27 | 2023-11-21 | 1010 | 9.8 | 0.1107 | | | [CVE-2026-53362](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53362) | Linux Kernel | 2026-08-27 | 2026-07-04 | 54 | 7.8 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-66384](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66384) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-08-27 | 2026-08-12 | 15 | 5.3 | 0.0026 | | | [CVE-2015-3246](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3246) | Red Hat Libuser | 2026-08-26 | 2015-08-11 | 4033 | 7.4 | 0.0709 | | | [CVE-2015-5287](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5287) | Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool | 2026-08-26 | 2015-12-07 | 3915 | 7.8 | 0.0341 | | | [CVE-2019-1068](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1068) | Microsoft SQL Server | 2026-08-26 | 2019-07-15 | 2599 | 8.8 | 0.4466 | | | [CVE-2021-23758](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23758) | Ajax.NET Professional Ajax.NET Professional | 2026-08-26 | 2021-12-03 | 1727 | 9.8 | 0.8910 | | | [CVE-2022-0995](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0995) | Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | 2022-03-25 | 1615 | 7.8 | 0.0634 | | | [CVE-2026-8452](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8452) | Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway | 2026-08-26 | 2026-06-30 | 57 | 9.8 | 0.0104 | | | [CVE-2026-60004](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60004) | Gitea Gitea | 2026-08-25 | 2026-08-26 | -1 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21962](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21962) | Oracle HTTP Server and Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in | 2026-08-24 | 2026-01-20 | 216 | 10 | 0.4323 | | | [CVE-2026-73570](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73570) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-08-21 | 2026-08-13 | 8 | 8.9 | 0.0054 | | | [CVE-2026-72529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72529) | TrueConf Server | 2026-08-20 | 2026-08-19 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-72530](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72530) | TrueConf Server | 2026-08-20 | 2026-08-19 | 1 | 9 | 0.0034 | | | [CVE-2026-64849](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64849) | MLflow MLflow | 2026-08-19 | 2026-08-17 | 2 | 9.3 | 0.0111 | | | [CVE-2026-33824](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824) | Microsoft Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions | 2026-08-18 | 2026-04-14 | 126 | 9.8 | 0.5585 | | | [CVE-2026-55040](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55040) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-08-18 | 2026-07-14 | 35 | 9.1 | 0.0397 | | | [CVE-2026-59310](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59310) | Broadcom VMware vCenter | 2026-08-18 | 2026-07-30 | 19 | 9.8 | 0.0114 | known | | [CVE-2026-65400](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65400) | Apple macOS | 2026-08-18 | 2026-08-06 | 12 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | | | [CVE-2025-62593](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62593) | Ray-Project Ray | 2026-08-17 | 2025-11-26 | 264 | 8.8 | 0.0037 | | | [CVE-2026-20349](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20349) | Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-11 | 0 | 8.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-68820](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68820) | Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-11 | 0 | 7 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-72898](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72898) | Metabase Metabase | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-10 | 1 | 10 | 0.0069 | | | [CVE-2026-8037](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8037) | Progress LoadMaster | 2026-08-07 | 2026-06-04 | 64 | 9.8 | 0.8479 | | | [CVE-2026-63077](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63077) | JetBrains TeamCity | 2026-08-05 | 2026-07-27 | 9 | 9.8 | 0.0065 | known | | [CVE-2026-18556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18556) | N-able N-central | 2026-08-04 | 2026-08-01 | 3 | 7.4 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-34486](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34486) | Apache Tomcat | 2026-08-04 | 2026-04-09 | 117 | 7.5 | 0.4263 | | | [CVE-2026-9198](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9198) | IBM Langflow | 2026-08-04 | 2026-07-17 | 18 | 9.8 | 0.0189 | | | [CVE-2026-18577](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18577) | N-able N-central | 2026-08-03 | 2026-08-02 | 1 | 8.1 | 0.0148 | | | [CVE-2026-20316](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20316) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) | 2026-07-29 | 2026-07-29 | 0 | 5.3 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2025-68686](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68686) | Fortinet FortiOS | 2026-07-27 | 2026-02-10 | 167 | 5.9 | 0.0048 | | | [CVE-2026-16812](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16812) | Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator | 2026-07-27 | 2026-07-27 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-16232](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16232) | Check Point SmartConsole | 2026-07-22 | 2026-07-22 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-50522](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50522) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-07-22 | 2026-07-14 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.2035 | | | [CVE-2021-27137](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27137) | DD-WRT DD-WRT | 2026-07-21 | 2026-07-16 | 5 | 8.1 | 0.0545 | | | [CVE-2026-0770](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0770) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-07-21 | 2026-01-23 | 179 | 9.8 | 0.1037 | | | [CVE-2026-60137](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60137) | WordPress Core | 2026-07-21 | 2026-07-17 | 4 | 5.9 | 0.0403 | | | [CVE-2026-63030](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63030) | WordPress Core | 2026-07-21 | 2026-07-17 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0895 | | | [CVE-2026-25089](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25089) | Fortinet FortiSandbox | 2026-07-16 | 2026-06-09 | 37 | 9.8 | 0.2339 | | | [CVE-2026-39808](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39808) | Fortinet FortiSandbox | 2026-07-16 | 2026-04-14 | 93 | 9.8 | 0.4867 | | | [CVE-2026-58644](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58644) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-07-16 | 2026-07-14 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0130 | | | [CVE-2023-4346](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4346) | KNX Association KNX Protocol Connection Authorization Option 1 | 2026-07-15 | 2023-08-29 | 1051 | 7.5 | 0.0048 | | | [CVE-2026-46817](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46817) | Oracle E-Business Suite | 2026-07-15 | 2026-05-28 | 48 | 9.8 | 0.0068 | | | [CVE-2026-15409](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15409) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-15410](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15410) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-56155](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56155) | Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-56164](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56164) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2008-4128](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4128) | Cisco IOS | 2026-07-13 | 2008-09-18 | 6507 | 8.1 | 0.1204 | | | [CVE-2026-48939](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48939) | iCagenda iCagenda | 2026-07-10 | 2026-06-20 | 20 | 9.8 | 0.0056 | | | [CVE-2026-56291](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56291) | Balbooa Forms | 2026-07-10 | 2026-07-09 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-48282](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48282) | Adobe ColdFusion | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-30 | 7 | 10 | 0.0102 | | | [CVE-2026-48908](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48908) | JoomShaper SP Page Builder | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-20 | 17 | 9.8 | 0.0080 | | | [CVE-2026-55255](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-23 | 14 | 8.4 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-56290](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56290) | Joomlack Page Builder | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-29 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.0036 | | | [CVE-2026-45659](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45659) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-07-01 | 2026-05-22 | 40 | 8.8 | 0.0278 | known | | [CVE-2026-48558](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48558) | SimpleHelp SimpleHelp | 2026-06-29 | 2026-06-12 | 17 | 10 | 0.0072 | | | [CVE-2026-12569](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12569) | PTC Windchill and FlexPLM | 2026-06-25 | 2026-06-18 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | known | | [CVE-2026-20230](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20230) | Cisco Unified Communications Manager | 2026-06-25 | 2026-06-03 | 22 | 8.6 | 0.3416 | | | [CVE-2025-67038](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67038) | Lantronix EDS5000 | 2026-06-23 | 2026-03-11 | 104 | 9.8 | 0.0047 | | | [CVE-2026-34908](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34908) | Ubiquiti UniFi OS | 2026-06-23 | 2026-05-22 | 32 | 10 | 0.0086 | | | [CVE-2026-34909](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34909) | Ubiquiti UniFi OS | 2026-06-23 | 2026-05-22 | 32 | 10 | 0.0089 | | | [CVE-2026-34910](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34910) | Ubiquiti UniFi OS | 2026-06-23 | 2026-05-22 | 32 | 10 | 0.3362 | | | [CVE-2026-20253](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20253) | Splunk Enterprise | 2026-06-18 | 2026-06-10 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.0173 | | | [CVE-2026-48907](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48907) | Widget Factory Joomla Content Editor | 2026-06-16 | 2026-06-05 | 11 | 9.8 | 0.0084 | | | [CVE-2026-20262](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20262) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-06-15 | 2026-06-15 | 0 | 6.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-54420](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54420) | LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin | 2026-06-15 | 2026-06-14 | 1 | 8.5 | 0.0035 | | | [CVE-2026-35273](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35273) | Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools | 2026-06-12 | 2026-06-11 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0002 | known | | [CVE-2026-10520](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10520) | Ivanti Sentry | 2026-06-11 | 2026-06-09 | 2 | 10 | 0.0328 | | | [CVE-2026-11645](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11645) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-09 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-20245](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20245) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-04 | 5 | 7.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-7473](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7473) | Arista Extensible Operating System | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-05 | 4 | 5.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-42271](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42271) | BerriAI LiteLLM | 2026-06-08 | 2026-05-08 | 31 | 8.8 | 0.0412 | | | [CVE-2026-50751](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50751) | Check Point Security Gateway | 2026-06-08 | 2026-06-08 | 0 | 9.3 | 0.0001 | known | | [CVE-2026-28318](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28318) | SolarWinds Serv-U | 2026-06-05 | 2026-06-04 | 1 | 7.5 | 0.0006 | | | [CVE-2026-45247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45247) | Mirasvit Mirasvit Full Page Cache Warmer | 2026-06-03 | 2026-05-26 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.0014 | | | [CVE-2022-0492](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492) | Linux Kernel | 2026-06-02 | 2022-03-03 | 1552 | 7.8 | 0.0524 | | | [CVE-2025-48595](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48595) | Android Framework | 2026-06-02 | 2026-06-01 | 1 | 8.4 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2024-21182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21182) | Oracle WebLogic Server | 2026-06-01 | 2024-07-16 | 685 | 7.5 | 0.8767 | | | [CVE-2026-0257](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0257) | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 2026-05-29 | 2026-05-13 | 16 | 9.1 | 0.0006 | known | | [CVE-2026-45321](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321) | TanStack TanStack | 2026-05-27 | 2026-05-12 | 15 | 9.6 | 0.0003 | known | | [CVE-2026-48027](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48027) | Nx Nx Console | 2026-05-27 | 2026-05-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-8398](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8398) | Daemon Daemon Tools Lite | 2026-05-27 | 2026-05-15 | 12 | 9.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2026-48172](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48172) | LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin | 2026-05-26 | 2026-05-21 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-9082](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9082) | Drupal Core | 2026-05-22 | 2026-05-20 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-34291](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34291) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-05-21 | 2025-12-05 | 167 | 8.8 | 0.0949 | | | [CVE-2026-34926](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34926) | Trend Micro Apex One | 2026-05-21 | 2026-05-21 | 0 | 6.7 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2008-4250](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4250) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-05-20 | 2008-10-23 | 6418 | 9.8 | 0.9348 | | | [CVE-2009-1537](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1537) | Microsoft DirectX | 2026-05-20 | 2009-05-29 | 6200 | 8.8 | 0.6808 | | | [CVE-2009-3459](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3459) | Adobe Acrobat and Reader | 2026-05-20 | 2009-10-13 | 6063 | 8.8 | 0.8702 | | | [CVE-2010-0249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0249) | Microsoft Internet Explorer | 2026-05-20 | 2010-01-15 | 5969 | 8.8 | 0.9006 | | | [CVE-2010-0806](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0806) | Microsoft Internet Explorer | 2026-05-20 | 2010-03-10 | 5915 | 8.8 | 0.8948 | | | [CVE-2026-41091](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41091) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-05-20 | 2026-05-20 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-45498](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45498) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-05-20 | 2026-05-20 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42897](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42897) | Microsoft Microsoft | 2026-05-15 | 2026-05-14 | 1 | 6.1 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-20182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20182) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN | 2026-05-14 | 2026-05-14 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42208](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42208) | BerriAI LiteLLM | 2026-05-08 | 2026-05-08 | 0 | 9.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-6973](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6973) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-05-07 | 2026-05-07 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-0300](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0300) | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 2026-05-06 | 2026-05-06 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-31431](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31431) | Linux Kernel | 2026-05-01 | 2026-04-22 | 9 | 7.8 | 0.0260 | | | [CVE-2026-41940](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41940) | WebPros cPanel & WHM and WP2 (WordPress Squared) | 2026-04-30 | 2026-04-29 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.1652 | known | | [CVE-2024-1708](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1708) | ConnectWise ScreenConnect | 2026-04-28 | 2024-02-21 | 797 | 8.4 | 0.5366 | known | | [CVE-2026-32202](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32202) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-28 | 2026-04-14 | 14 | 4.3 | 0.0009 | | | [CVE-2024-57726](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57726) | SimpleHelp SimpleHelp | 2026-04-24 | 2025-01-15 | 464 | 9.9 | 0.0031 | known | | [CVE-2024-57728](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57728) | SimpleHelp SimpleHelp | 2026-04-24 | 2025-01-15 | 464 | 7.2 | 0.0117 | known | | [CVE-2024-7399](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7399) | Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server | 2026-04-24 | 2024-08-12 | 620 | 9.8 | 0.7100 | | | [CVE-2025-29635](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29635) | D-Link DIR-823X | 2026-04-24 | 2025-03-25 | 395 | 7.2 | 0.0125 | | | [CVE-2026-39987](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39987) | Marimo Marimo | 2026-04-23 | 2026-04-09 | 14 | 9.8 | 0.0699 | | | [CVE-2026-33825](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33825) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-04-22 | 2026-04-14 | 8 | 7.8 | 0.0006 | known | | [CVE-2023-27351](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27351) | PaperCut NG/MF | 2026-04-20 | 2023-04-20 | 1096 | 7.5 | 0.4463 | known | | [CVE-2024-27199](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27199) | JetBrains TeamCity | 2026-04-20 | 2024-03-04 | 777 | 7.3 | 0.8247 | known | | [CVE-2025-2749](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2749) | Kentico Kentico Xperience | 2026-04-20 | 2025-03-24 | 392 | 7.2 | 0.0123 | | | [CVE-2025-32975](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32975) | Quest KACE Systems Management Appliance (SMA) | 2026-04-20 | 2025-06-24 | 300 | 10 | 0.0054 | | | [CVE-2025-48700](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48700) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-04-20 | 2025-06-23 | 301 | 6.1 | 0.0018 | | | [CVE-2026-20122](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20122) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manger | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 5.4 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2026-20128](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20128) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 7.5 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-20133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20133) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 7.5 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-34197](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34197) | Apache ActiveMQ | 2026-04-16 | 2026-04-07 | 9 | 8.8 | 0.0622 | | | [CVE-2009-0238](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0238) | Microsoft Office | 2026-04-14 | 2009-02-25 | 6257 | 8.8 | 0.5718 | | | [CVE-2026-32201](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32201) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-14 | 0 | 6.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2012-1854](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1854) | Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) | 2026-04-13 | 2012-07-10 | 5025 | 7.8 | 0.0136 | | | [CVE-2020-9715](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9715) | Adobe Acrobat | 2026-04-13 | 2020-08-19 | 2063 | 7.8 | 0.5044 | | | [CVE-2023-21529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21529) | Microsoft Exchange Server | 2026-04-13 | 2023-02-14 | 1154 | 8.8 | 0.3668 | known | | [CVE-2023-36424](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36424) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-13 | 2023-11-14 | 881 | 7.8 | 0.1030 | | | [CVE-2025-60710](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60710) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-13 | 2025-11-11 | 153 | 7.8 | 0.0019 | known | | [CVE-2026-21643](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21643) | Fortinet FortiClient EMS | 2026-04-13 | 2026-02-06 | 66 | 9.8 | 0.1370 | | | [CVE-2026-34621](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34621) | Adobe Acrobat and Reader | 2026-04-13 | 2026-04-11 | 2 | 8.6 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2026-1340](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1340) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-04-08 | 2026-01-29 | 69 | 9.8 | 0.6774 | | | [CVE-2026-35616](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35616) | Fortinet FortiClient EMS | 2026-04-06 | 2026-04-04 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-3502](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3502) | TrueConf Client | 2026-04-02 | 2026-03-30 | 3 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-5281](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5281) | Google Dawn | 2026-04-01 | 2026-04-01 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2026-3055](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3055) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-03-30 | 2026-03-23 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2025-53521](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53521) | F5 BIG-IP | 2026-03-27 | 2025-10-15 | 163 | 9.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-33634](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33634) | Aquasecurity Trivy | 2026-03-26 | 2026-03-23 | 3 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-33017](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33017) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-03-25 | 2026-03-20 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0059 | | | [CVE-2025-31277](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31277) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-07-30 | 233 | 8.8 | 0.0013 | | | [CVE-2025-32432](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32432) | Craft CMS Craft CMS | 2026-03-20 | 2025-04-25 | 329 | 10 | 0.7902 | | | [CVE-2025-43510](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43510) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-12-12 | 98 | 7.8 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-43520](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43520) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-12-12 | 98 | 5.5 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-54068](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54068) | Laravel Livewire | 2026-03-20 | 2025-07-17 | 246 | 9.8 | 0.1597 | | | [CVE-2026-20131](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20131) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) | 2026-03-19 | 2026-03-04 | 15 | 10 | 0.0057 | known | | [CVE-2025-66376](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66376) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-03-18 | 2026-01-05 | 72 | 6.1 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2026-20963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20963) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-03-18 | 2026-01-13 | 64 | 9.8 | 0.0163 | | | [CVE-2025-47813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47813) | Wing FTP Server Wing FTP Server | 2026-03-16 | 2025-07-10 | 249 | 4.3 | 0.0055 | | | [CVE-2026-3909](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3909) | Google Skia | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-13 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-3910](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3910) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-13 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2025-68613](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68613) | n8n n8n | 2026-03-11 | 2025-12-19 | 82 | 8.8 | 0.7898 | | | [CVE-2021-22054](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22054) | Omnissa Workspace One UEM | 2026-03-09 | 2021-12-17 | 1543 | 7.5 | 0.8893 | | | [CVE-2025-26399](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26399) | SolarWinds Web Help Desk | 2026-03-09 | 2025-09-23 | 167 | 9.8 | 0.1249 | known | | [CVE-2026-1603](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1603) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) | 2026-03-09 | 2026-02-10 | 27 | 7.5 | 0.1174 | | | [CVE-2017-7921](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7921) | Hikvision Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2017-05-06 | 3225 | 9.8 | 0.9410 | | | [CVE-2021-22681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22681) | Rockwell Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2021-03-03 | 1828 | 9.8 | 0.0018 | | | [CVE-2021-30952](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30952) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2021-08-24 | 1654 | 7.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2023-41974](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41974) | Apple iOS and iPadOS | 2026-03-05 | 2024-01-10 | 785 | 7.8 | 0.0031 | | | [CVE-2023-43000](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43000) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2025-11-05 | 120 | 8.8 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2026-21385](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21385) | Qualcomm Multiple Chipsets | 2026-03-03 | 2026-03-02 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-22719](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22719) | Broadcom VMware Aria Operations | 2026-03-03 | 2026-02-25 | 6 | 8.1 | 0.0047 | | | [CVE-2022-20775](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20775) | Cisco SD-WAN | 2026-02-25 | 2022-09-30 | 1244 | 7.8 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-20127](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20127) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager | 2026-02-25 | 2026-02-25 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-25108](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25108) | Soliton Systems K.K FileZen | 2026-02-24 | 2026-02-13 | 11 | 8.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2025-49113](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49113) | Roundcube Webmail | 2026-02-20 | 2025-06-02 | 263 | 8.8 | 0.9211 | | | [CVE-2025-68461](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68461) | Roundcube Webmail | 2026-02-20 | 2025-12-18 | 64 | 6.1 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2021-22175](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22175) | GitLab GitLab | 2026-02-18 | 2021-06-11 | 1713 | 9.8 | 0.5288 | | | [CVE-2026-22769](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22769) | Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines (RP4VMs) | 2026-02-18 | 2026-02-17 | 1 | 10 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2008-0015](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0015) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-17 | 2009-07-07 | 6069 | 8.8 | 0.8752 | | | [CVE-2020-7796](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7796) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite | 2026-02-17 | 2020-02-18 | 2191 | 9.8 | 0.9060 | | | [CVE-2024-7694](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7694) | TeamT5 ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware | 2026-02-17 | 2024-08-12 | 554 | 7.2 | 0.0136 | | | [CVE-2026-2441](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2441) | Google Chromium | 2026-02-17 | 2026-02-13 | 4 | 8.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-1731](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731) | BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and Privileged Remote Access (PRA) | 2026-02-13 | 2026-02-06 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0422 | known | | [CVE-2024-43468](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43468) | Microsoft Configuration Manager | 2026-02-12 | 2024-10-08 | 492 | 9.8 | 0.7383 | | | [CVE-2025-15556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15556) | Notepad++ Notepad++ | 2026-02-12 | 2026-02-03 | 9 | 7.5 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2025-40536](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40536) | SolarWinds Web Help Desk | 2026-02-12 | 2026-01-28 | 15 | 9.8 | 0.2782 | | | [CVE-2026-20700](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20700) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-02-12 | 2026-02-11 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-21510](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21510) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21513](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21513) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21514](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21514) | Microsoft Office | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21519](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21519) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21525](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21525) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 6.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21533](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21533) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-11953](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11953) | React Native Community CLI | 2026-02-05 | 2025-11-03 | 94 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2026-24423](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24423) | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-02-05 | 2026-01-23 | 13 | 9.8 | 0.0012 | known | | [CVE-2019-19006](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19006) | Sangoma FreePBX | 2026-02-03 | 2019-11-21 | 2266 | 9.8 | 0.0214 | | | [CVE-2021-39935](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39935) | GitLab Community and Enterprise Editions | 2026-02-03 | 2021-12-13 | 1513 | 7.5 | 0.2825 | | | [CVE-2025-40551](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40551) | SolarWinds Web Help Desk | 2026-02-03 | 2026-01-28 | 6 | 9.8 | 0.0103 | | | [CVE-2025-64328](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64328) | Sangoma FreePBX | 2026-02-03 | 2025-11-07 | 88 | 7.2 | 0.0046 | | | [CVE-2026-1281](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1281) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-01-29 | 2026-01-29 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-24858](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24858) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-01-27 | 2026-01-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2018-14634](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14634) | Linux Kernel | 2026-01-26 | 2018-09-25 | 2680 | 7.8 | 0.0373 | | | [CVE-2025-52691](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52691) | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-01-26 | 2025-12-29 | 28 | 10 | 0.7359 | known | | [CVE-2026-21509](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21509) | Microsoft Office | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-26 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-23760](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23760) | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-22 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0336 | known | | [CVE-2026-24061](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24061) | GNU InetUtils | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-21 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0049 | | | [CVE-2024-37079](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37079) | Broadcom VMware vCenter Server | 2026-01-23 | 2024-06-18 | 584 | 9.8 | 0.5378 | | | [CVE-2025-31125](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31125) | Vite Vitejs | 2026-01-22 | 2025-03-31 | 297 | 7.5 | 0.0361 | | | [CVE-2025-34026](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34026) | Versa Concerto | 2026-01-22 | 2025-05-21 | 246 | 7.5 | 0.0788 | | | [CVE-2025-54313](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54313) | Prettier eslint-config-prettier | 2026-01-22 | 2025-07-19 | 187 | 7.5 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-68645](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68645) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-01-22 | 2025-12-22 | 31 | 8.8 | 0.0977 | | | [CVE-2026-20045](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20045) | Cisco Unified Communications Manager | 2026-01-21 | 2026-01-21 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20805](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20805) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-01-13 | 2026-01-13 | 0 | 5.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-8110](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8110) | Gogs Gogs | 2026-01-12 | 2025-12-10 | 33 | 8.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2009-0556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0556) | Microsoft Office | 2026-01-07 | 2009-04-03 | 6123 | 8.8 | 0.4755 | | | [CVE-2025-37164](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37164) | Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) OneView | 2026-01-07 | 2025-12-16 | 22 | 9.8 | 0.7334 | | | [CVE-2025-14847](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14847) | MongoDB MongoDB and MongoDB Server | 2025-12-29 | 2025-12-19 | 10 | 7.5 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2023-52163](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52163) | Digiever DS-2105 Pro | 2025-12-22 | 2025-02-03 | 322 | 8.8 | 0.0015 | | | [CVE-2025-14733](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14733) | WatchGuard Firebox | 2025-12-19 | 2025-12-19 | 0 | 9.8 | 0.0021 | known | | [CVE-2025-20393](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20393) | Cisco Multiple Products | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-17 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-40602](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40602) | SonicWall SMA1000 appliance | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-18 | -1 | 6.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-59374](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59374) | ASUS Live Update | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-17 | 0 | 9.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2025-59718](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59718) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2025-12-16 | 2025-12-09 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2025-14611](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14611) | Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox | 2025-12-15 | 2025-12-12 | 3 | 9.8 | 0.0006 | | | [CVE-2025-43529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43529) | Apple Multiple Products | 2025-12-15 | 2025-12-17 | -2 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2018-4063](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-4063) | Sierra Wireless AirLink ALEOS | 2025-12-12 | 2019-05-06 | 2412 | 8.8 | 0.0018 | | | [CVE-2025-14174](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14174) | Google Chromium | 2025-12-12 | 2025-12-12 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-58360](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58360) | OSGeo GeoServer | 2025-12-11 | 2025-11-25 | 16 | 9.8 | 0.1206 | | | [CVE-2025-6218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6218) | RARLAB WinRAR | 2025-12-09 | 2025-06-21 | 171 | 7.8 | 0.0049 | | | [CVE-2025-62221](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62221) | Microsoft Windows | 2025-12-09 | 2025-12-09 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2022-37055](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37055) | D-Link Routers | 2025-12-08 | 2022-08-28 | 1198 | 9.8 | 0.3473 | | | [CVE-2025-66644](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66644) | Array Networks ArrayOS AG | 2025-12-08 | 2025-12-05 | 3 | 9.8 | 0.0015 | | | [CVE-2025-55182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55182) | Meta React Server Components | 2025-12-05 | 2025-12-03 | 2 | 10 | 0.1381 | known | | [CVE-2021-26828](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26828) | OpenPLC ScadaBR | 2025-12-03 | 2021-06-11 | 1636 | 8.8 | 0.5265 | | | [CVE-2025-48572](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48572) | Android Framework | 2025-12-02 | 2025-12-08 | -6 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-48633](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48633) | Android Framework | 2025-12-02 | 2025-12-08 | -6 | 5.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2021-26829](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26829) | OpenPLC ScadaBR | 2025-11-28 | 2021-06-11 | 1631 | 5.4 | 0.0025 | | | [CVE-2025-61757](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61757) | Oracle Fusion Middleware | 2025-11-21 | 2025-10-21 | 31 | 9.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2025-13223](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13223) | Google Chromium V8 | 2025-11-19 | 2025-11-17 | 2 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2025-58034](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58034) | Fortinet FortiWeb | 2025-11-18 | 2025-11-18 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-64446](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64446) | Fortinet FortiWeb | 2025-11-14 | 2025-11-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-12480](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12480) | Gladinet Triofox | 2025-11-12 | 2025-11-10 | 2 | 9.1 | 0.0743 | | | [CVE-2025-62215](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62215) | Microsoft Windows | 2025-11-12 | 2025-11-11 | 1 | 7 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2025-9242](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9242) | WatchGuard Firebox | 2025-11-12 | 2025-09-17 | 56 | 9.8 | 0.0550 | | | [CVE-2025-21042](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21042) | Samsung Mobile Devices | 2025-11-10 | 2025-09-12 | 59 | 9.8 | 0.0022 | | 318 rows, newest first. **Cite this.** KEV Lag Ledger, EPSS vs CVSS, computed from CISA KEV 2026.11.09, NVD and FIRST EPSS, fetched 2026-11-10. https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/ ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/ --- # Three public sources, one subtraction, no judgment LEDGER METHOD, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The ledger takes every KEV entry added in the 365 days before the catalog release, looks up its NVD publication date and CVSS base score, and asks the FIRST EPSS API for the score on the day CISA listed it. Days to listing is the KEV dateAdded minus the NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. Every KEV entry with dateAdded in the trailing 365 days of the catalog release. NVD published date and CVSS base score (v3.1, else v3.0, else v4.0, else v2; NVD Primary first). EPSS score and percentile on the KEV dateAdded from the FIRST API. days_publication_to_kev = dateAdded minus NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. ## Choices in the computation - CVSS: NVD's primary score first, in the order v3.1, v3.0, v4.0, v2, so scores compare across rows. - EPSS: the score published for the KEV dateAdded, not today's; a CVE without a score that day is left blank, never filled from a later day. - A negative day count means CISA listed the CVE before NVD published its record. - The computation is in the repository with tests (tools/kev/compute.mjs and its test file). ## Sources - **KEV:** https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json, catalog 2026.11.09, released 2026-11-09 - **NVD:** https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId= - **EPSS:** https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=&date= - **Fetched:** 2026-11-10T17:25:10.174Z ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST EPSS API: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/method/ --- # 9 KEV additions in November 2025, median 2 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, NOVEMBER 2025, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 9 CVEs to the KEV catalog in November 2025 (a part month in the ledger window). The median was listed 2 days after NVD publication; 55.6 percent within a week. 11.1 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 100 percent of the 7 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, November 2025* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2025-62215 (Microsoft Windows) was listed on 12 Nov 2025 with an EPSS score of 0.0005 and CVSS 7. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2021-26829](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26829) | OpenPLC ScadaBR | 2025-11-28 | 2021-06-11 | 1631 | 5.4 | 0.0025 | | | [CVE-2025-61757](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61757) | Oracle Fusion Middleware | 2025-11-21 | 2025-10-21 | 31 | 9.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2025-13223](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13223) | Google Chromium V8 | 2025-11-19 | 2025-11-17 | 2 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2025-58034](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58034) | Fortinet FortiWeb | 2025-11-18 | 2025-11-18 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-64446](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64446) | Fortinet FortiWeb | 2025-11-14 | 2025-11-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-12480](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12480) | Gladinet Triofox | 2025-11-12 | 2025-11-10 | 2 | 9.1 | 0.0743 | | | [CVE-2025-62215](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62215) | Microsoft Windows | 2025-11-12 | 2025-11-11 | 1 | 7 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2025-9242](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9242) | WatchGuard Firebox | 2025-11-12 | 2025-09-17 | 56 | 9.8 | 0.0550 | | | [CVE-2025-21042](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21042) | Samsung Mobile Devices | 2025-11-10 | 2025-09-12 | 59 | 9.8 | 0.0022 | | 9 additions, newest first. - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2021-26829: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26829 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-61757: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61757 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-13223: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13223 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-58034: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58034 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-64446: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64446 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2025-11/ --- # 20 KEV additions in December 2025, median 2.5 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, DECEMBER 2025, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 20 CVEs to the KEV catalog in December 2025. The median was listed 2.5 days after NVD publication; 65 percent within a week. 10 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 69.2 percent of the 13 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, December 2025* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2025-14847 (MongoDB MongoDB and MongoDB Server) was listed on 29 Dec 2025 with an EPSS score of 0.0004 and CVSS 7.5. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2025-14847](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14847) | MongoDB MongoDB and MongoDB Server | 2025-12-29 | 2025-12-19 | 10 | 7.5 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2023-52163](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52163) | Digiever DS-2105 Pro | 2025-12-22 | 2025-02-03 | 322 | 8.8 | 0.0015 | | | [CVE-2025-14733](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14733) | WatchGuard Firebox | 2025-12-19 | 2025-12-19 | 0 | 9.8 | 0.0021 | known | | [CVE-2025-20393](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20393) | Cisco Multiple Products | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-17 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-40602](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40602) | SonicWall SMA1000 appliance | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-18 | -1 | 6.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-59374](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59374) | ASUS Live Update | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-17 | 0 | 9.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2025-59718](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59718) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2025-12-16 | 2025-12-09 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2025-14611](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14611) | Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox | 2025-12-15 | 2025-12-12 | 3 | 9.8 | 0.0006 | | | [CVE-2025-43529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43529) | Apple Multiple Products | 2025-12-15 | 2025-12-17 | -2 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2018-4063](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-4063) | Sierra Wireless AirLink ALEOS | 2025-12-12 | 2019-05-06 | 2412 | 8.8 | 0.0018 | | | [CVE-2025-14174](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14174) | Google Chromium | 2025-12-12 | 2025-12-12 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-58360](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58360) | OSGeo GeoServer | 2025-12-11 | 2025-11-25 | 16 | 9.8 | 0.1206 | | | [CVE-2025-6218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6218) | RARLAB WinRAR | 2025-12-09 | 2025-06-21 | 171 | 7.8 | 0.0049 | | | [CVE-2025-62221](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62221) | Microsoft Windows | 2025-12-09 | 2025-12-09 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2022-37055](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37055) | D-Link Routers | 2025-12-08 | 2022-08-28 | 1198 | 9.8 | 0.3473 | | | [CVE-2025-66644](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66644) | Array Networks ArrayOS AG | 2025-12-08 | 2025-12-05 | 3 | 9.8 | 0.0015 | | | [CVE-2025-55182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55182) | Meta React Server Components | 2025-12-05 | 2025-12-03 | 2 | 10 | 0.1381 | known | | [CVE-2021-26828](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26828) | OpenPLC ScadaBR | 2025-12-03 | 2021-06-11 | 1636 | 8.8 | 0.5265 | | | [CVE-2025-48572](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48572) | Android Framework | 2025-12-02 | 2025-12-08 | -6 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-48633](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48633) | Android Framework | 2025-12-02 | 2025-12-08 | -6 | 5.5 | no score that day | | 20 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-14847: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14847 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2023-52163: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52163 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-14733: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14733 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-20393: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20393 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-40602: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40602 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2025-12/ --- # 17 KEV additions in January 2026, median 28 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, JANUARY 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 17 CVEs to the KEV catalog in January 2026. The median was listed 28 days after NVD publication; 41.2 percent within a week. 5.9 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 66.7 percent of the 12 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, January 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2025-54313 (Prettier eslint-config-prettier) was listed on 22 Jan 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0002 and CVSS 7.5. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-1281](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1281) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-01-29 | 2026-01-29 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-24858](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24858) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-01-27 | 2026-01-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2018-14634](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14634) | Linux Kernel | 2026-01-26 | 2018-09-25 | 2680 | 7.8 | 0.0373 | | | [CVE-2025-52691](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52691) | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-01-26 | 2025-12-29 | 28 | 10 | 0.7359 | known | | [CVE-2026-21509](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21509) | Microsoft Office | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-26 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-23760](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23760) | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-22 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0336 | known | | [CVE-2026-24061](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24061) | GNU InetUtils | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-21 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0049 | | | [CVE-2024-37079](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37079) | Broadcom VMware vCenter Server | 2026-01-23 | 2024-06-18 | 584 | 9.8 | 0.5378 | | | [CVE-2025-31125](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31125) | Vite Vitejs | 2026-01-22 | 2025-03-31 | 297 | 7.5 | 0.0361 | | | [CVE-2025-34026](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34026) | Versa Concerto | 2026-01-22 | 2025-05-21 | 246 | 7.5 | 0.0788 | | | [CVE-2025-54313](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54313) | Prettier eslint-config-prettier | 2026-01-22 | 2025-07-19 | 187 | 7.5 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-68645](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68645) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-01-22 | 2025-12-22 | 31 | 8.8 | 0.0977 | | | [CVE-2026-20045](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20045) | Cisco Unified Communications Manager | 2026-01-21 | 2026-01-21 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20805](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20805) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-01-13 | 2026-01-13 | 0 | 5.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-8110](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8110) | Gogs Gogs | 2026-01-12 | 2025-12-10 | 33 | 8.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2009-0556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0556) | Microsoft Office | 2026-01-07 | 2009-04-03 | 6123 | 8.8 | 0.4755 | | | [CVE-2025-37164](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37164) | Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) OneView | 2026-01-07 | 2025-12-16 | 22 | 9.8 | 0.7334 | | 17 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-1281: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1281 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-24858: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24858 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2018-14634: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14634 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-52691: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52691 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-21509: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21509 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-01/ --- # 28 KEV additions in February 2026, median 12 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, FEBRUARY 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 28 CVEs to the KEV catalog in February 2026. The median was listed 12 days after NVD publication; 42.9 percent within a week. 7.1 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 66.7 percent of the 21 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, February 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-20700 (Apple Multiple Products) was listed on 12 Feb 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0001 and CVSS 7.8. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2022-20775](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20775) | Cisco SD-WAN | 2026-02-25 | 2022-09-30 | 1244 | 7.8 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-20127](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20127) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager | 2026-02-25 | 2026-02-25 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-25108](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25108) | Soliton Systems K.K FileZen | 2026-02-24 | 2026-02-13 | 11 | 8.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2025-49113](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49113) | Roundcube Webmail | 2026-02-20 | 2025-06-02 | 263 | 8.8 | 0.9211 | | | [CVE-2025-68461](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68461) | Roundcube Webmail | 2026-02-20 | 2025-12-18 | 64 | 6.1 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2021-22175](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22175) | GitLab GitLab | 2026-02-18 | 2021-06-11 | 1713 | 9.8 | 0.5288 | | | [CVE-2026-22769](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22769) | Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines (RP4VMs) | 2026-02-18 | 2026-02-17 | 1 | 10 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2008-0015](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0015) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-17 | 2009-07-07 | 6069 | 8.8 | 0.8752 | | | [CVE-2020-7796](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7796) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite | 2026-02-17 | 2020-02-18 | 2191 | 9.8 | 0.9060 | | | [CVE-2024-7694](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7694) | TeamT5 ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware | 2026-02-17 | 2024-08-12 | 554 | 7.2 | 0.0136 | | | [CVE-2026-2441](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2441) | Google Chromium | 2026-02-17 | 2026-02-13 | 4 | 8.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-1731](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731) | BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and Privileged Remote Access (PRA) | 2026-02-13 | 2026-02-06 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0422 | known | | [CVE-2024-43468](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43468) | Microsoft Configuration Manager | 2026-02-12 | 2024-10-08 | 492 | 9.8 | 0.7383 | | | [CVE-2025-15556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15556) | Notepad++ Notepad++ | 2026-02-12 | 2026-02-03 | 9 | 7.5 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2025-40536](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40536) | SolarWinds Web Help Desk | 2026-02-12 | 2026-01-28 | 15 | 9.8 | 0.2782 | | | [CVE-2026-20700](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20700) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-02-12 | 2026-02-11 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-21510](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21510) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21513](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21513) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21514](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21514) | Microsoft Office | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21519](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21519) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21525](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21525) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 6.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21533](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21533) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-11953](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11953) | React Native Community CLI | 2026-02-05 | 2025-11-03 | 94 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2026-24423](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24423) | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-02-05 | 2026-01-23 | 13 | 9.8 | 0.0012 | known | | [CVE-2019-19006](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19006) | Sangoma FreePBX | 2026-02-03 | 2019-11-21 | 2266 | 9.8 | 0.0214 | | | [CVE-2021-39935](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39935) | GitLab Community and Enterprise Editions | 2026-02-03 | 2021-12-13 | 1513 | 7.5 | 0.2825 | | | [CVE-2025-40551](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40551) | SolarWinds Web Help Desk | 2026-02-03 | 2026-01-28 | 6 | 9.8 | 0.0103 | | | [CVE-2025-64328](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64328) | Sangoma FreePBX | 2026-02-03 | 2025-11-07 | 88 | 7.2 | 0.0046 | | 28 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2022-20775: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20775 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-20127: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20127 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-25108: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25108 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-49113: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49113 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-68461: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68461 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-02/ --- # 26 KEV additions in March 2026, median 98 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, MARCH 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 26 CVEs to the KEV catalog in March 2026. The median was listed 98 days after NVD publication; 26.9 percent within a week. 11.5 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 73.1 percent of the 26 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, March 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-21385 (Qualcomm Multiple Chipsets) was listed on 3 Mar 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0001 and CVSS 7.8. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-3055](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3055) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-03-30 | 2026-03-23 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2025-53521](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53521) | F5 BIG-IP | 2026-03-27 | 2025-10-15 | 163 | 9.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-33634](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33634) | Aquasecurity Trivy | 2026-03-26 | 2026-03-23 | 3 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-33017](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33017) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-03-25 | 2026-03-20 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0059 | | | [CVE-2025-31277](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31277) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-07-30 | 233 | 8.8 | 0.0013 | | | [CVE-2025-32432](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32432) | Craft CMS Craft CMS | 2026-03-20 | 2025-04-25 | 329 | 10 | 0.7902 | | | [CVE-2025-43510](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43510) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-12-12 | 98 | 7.8 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-43520](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43520) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-12-12 | 98 | 5.5 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-54068](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54068) | Laravel Livewire | 2026-03-20 | 2025-07-17 | 246 | 9.8 | 0.1597 | | | [CVE-2026-20131](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20131) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) | 2026-03-19 | 2026-03-04 | 15 | 10 | 0.0057 | known | | [CVE-2025-66376](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66376) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-03-18 | 2026-01-05 | 72 | 6.1 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2026-20963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20963) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-03-18 | 2026-01-13 | 64 | 9.8 | 0.0163 | | | [CVE-2025-47813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47813) | Wing FTP Server Wing FTP Server | 2026-03-16 | 2025-07-10 | 249 | 4.3 | 0.0055 | | | [CVE-2026-3909](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3909) | Google Skia | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-13 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-3910](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3910) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-13 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2025-68613](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68613) | n8n n8n | 2026-03-11 | 2025-12-19 | 82 | 8.8 | 0.7898 | | | [CVE-2021-22054](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22054) | Omnissa Workspace One UEM | 2026-03-09 | 2021-12-17 | 1543 | 7.5 | 0.8893 | | | [CVE-2025-26399](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26399) | SolarWinds Web Help Desk | 2026-03-09 | 2025-09-23 | 167 | 9.8 | 0.1249 | known | | [CVE-2026-1603](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1603) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) | 2026-03-09 | 2026-02-10 | 27 | 7.5 | 0.1174 | | | [CVE-2017-7921](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7921) | Hikvision Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2017-05-06 | 3225 | 9.8 | 0.9410 | | | [CVE-2021-22681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22681) | Rockwell Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2021-03-03 | 1828 | 9.8 | 0.0018 | | | [CVE-2021-30952](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30952) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2021-08-24 | 1654 | 7.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2023-41974](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41974) | Apple iOS and iPadOS | 2026-03-05 | 2024-01-10 | 785 | 7.8 | 0.0031 | | | [CVE-2023-43000](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43000) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2025-11-05 | 120 | 8.8 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2026-21385](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21385) | Qualcomm Multiple Chipsets | 2026-03-03 | 2026-03-02 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-22719](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22719) | Broadcom VMware Aria Operations | 2026-03-03 | 2026-02-25 | 6 | 8.1 | 0.0047 | | 26 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-3055: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3055 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-53521: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53521 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-33634: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33634 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-33017: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33017 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-31277: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31277 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-03/ --- # 31 KEV additions in April 2026, median 153 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, APRIL 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 31 CVEs to the KEV catalog in April 2026. The median was listed 153 days after NVD publication; 19.4 percent within a week. 12.9 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 63.3 percent of the 30 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, April 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-3502 (TrueConf Client) was listed on 2 Apr 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0001 and CVSS 7.8. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-41940](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41940) | WebPros cPanel & WHM and WP2 (WordPress Squared) | 2026-04-30 | 2026-04-29 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.1652 | known | | [CVE-2024-1708](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1708) | ConnectWise ScreenConnect | 2026-04-28 | 2024-02-21 | 797 | 8.4 | 0.5366 | known | | [CVE-2026-32202](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32202) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-28 | 2026-04-14 | 14 | 4.3 | 0.0009 | | | [CVE-2024-57726](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57726) | SimpleHelp SimpleHelp | 2026-04-24 | 2025-01-15 | 464 | 9.9 | 0.0031 | known | | [CVE-2024-57728](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57728) | SimpleHelp SimpleHelp | 2026-04-24 | 2025-01-15 | 464 | 7.2 | 0.0117 | known | | [CVE-2024-7399](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7399) | Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server | 2026-04-24 | 2024-08-12 | 620 | 9.8 | 0.7100 | | | [CVE-2025-29635](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29635) | D-Link DIR-823X | 2026-04-24 | 2025-03-25 | 395 | 7.2 | 0.0125 | | | [CVE-2026-39987](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39987) | Marimo Marimo | 2026-04-23 | 2026-04-09 | 14 | 9.8 | 0.0699 | | | [CVE-2026-33825](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33825) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-04-22 | 2026-04-14 | 8 | 7.8 | 0.0006 | known | | [CVE-2023-27351](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27351) | PaperCut NG/MF | 2026-04-20 | 2023-04-20 | 1096 | 7.5 | 0.4463 | known | | [CVE-2024-27199](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27199) | JetBrains TeamCity | 2026-04-20 | 2024-03-04 | 777 | 7.3 | 0.8247 | known | | [CVE-2025-2749](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2749) | Kentico Kentico Xperience | 2026-04-20 | 2025-03-24 | 392 | 7.2 | 0.0123 | | | [CVE-2025-32975](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32975) | Quest KACE Systems Management Appliance (SMA) | 2026-04-20 | 2025-06-24 | 300 | 10 | 0.0054 | | | [CVE-2025-48700](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48700) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-04-20 | 2025-06-23 | 301 | 6.1 | 0.0018 | | | [CVE-2026-20122](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20122) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manger | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 5.4 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2026-20128](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20128) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 7.5 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-20133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20133) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 7.5 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-34197](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34197) | Apache ActiveMQ | 2026-04-16 | 2026-04-07 | 9 | 8.8 | 0.0622 | | | [CVE-2009-0238](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0238) | Microsoft Office | 2026-04-14 | 2009-02-25 | 6257 | 8.8 | 0.5718 | | | [CVE-2026-32201](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32201) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-14 | 0 | 6.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2012-1854](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1854) | Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) | 2026-04-13 | 2012-07-10 | 5025 | 7.8 | 0.0136 | | | [CVE-2020-9715](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9715) | Adobe Acrobat | 2026-04-13 | 2020-08-19 | 2063 | 7.8 | 0.5044 | | | [CVE-2023-21529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21529) | Microsoft Exchange Server | 2026-04-13 | 2023-02-14 | 1154 | 8.8 | 0.3668 | known | | [CVE-2023-36424](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36424) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-13 | 2023-11-14 | 881 | 7.8 | 0.1030 | | | [CVE-2025-60710](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60710) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-13 | 2025-11-11 | 153 | 7.8 | 0.0019 | known | | [CVE-2026-21643](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21643) | Fortinet FortiClient EMS | 2026-04-13 | 2026-02-06 | 66 | 9.8 | 0.1370 | | | [CVE-2026-34621](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34621) | Adobe Acrobat and Reader | 2026-04-13 | 2026-04-11 | 2 | 8.6 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2026-1340](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1340) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-04-08 | 2026-01-29 | 69 | 9.8 | 0.6774 | | | [CVE-2026-35616](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35616) | Fortinet FortiClient EMS | 2026-04-06 | 2026-04-04 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-3502](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3502) | TrueConf Client | 2026-04-02 | 2026-03-30 | 3 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-5281](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5281) | Google Dawn | 2026-04-01 | 2026-04-01 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0004 | | 31 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-41940: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41940 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2024-1708: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1708 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-32202: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32202 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2024-57726: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57726 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2024-57728: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57728 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-04/ --- # 21 KEV additions in May 2026, median 5 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, MAY 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 21 CVEs to the KEV catalog in May 2026. The median was listed 5 days after NVD publication; 52.4 percent within a week. 9.5 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 64.3 percent of the 14 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, May 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-48172 (LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin) was listed on 26 May 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0001 and CVSS 9.8. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-0257](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0257) | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 2026-05-29 | 2026-05-13 | 16 | 9.1 | 0.0006 | known | | [CVE-2026-45321](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321) | TanStack TanStack | 2026-05-27 | 2026-05-12 | 15 | 9.6 | 0.0003 | known | | [CVE-2026-48027](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48027) | Nx Nx Console | 2026-05-27 | 2026-05-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-8398](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8398) | Daemon Daemon Tools Lite | 2026-05-27 | 2026-05-15 | 12 | 9.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2026-48172](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48172) | LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin | 2026-05-26 | 2026-05-21 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-9082](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9082) | Drupal Core | 2026-05-22 | 2026-05-20 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-34291](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34291) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-05-21 | 2025-12-05 | 167 | 8.8 | 0.0949 | | | [CVE-2026-34926](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34926) | Trend Micro Apex One | 2026-05-21 | 2026-05-21 | 0 | 6.7 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2008-4250](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4250) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-05-20 | 2008-10-23 | 6418 | 9.8 | 0.9348 | | | [CVE-2009-1537](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1537) | Microsoft DirectX | 2026-05-20 | 2009-05-29 | 6200 | 8.8 | 0.6808 | | | [CVE-2009-3459](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3459) | Adobe Acrobat and Reader | 2026-05-20 | 2009-10-13 | 6063 | 8.8 | 0.8702 | | | [CVE-2010-0249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0249) | Microsoft Internet Explorer | 2026-05-20 | 2010-01-15 | 5969 | 8.8 | 0.9006 | | | [CVE-2010-0806](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0806) | Microsoft Internet Explorer | 2026-05-20 | 2010-03-10 | 5915 | 8.8 | 0.8948 | | | [CVE-2026-41091](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41091) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-05-20 | 2026-05-20 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-45498](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45498) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-05-20 | 2026-05-20 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42897](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42897) | Microsoft Microsoft | 2026-05-15 | 2026-05-14 | 1 | 6.1 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-20182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20182) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN | 2026-05-14 | 2026-05-14 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42208](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42208) | BerriAI LiteLLM | 2026-05-08 | 2026-05-08 | 0 | 9.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-6973](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6973) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-05-07 | 2026-05-07 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-0300](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0300) | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 2026-05-06 | 2026-05-06 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-31431](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31431) | Linux Kernel | 2026-05-01 | 2026-04-22 | 9 | 7.8 | 0.0260 | | 21 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-0257: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0257 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-45321: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-48027: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48027 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-8398: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8398 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-48172: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48172 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-05/ --- # 23 KEV additions in June 2026, median 8 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, JUNE 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 23 CVEs to the KEV catalog in June 2026. The median was listed 8 days after NVD publication; 47.8 percent within a week. 8.7 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 86.4 percent of the 22 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, June 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2025-48595 (Android Framework) was listed on 2 Jun 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0001 and CVSS 8.4. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-48558](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48558) | SimpleHelp SimpleHelp | 2026-06-29 | 2026-06-12 | 17 | 10 | 0.0072 | | | [CVE-2026-12569](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12569) | PTC Windchill and FlexPLM | 2026-06-25 | 2026-06-18 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | known | | [CVE-2026-20230](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20230) | Cisco Unified Communications Manager | 2026-06-25 | 2026-06-03 | 22 | 8.6 | 0.3416 | | | [CVE-2025-67038](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67038) | Lantronix EDS5000 | 2026-06-23 | 2026-03-11 | 104 | 9.8 | 0.0047 | | | [CVE-2026-34908](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34908) | Ubiquiti UniFi OS | 2026-06-23 | 2026-05-22 | 32 | 10 | 0.0086 | | | [CVE-2026-34909](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34909) | Ubiquiti UniFi OS | 2026-06-23 | 2026-05-22 | 32 | 10 | 0.0089 | | | [CVE-2026-34910](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34910) | Ubiquiti UniFi OS | 2026-06-23 | 2026-05-22 | 32 | 10 | 0.3362 | | | [CVE-2026-20253](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20253) | Splunk Enterprise | 2026-06-18 | 2026-06-10 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.0173 | | | [CVE-2026-48907](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48907) | Widget Factory Joomla Content Editor | 2026-06-16 | 2026-06-05 | 11 | 9.8 | 0.0084 | | | [CVE-2026-20262](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20262) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-06-15 | 2026-06-15 | 0 | 6.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-54420](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54420) | LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin | 2026-06-15 | 2026-06-14 | 1 | 8.5 | 0.0035 | | | [CVE-2026-35273](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35273) | Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools | 2026-06-12 | 2026-06-11 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0002 | known | | [CVE-2026-10520](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10520) | Ivanti Sentry | 2026-06-11 | 2026-06-09 | 2 | 10 | 0.0328 | | | [CVE-2026-11645](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11645) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-09 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-20245](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20245) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-04 | 5 | 7.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-7473](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7473) | Arista Extensible Operating System | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-05 | 4 | 5.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-42271](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42271) | BerriAI LiteLLM | 2026-06-08 | 2026-05-08 | 31 | 8.8 | 0.0412 | | | [CVE-2026-50751](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50751) | Check Point Security Gateway | 2026-06-08 | 2026-06-08 | 0 | 9.3 | 0.0001 | known | | [CVE-2026-28318](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28318) | SolarWinds Serv-U | 2026-06-05 | 2026-06-04 | 1 | 7.5 | 0.0006 | | | [CVE-2026-45247](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45247) | Mirasvit Mirasvit Full Page Cache Warmer | 2026-06-03 | 2026-05-26 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.0014 | | | [CVE-2022-0492](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492) | Linux Kernel | 2026-06-02 | 2022-03-03 | 1552 | 7.8 | 0.0524 | | | [CVE-2025-48595](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48595) | Android Framework | 2026-06-02 | 2026-06-01 | 1 | 8.4 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2024-21182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21182) | Oracle WebLogic Server | 2026-06-01 | 2024-07-16 | 685 | 7.5 | 0.8767 | | 23 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-48558: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48558 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-12569: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12569 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-20230: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20230 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-67038: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67038 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-34908: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34908 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-06/ --- # 26 KEV additions in July 2026, median 7.5 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, JULY 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 26 CVEs to the KEV catalog in July 2026. The median was listed 7.5 days after NVD publication; 50 percent within a week. 11.5 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 73.7 percent of the 19 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, July 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-55255 (Langflow Langflow) was listed on 7 Jul 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0023 and CVSS 8.4. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-20316](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20316) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) | 2026-07-29 | 2026-07-29 | 0 | 5.3 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2025-68686](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68686) | Fortinet FortiOS | 2026-07-27 | 2026-02-10 | 167 | 5.9 | 0.0048 | | | [CVE-2026-16812](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16812) | Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator | 2026-07-27 | 2026-07-27 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-16232](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16232) | Check Point SmartConsole | 2026-07-22 | 2026-07-22 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-50522](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50522) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-07-22 | 2026-07-14 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.2035 | | | [CVE-2021-27137](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27137) | DD-WRT DD-WRT | 2026-07-21 | 2026-07-16 | 5 | 8.1 | 0.0545 | | | [CVE-2026-0770](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0770) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-07-21 | 2026-01-23 | 179 | 9.8 | 0.1037 | | | [CVE-2026-60137](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60137) | WordPress Core | 2026-07-21 | 2026-07-17 | 4 | 5.9 | 0.0403 | | | [CVE-2026-63030](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63030) | WordPress Core | 2026-07-21 | 2026-07-17 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0895 | | | [CVE-2026-25089](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25089) | Fortinet FortiSandbox | 2026-07-16 | 2026-06-09 | 37 | 9.8 | 0.2339 | | | [CVE-2026-39808](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39808) | Fortinet FortiSandbox | 2026-07-16 | 2026-04-14 | 93 | 9.8 | 0.4867 | | | [CVE-2026-58644](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58644) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-07-16 | 2026-07-14 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0130 | | | [CVE-2023-4346](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4346) | KNX Association KNX Protocol Connection Authorization Option 1 | 2026-07-15 | 2023-08-29 | 1051 | 7.5 | 0.0048 | | | [CVE-2026-46817](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46817) | Oracle E-Business Suite | 2026-07-15 | 2026-05-28 | 48 | 9.8 | 0.0068 | | | [CVE-2026-15409](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15409) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-15410](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15410) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-56155](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56155) | Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-56164](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56164) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2008-4128](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4128) | Cisco IOS | 2026-07-13 | 2008-09-18 | 6507 | 8.1 | 0.1204 | | | [CVE-2026-48939](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48939) | iCagenda iCagenda | 2026-07-10 | 2026-06-20 | 20 | 9.8 | 0.0056 | | | [CVE-2026-56291](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56291) | Balbooa Forms | 2026-07-10 | 2026-07-09 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-48282](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48282) | Adobe ColdFusion | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-30 | 7 | 10 | 0.0102 | | | [CVE-2026-48908](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48908) | JoomShaper SP Page Builder | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-20 | 17 | 9.8 | 0.0080 | | | [CVE-2026-55255](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255) | Langflow Langflow | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-23 | 14 | 8.4 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-56290](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56290) | Joomlack Page Builder | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-29 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.0036 | | | [CVE-2026-45659](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45659) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-07-01 | 2026-05-22 | 40 | 8.8 | 0.0278 | known | 26 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-20316: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20316 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-68686: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68686 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-16812: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16812 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-16232: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16232 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-50522: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50522 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-07/ --- # 31 KEV additions in August 2026, median 18 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, AUGUST 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 31 CVEs to the KEV catalog in August 2026. The median was listed 18 days after NVD publication; 35.5 percent within a week. 3.2 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 75 percent of the 28 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, August 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-66384 (JFrog Artifactory) was listed on 27 Aug 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0026 and CVSS 5.3. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-81578](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81578) | PaperCut NG/MF | 2026-08-31 | 2026-08-28 | 3 | 9.8 | 0.0039 | | | [CVE-2026-82078](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82078) | PaperCut NG/MF | 2026-08-31 | 2026-08-28 | 3 | 9.1 | 0.0046 | | | [CVE-2023-49105](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49105) | ownCloud ownCloud | 2026-08-27 | 2023-11-21 | 1010 | 9.8 | 0.1107 | | | [CVE-2026-53362](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53362) | Linux Kernel | 2026-08-27 | 2026-07-04 | 54 | 7.8 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-66384](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66384) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-08-27 | 2026-08-12 | 15 | 5.3 | 0.0026 | | | [CVE-2015-3246](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3246) | Red Hat Libuser | 2026-08-26 | 2015-08-11 | 4033 | 7.4 | 0.0709 | | | [CVE-2015-5287](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5287) | Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool | 2026-08-26 | 2015-12-07 | 3915 | 7.8 | 0.0341 | | | [CVE-2019-1068](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1068) | Microsoft SQL Server | 2026-08-26 | 2019-07-15 | 2599 | 8.8 | 0.4466 | | | [CVE-2021-23758](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23758) | Ajax.NET Professional Ajax.NET Professional | 2026-08-26 | 2021-12-03 | 1727 | 9.8 | 0.8910 | | | [CVE-2022-0995](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0995) | Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | 2022-03-25 | 1615 | 7.8 | 0.0634 | | | [CVE-2026-8452](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8452) | Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway | 2026-08-26 | 2026-06-30 | 57 | 9.8 | 0.0104 | | | [CVE-2026-60004](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60004) | Gitea Gitea | 2026-08-25 | 2026-08-26 | -1 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21962](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21962) | Oracle HTTP Server and Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in | 2026-08-24 | 2026-01-20 | 216 | 10 | 0.4323 | | | [CVE-2026-73570](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73570) | Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) | 2026-08-21 | 2026-08-13 | 8 | 8.9 | 0.0054 | | | [CVE-2026-72529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72529) | TrueConf Server | 2026-08-20 | 2026-08-19 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-72530](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72530) | TrueConf Server | 2026-08-20 | 2026-08-19 | 1 | 9 | 0.0034 | | | [CVE-2026-64849](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64849) | MLflow MLflow | 2026-08-19 | 2026-08-17 | 2 | 9.3 | 0.0111 | | | [CVE-2026-33824](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824) | Microsoft Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions | 2026-08-18 | 2026-04-14 | 126 | 9.8 | 0.5585 | | | [CVE-2026-55040](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55040) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-08-18 | 2026-07-14 | 35 | 9.1 | 0.0397 | | | [CVE-2026-59310](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59310) | Broadcom VMware vCenter | 2026-08-18 | 2026-07-30 | 19 | 9.8 | 0.0114 | known | | [CVE-2026-65400](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65400) | Apple macOS | 2026-08-18 | 2026-08-06 | 12 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | | | [CVE-2025-62593](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62593) | Ray-Project Ray | 2026-08-17 | 2025-11-26 | 264 | 8.8 | 0.0037 | | | [CVE-2026-20349](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20349) | Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-11 | 0 | 8.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-68820](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68820) | Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-11 | 0 | 7 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-72898](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72898) | Metabase Metabase | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-10 | 1 | 10 | 0.0069 | | | [CVE-2026-8037](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8037) | Progress LoadMaster | 2026-08-07 | 2026-06-04 | 64 | 9.8 | 0.8479 | | | [CVE-2026-63077](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63077) | JetBrains TeamCity | 2026-08-05 | 2026-07-27 | 9 | 9.8 | 0.0065 | known | | [CVE-2026-18556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18556) | N-able N-central | 2026-08-04 | 2026-08-01 | 3 | 7.4 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-34486](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34486) | Apache Tomcat | 2026-08-04 | 2026-04-09 | 117 | 7.5 | 0.4263 | | | [CVE-2026-9198](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9198) | IBM Langflow | 2026-08-04 | 2026-07-17 | 18 | 9.8 | 0.0189 | | | [CVE-2026-18577](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18577) | N-able N-central | 2026-08-03 | 2026-08-02 | 1 | 8.1 | 0.0148 | | 31 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-81578: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81578 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-82078: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82078 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2023-49105: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49105 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-53362: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53362 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-66384: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66384 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-08/ --- # 43 KEV additions in September 2026, median 3 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, SEPTEMBER 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 43 CVEs to the KEV catalog in September 2026. The median was listed 3 days after NVD publication; 58.1 percent within a week. 7 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 96.9 percent of the 32 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, September 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-58704 (Google Pixel) was listed on 16 Sep 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0011 and CVSS 8.8. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-76504](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76504) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-09-30 | 2026-09-30 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-86950](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86950) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-09-29 | 2026-09-28 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0081 | | | [CVE-2026-88771](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88771) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-27 | 2026-09-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-88772](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88772) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-27 | 2026-09-27 | 0 | 8.1 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-65660](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65660) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-09-25 | 2026-08-11 | 45 | 8.8 | 0.0122 | | | [CVE-2026-67279](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67279) | MikroTik RouterOS | 2026-09-25 | 2026-09-05 | 20 | 6.5 | 0.0071 | | | [CVE-2026-87902](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87902) | WordPress Core | 2026-09-25 | 2026-09-22 | 3 | 8.1 | 0.0288 | | | [CVE-2026-5430](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5430) | WSO2 Multiple Products | 2026-09-24 | 2026-08-06 | 49 | 10 | 0.0037 | | | [CVE-2026-71362](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71362) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-09-24 | 2026-08-11 | 44 | 9.1 | 0.0233 | | | [CVE-2026-85102](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85102) | Check Point Multiple Products | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-09 | 13 | 9.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2026-93616](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93616) | Check Point Multiple Products | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-22 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-93952](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93952) | Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-22 | 0 | 10 | 0.0042 | | | [CVE-2026-94127](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94127) | F5 BIG-IP APM | 2026-09-22 | 2026-09-22 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-7273](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7273) | Zyxel GS1900 Series Switches | 2026-09-21 | 2026-06-16 | 97 | 8.8 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2025-39682](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39682) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2025-09-05 | 378 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | | | [CVE-2025-39964](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39964) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2025-10-13 | 340 | 5.5 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-53266](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53266) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2026-06-25 | 85 | 8.8 | 0.0012 | | | [CVE-2026-58704](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58704) | Google Pixel | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-15 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0011 | | | [CVE-2026-76460](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76460) | Cisco Identity Services Engine | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-16 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-87886](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87886) | Acronis Backup | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-17 | -1 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76461](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76461) | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | 2026-09-14 | 2026-09-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42016](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42016) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-09-11 | 2026-07-27 | 46 | 8.8 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-42018](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42018) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-09-11 | 2026-08-12 | 30 | 7.5 | 0.0035 | | | [CVE-2026-84869](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84869) | ConnectWise ScreenConnect | 2026-09-11 | 2026-09-08 | 3 | 9.9 | 0.0038 | | | [CVE-2026-85706](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85706) | GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition | 2026-09-11 | 2026-09-12 | -1 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-67277](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67277) | MikroTik RouterOS | 2026-09-10 | 2026-09-05 | 5 | 8.2 | 0.0043 | | | [CVE-2026-86060](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86060) | MikroTik RouterOS | 2026-09-10 | 2026-09-05 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2025-25249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25249) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-09-09 | 2026-01-13 | 239 | 9.8 | 0.0076 | | | [CVE-2026-19490](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19490) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-09 | 2026-08-19 | 21 | 9.8 | 0.0337 | | | [CVE-2026-20079](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20079) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) and Security Cloud Control (SCC) Firewall Management | 2026-09-09 | 2026-03-04 | 189 | 10 | 0.3595 | | | [CVE-2026-87491](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87491) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-09-09 | 2026-09-09 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0029 | | | [CVE-2026-75650](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-07 | 1 | 10 | 0.0068 | | | [CVE-2026-81963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81963) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-08 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-85880](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85880) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-08 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-86218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86218) | N-able N-central | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-06 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0041 | | | [CVE-2026-85046](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85046) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-09-04 | 2026-09-03 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0046 | | | [CVE-2026-48710](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48710) | Kludex Starlette | 2026-09-02 | 2026-05-26 | 99 | 6.5 | 0.0210 | | | [CVE-2026-49869](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49869) | Kestra Kestra OSS | 2026-09-02 | 2026-06-26 | 68 | 10 | 0.0099 | | | [CVE-2026-59822](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59822) | BerriAI LiteLLM | 2026-09-02 | 2026-07-08 | 56 | 8.2 | 0.0052 | | | [CVE-2026-82329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82329) | JFrog Artifactory | 2026-09-02 | 2026-08-28 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0124 | | | [CVE-2026-83548](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83548) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-01 | 1 | 10 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-83549](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83549) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-01 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0092 | | | [CVE-2026-9586](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9586) | Sangoma Switchvox | 2026-09-02 | 2026-07-17 | 47 | 9.8 | 0.0109 | | 43 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-76504: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76504 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-86950: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86950 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-88771: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88771 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-88772: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88772 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-65660: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65660 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-09/ --- # 36 KEV additions in October 2026, median 9.5 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, OCTOBER 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 36 CVEs to the KEV catalog in October 2026. The median was listed 9.5 days after NVD publication; 47.2 percent within a week. 22.2 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 70 percent of the 30 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, October 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-110936 (Siemens Software Center) was listed on 20 Oct 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0014 and CVSS 6.7. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-111357](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111357) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-10-15 | 15 | 7 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-118527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-11-03 | -4 | 4.3 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76418](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418) | Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software | 2026-10-29 | 2026-10-28 | 1 | 8.6 | 0.0057 | | | [CVE-2026-97229](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97229) | GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition | 2026-10-29 | 2026-10-13 | 16 | 10 | 0.1843 | | | [CVE-2026-41709](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709) | Broadcom VMware ESX | 2026-10-28 | 2026-07-30 | 90 | 2.7 | 0.0030 | | | [CVE-2026-46300](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46300) | Linux Kernel | 2026-10-28 | 2026-05-23 | 158 | 7.8 | 0.1019 | | | [CVE-2026-111497](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111497) | Google Brotli | 2026-10-27 | 2026-10-22 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.5548 | | | [CVE-2026-48356](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-10-27 | 2026-07-14 | 105 | 9.3 | 0.3058 | | | [CVE-2026-109618](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618) | PHP Group PHP | 2026-10-26 | 2026-10-21 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.9998 | | | [CVE-2026-109619](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109619) | PHP Group PHP | 2026-10-26 | 2026-10-21 | 5 | 8.1 | 1.0000 | | | [CVE-2026-110447](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110447) | Collabora Collabora Online, Built-in CODE Server | 2026-10-23 | 2026-10-14 | 9 | 9.8 | 0.0123 | | | [CVE-2026-114625](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114625) | Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator | 2026-10-23 | 2026-10-22 | 1 | 9.9 | 0.0056 | | | [CVE-2026-106931](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106931) | EG Secure Solutions SiteGuard Server Edition | 2026-10-20 | 2026-10-14 | 6 | 7.8 | 0.0066 | | | [CVE-2026-110936](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110936) | Siemens Software Center | 2026-10-20 | 2026-10-15 | 5 | 6.7 | 0.0014 | | | [CVE-2026-96652](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96652) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 4.3 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-96654](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96654) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 6.5 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-96655](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96655) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 4.3 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-96656](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96656) | Plex Media Server | 2026-10-20 | 2026-09-23 | 27 | 7.2 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2025-61624](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61624) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-10-16 | 2026-04-14 | 185 | 6.5 | 0.0058 | | | [CVE-2026-102764](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102764) | BeyondTrust Remote Support | 2026-10-16 | 2026-10-15 | 1 | 9.8 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-21589](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21589) | Atlassian Multiple Products | 2026-10-15 | 2026-10-05 | 10 | 7.5 | 0.0278 | | | [CVE-2026-0322](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0322) | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-14 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-105133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105133) | Ahsay AhsayCBS | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-04 | 10 | 7.3 | 0.0038 | | | [CVE-2026-105134](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105134) | Ahsay AhsayCBS | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-04 | 10 | 10 | 0.0184 | | | [CVE-2026-76519](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76519) | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-104935](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104935) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-13 | 2026-10-13 | 0 | 8.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-96951](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96951) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-10-13 | 2026-10-13 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2015-3306](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3306) | ProFTPD ProFTPD | 2026-10-08 | 2015-05-18 | 4161 | 10 | 0.9675 | | | [CVE-2015-5477](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5477) | ISC BIND | 2026-10-08 | 2015-07-29 | 4089 | 7.5 | 0.9128 | | | [CVE-2016-3081](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3081) | Apache Struts | 2026-10-08 | 2016-04-26 | 3817 | 8.1 | 0.9335 | | | [CVE-2021-3199](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3199) | ONLYOFFICE Docs | 2026-10-08 | 2021-01-26 | 2081 | 9.8 | 0.0822 | | | [CVE-2023-22894](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22894) | Strapi Strapi | 2026-10-08 | 2023-04-19 | 1268 | 4.9 | 0.0166 | | | [CVE-2026-88779](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88779) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-10-04 | 2026-10-04 | 0 | 7.5 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-102489](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102489) | Zammad GmbH Zammad | 2026-10-02 | 2026-09-30 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0058 | | | [CVE-2026-102490](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102490) | Zammad GmbH Zammad | 2026-10-02 | 2026-09-30 | 2 | 7.8 | 0.0026 | | | [CVE-2026-104286](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104286) | Fortinet FortiMail | 2026-10-01 | 2026-10-01 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | 36 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [November 2026](/ledger/2026-11/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-111357: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111357 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-118527: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-76418: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-97229: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97229 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-41709: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-10/ --- # 7 KEV additions in November 2026, median 4 days to listing KEV LAG LEDGER, NOVEMBER 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added 7 CVEs to the KEV catalog in November 2026 (a part month in the ledger window). The median was listed 4 days after NVD publication; 85.7 percent within a week. 14.3 percent scored CVSS below 7, and 100 percent of the 6 with an EPSS score that day were below 0.1. *Figure: Days to listing, November 2026* **Lowest EPSS on the day.** CVE-2026-102895 (GPUStack GPUStack) was listed on 9 Nov 2026 with an EPSS score of 0.0033 and CVSS 9.8. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-102895](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895) | GPUStack GPUStack | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-04 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2026-116779](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116779) | SignalWire FreeSwitch | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-05 | 4 | 9.8 | 0.0130 | | | [CVE-2026-123158](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123158) | OpenBSD OpenSSH | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-05 | 4 | 8.1 | 0.0101 | | | [CVE-2026-123218](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123218) | IBM Aspera Faspex | 2026-11-09 | 2026-11-07 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0040 | | | [CVE-2026-19868](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19868) | SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN | 2026-11-06 | 2026-11-06 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2024-27834](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27834) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-11-04 | 2024-05-14 | 904 | 5.5 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-119977](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119977) | WordPress WordPress Core | 2026-11-03 | 2026-10-31 | 3 | 8.1 | 0.0060 | | 7 additions, newest first. - [November 2025](/ledger/2025-11/) - [December 2025](/ledger/2025-12/) - [January 2026](/ledger/2026-01/) - [February 2026](/ledger/2026-02/) - [March 2026](/ledger/2026-03/) - [April 2026](/ledger/2026-04/) - [May 2026](/ledger/2026-05/) - [June 2026](/ledger/2026-06/) - [July 2026](/ledger/2026-07/) - [August 2026](/ledger/2026-08/) - [September 2026](/ledger/2026-09/) - [October 2026](/ledger/2026-10/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-102895: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-116779: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116779 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-123158: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123158 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-123218: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123218 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-19868: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19868 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/2026-11/ --- # 42 Microsoft CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, MICROSOFT, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 42 Microsoft CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 5 days after NVD publication. 11.9 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.1532 across the 24 with a score that day. 4 carry CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-96951](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96951) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-10-13 | 2026-10-13 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-65660](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65660) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-09-25 | 2026-08-11 | 45 | 8.8 | 0.0122 | | | [CVE-2026-81963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81963) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-08 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-85880](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85880) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-08 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2019-1068](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1068) | Microsoft SQL Server | 2026-08-26 | 2019-07-15 | 2599 | 8.8 | 0.4466 | | | [CVE-2026-33824](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824) | Microsoft Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Service Extensions | 2026-08-18 | 2026-04-14 | 126 | 9.8 | 0.5585 | | | [CVE-2026-55040](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55040) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-08-18 | 2026-07-14 | 35 | 9.1 | 0.0397 | | | [CVE-2026-68820](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68820) | Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-11 | 0 | 7 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-50522](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50522) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-07-22 | 2026-07-14 | 8 | 9.8 | 0.2035 | | | [CVE-2026-58644](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58644) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-07-16 | 2026-07-14 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0130 | | | [CVE-2026-56155](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56155) | Microsoft Active Directory Federation Services | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-56164](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56164) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-45659](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45659) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-07-01 | 2026-05-22 | 40 | 8.8 | 0.0278 | known | | [CVE-2008-4250](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4250) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-05-20 | 2008-10-23 | 6418 | 9.8 | 0.9348 | | | [CVE-2009-1537](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1537) | Microsoft DirectX | 2026-05-20 | 2009-05-29 | 6200 | 8.8 | 0.6808 | | | [CVE-2010-0249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0249) | Microsoft Internet Explorer | 2026-05-20 | 2010-01-15 | 5969 | 8.8 | 0.9006 | | | [CVE-2010-0806](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0806) | Microsoft Internet Explorer | 2026-05-20 | 2010-03-10 | 5915 | 8.8 | 0.8948 | | | [CVE-2026-41091](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41091) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-05-20 | 2026-05-20 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-45498](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45498) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-05-20 | 2026-05-20 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-42897](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42897) | Microsoft Microsoft | 2026-05-15 | 2026-05-14 | 1 | 6.1 | 0.0022 | | | [CVE-2026-32202](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32202) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-28 | 2026-04-14 | 14 | 4.3 | 0.0009 | | | [CVE-2026-33825](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33825) | Microsoft Defender | 2026-04-22 | 2026-04-14 | 8 | 7.8 | 0.0006 | known | | [CVE-2009-0238](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0238) | Microsoft Office | 2026-04-14 | 2009-02-25 | 6257 | 8.8 | 0.5718 | | | [CVE-2026-32201](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32201) | Microsoft SharePoint Server | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-14 | 0 | 6.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2012-1854](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1854) | Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) | 2026-04-13 | 2012-07-10 | 5025 | 7.8 | 0.0136 | | | [CVE-2023-21529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21529) | Microsoft Exchange Server | 2026-04-13 | 2023-02-14 | 1154 | 8.8 | 0.3668 | known | | [CVE-2023-36424](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36424) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-13 | 2023-11-14 | 881 | 7.8 | 0.1030 | | | [CVE-2025-60710](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60710) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-04-13 | 2025-11-11 | 153 | 7.8 | 0.0019 | known | | [CVE-2026-20963](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20963) | Microsoft SharePoint | 2026-03-18 | 2026-01-13 | 64 | 9.8 | 0.0163 | | | [CVE-2008-0015](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0015) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-17 | 2009-07-07 | 6069 | 8.8 | 0.8752 | | | [CVE-2024-43468](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43468) | Microsoft Configuration Manager | 2026-02-12 | 2024-10-08 | 492 | 9.8 | 0.7383 | | | [CVE-2026-21510](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21510) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21513](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21513) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21514](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21514) | Microsoft Office | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21519](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21519) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21525](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21525) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 6.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21533](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21533) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-10 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-21509](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21509) | Microsoft Office | 2026-01-26 | 2026-01-26 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20805](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20805) | Microsoft Windows | 2026-01-13 | 2026-01-13 | 0 | 5.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2009-0556](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0556) | Microsoft Office | 2026-01-07 | 2009-04-03 | 6123 | 8.8 | 0.4755 | | | [CVE-2025-62221](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62221) | Microsoft Windows | 2025-12-09 | 2025-12-09 | 0 | 7.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-62215](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62215) | Microsoft Windows | 2025-11-12 | 2025-11-11 | 1 | 7 | 0.0005 | | 42 Microsoft additions. ## Other vendors - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-96951: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96951 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-65660: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65660 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-81963: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81963 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-85880: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85880 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/microsoft/ --- # 21 Cisco CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, CISCO, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 21 Cisco CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 0 days after NVD publication. 14.3 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0040 across the 10 with a score that day. 2 carry CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-76418](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418) | Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software | 2026-10-29 | 2026-10-28 | 1 | 8.6 | 0.0057 | | | [CVE-2026-76519](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76519) | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | 2026-10-14 | 2026-10-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76504](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76504) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-09-30 | 2026-09-30 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76460](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76460) | Cisco Identity Services Engine | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-16 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-76461](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76461) | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | 2026-09-14 | 2026-09-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20079](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20079) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) and Security Cloud Control (SCC) Firewall Management | 2026-09-09 | 2026-03-04 | 189 | 10 | 0.3595 | | | [CVE-2026-20349](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20349) | Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) | 2026-08-11 | 2026-08-11 | 0 | 8.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20316](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20316) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) | 2026-07-29 | 2026-07-29 | 0 | 5.3 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2008-4128](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4128) | Cisco IOS | 2026-07-13 | 2008-09-18 | 6507 | 8.1 | 0.1204 | | | [CVE-2026-20230](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20230) | Cisco Unified Communications Manager | 2026-06-25 | 2026-06-03 | 22 | 8.6 | 0.3416 | | | [CVE-2026-20262](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20262) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-06-15 | 2026-06-15 | 0 | 6.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20245](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20245) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-04 | 5 | 7.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-20182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20182) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN | 2026-05-14 | 2026-05-14 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20122](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20122) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manger | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 5.4 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2026-20128](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20128) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 7.5 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2026-20133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20133) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager | 2026-04-20 | 2026-02-25 | 54 | 7.5 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-20131](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20131) | Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) | 2026-03-19 | 2026-03-04 | 15 | 10 | 0.0057 | known | | [CVE-2022-20775](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20775) | Cisco SD-WAN | 2026-02-25 | 2022-09-30 | 1244 | 7.8 | 0.0023 | | | [CVE-2026-20127](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20127) | Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager | 2026-02-25 | 2026-02-25 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-20045](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20045) | Cisco Unified Communications Manager | 2026-01-21 | 2026-01-21 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-20393](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20393) | Cisco Multiple Products | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-17 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | | 21 Cisco additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-76418: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76418 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-76519: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76519 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-76504: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76504 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-76460: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76460 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/cisco/ --- # 12 Fortinet CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, FORTINET, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 12 Fortinet CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 22 days after NVD publication. 16.7 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0067 across the 8 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2025-61624](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61624) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-10-16 | 2026-04-14 | 185 | 6.5 | 0.0058 | | | [CVE-2026-104286](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104286) | Fortinet FortiMail | 2026-10-01 | 2026-10-01 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-25249](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25249) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-09-09 | 2026-01-13 | 239 | 9.8 | 0.0076 | | | [CVE-2025-68686](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68686) | Fortinet FortiOS | 2026-07-27 | 2026-02-10 | 167 | 5.9 | 0.0048 | | | [CVE-2026-25089](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25089) | Fortinet FortiSandbox | 2026-07-16 | 2026-06-09 | 37 | 9.8 | 0.2339 | | | [CVE-2026-39808](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39808) | Fortinet FortiSandbox | 2026-07-16 | 2026-04-14 | 93 | 9.8 | 0.4867 | | | [CVE-2026-21643](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21643) | Fortinet FortiClient EMS | 2026-04-13 | 2026-02-06 | 66 | 9.8 | 0.1370 | | | [CVE-2026-35616](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35616) | Fortinet FortiClient EMS | 2026-04-06 | 2026-04-04 | 2 | 9.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2026-24858](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24858) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2026-01-27 | 2026-01-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-59718](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59718) | Fortinet Multiple Products | 2025-12-16 | 2025-12-09 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2025-58034](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58034) | Fortinet FortiWeb | 2025-11-18 | 2025-11-18 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-64446](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64446) | Fortinet FortiWeb | 2025-11-14 | 2025-11-14 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | 12 Fortinet additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-61624: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61624 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-104286: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104286 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-25249: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25249 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-68686: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68686 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/fortinet/ --- # 11 Apple CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, APPLE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 11 Apple CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 98 days after NVD publication. 18.2 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0022 across the 10 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2024-27834](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27834) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-11-04 | 2024-05-14 | 904 | 5.5 | 0.0060 | | | [CVE-2026-86950](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86950) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-09-29 | 2026-09-28 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0081 | | | [CVE-2026-65400](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65400) | Apple macOS | 2026-08-18 | 2026-08-06 | 12 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | | | [CVE-2025-31277](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31277) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-07-30 | 233 | 8.8 | 0.0013 | | | [CVE-2025-43510](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43510) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-12-12 | 98 | 7.8 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2025-43520](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43520) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-20 | 2025-12-12 | 98 | 5.5 | 0.0002 | | | [CVE-2021-30952](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30952) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2021-08-24 | 1654 | 7.8 | 0.0033 | | | [CVE-2023-41974](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41974) | Apple iOS and iPadOS | 2026-03-05 | 2024-01-10 | 785 | 7.8 | 0.0031 | | | [CVE-2023-43000](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43000) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-03-05 | 2025-11-05 | 120 | 8.8 | 0.0005 | | | [CVE-2026-20700](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20700) | Apple Multiple Products | 2026-02-12 | 2026-02-11 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0001 | | | [CVE-2025-43529](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43529) | Apple Multiple Products | 2025-12-15 | 2025-12-17 | -2 | 8.8 | no score that day | | 11 Apple additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2024-27834: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27834 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-86950: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86950 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-65400: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65400 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-31277: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31277 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/apple/ --- # 11 Google CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, GOOGLE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 11 Google CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 0 days after NVD publication. 0 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0008 across the 10 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-111497](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111497) | Google Brotli | 2026-10-27 | 2026-10-22 | 5 | 9.8 | 0.5548 | | | [CVE-2026-58704](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58704) | Google Pixel | 2026-09-16 | 2026-09-15 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0011 | | | [CVE-2026-87491](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87491) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-09-09 | 2026-09-09 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0029 | | | [CVE-2026-85046](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85046) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-09-04 | 2026-09-03 | 1 | 8.8 | 0.0046 | | | [CVE-2026-11645](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11645) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-06-09 | 2026-06-09 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-5281](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5281) | Google Dawn | 2026-04-01 | 2026-04-01 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0004 | | | [CVE-2026-3909](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3909) | Google Skia | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-13 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | | [CVE-2026-3910](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3910) | Google Chromium V8 | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-13 | 0 | 8.8 | 0.0008 | | | [CVE-2026-2441](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2441) | Google Chromium | 2026-02-17 | 2026-02-13 | 4 | 8.8 | 0.0003 | | | [CVE-2025-14174](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14174) | Google Chromium | 2025-12-12 | 2025-12-12 | 0 | 8.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2025-13223](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13223) | Google Chromium V8 | 2025-11-19 | 2025-11-17 | 2 | 8.8 | 0.0007 | | 11 Google additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-111497: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111497 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-58704: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58704 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-87491: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87491 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-85046: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85046 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/google/ --- # 9 Linux CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, LINUX, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 9 Linux CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 340 days after NVD publication. 11.1 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0260 across the 9 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-46300](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46300) | Linux Kernel | 2026-10-28 | 2026-05-23 | 158 | 7.8 | 0.1019 | | | [CVE-2025-39682](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39682) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2025-09-05 | 378 | 9.8 | 0.0050 | | | [CVE-2025-39964](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39964) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2025-10-13 | 340 | 5.5 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-53266](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53266) | Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 2026-06-25 | 85 | 8.8 | 0.0012 | | | [CVE-2026-53362](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53362) | Linux Kernel | 2026-08-27 | 2026-07-04 | 54 | 7.8 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2022-0995](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0995) | Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | 2022-03-25 | 1615 | 7.8 | 0.0634 | | | [CVE-2022-0492](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492) | Linux Kernel | 2026-06-02 | 2022-03-03 | 1552 | 7.8 | 0.0524 | | | [CVE-2026-31431](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31431) | Linux Kernel | 2026-05-01 | 2026-04-22 | 9 | 7.8 | 0.0260 | | | [CVE-2018-14634](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14634) | Linux Kernel | 2026-01-26 | 2018-09-25 | 2680 | 7.8 | 0.0373 | | 9 Linux additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-46300: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46300 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-39682: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39682 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2025-39964: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39964 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-53266: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53266 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/linux/ --- # 8 Ivanti CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, IVANTI, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 8 Ivanti CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 1 day after NVD publication. 12.5 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0751 across the 4 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-111357](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111357) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-10-15 | 15 | 7 | 0.0032 | | | [CVE-2026-118527](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-30 | 2026-11-03 | -4 | 4.3 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-104935](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104935) | Ivanti Connect Secure | 2026-10-13 | 2026-10-13 | 0 | 8.6 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-10520](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10520) | Ivanti Sentry | 2026-06-11 | 2026-06-09 | 2 | 10 | 0.0328 | | | [CVE-2026-6973](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6973) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-05-07 | 2026-05-07 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-1340](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1340) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-04-08 | 2026-01-29 | 69 | 9.8 | 0.6774 | | | [CVE-2026-1603](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1603) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) | 2026-03-09 | 2026-02-10 | 27 | 7.5 | 0.1174 | | | [CVE-2026-1281](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1281) | Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) | 2026-01-29 | 2026-01-29 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | 8 Ivanti additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-111357: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111357 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-118527: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-104935: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104935 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-10520: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10520 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/ivanti/ --- # 7 Adobe CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, ADOBE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 7 Adobe CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 44 days after NVD publication. 0 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0233 across the 7 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-48356](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-10-27 | 2026-07-14 | 105 | 9.3 | 0.3058 | | | [CVE-2026-71362](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71362) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-09-24 | 2026-08-11 | 44 | 9.1 | 0.0233 | | | [CVE-2026-75650](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650) | Adobe Commerce and Magento | 2026-09-08 | 2026-09-07 | 1 | 10 | 0.0068 | | | [CVE-2026-48282](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48282) | Adobe ColdFusion | 2026-07-07 | 2026-06-30 | 7 | 10 | 0.0102 | | | [CVE-2009-3459](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3459) | Adobe Acrobat and Reader | 2026-05-20 | 2009-10-13 | 6063 | 8.8 | 0.8702 | | | [CVE-2020-9715](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9715) | Adobe Acrobat | 2026-04-13 | 2020-08-19 | 2063 | 7.8 | 0.5044 | | | [CVE-2026-34621](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34621) | Adobe Acrobat and Reader | 2026-04-13 | 2026-04-11 | 2 | 8.6 | 0.0004 | | 7 Adobe additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-48356: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-71362: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71362 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-75650: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-48282: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48282 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/adobe/ --- # 6 Citrix CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, CITRIX, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 6 Citrix CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 3.5 days after NVD publication. 0 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0066 across the 4 with a score that day. None carries CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-88779](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88779) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-10-04 | 2026-10-04 | 0 | 7.5 | 0.0028 | | | [CVE-2026-88771](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88771) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-27 | 2026-09-27 | 0 | 9.8 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-88772](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88772) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-27 | 2026-09-27 | 0 | 8.1 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-19490](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19490) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-09-09 | 2026-08-19 | 21 | 9.8 | 0.0337 | | | [CVE-2026-8452](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8452) | Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway | 2026-08-26 | 2026-06-30 | 57 | 9.8 | 0.0104 | | | [CVE-2026-3055](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3055) | Citrix NetScaler | 2026-03-30 | 2026-03-23 | 7 | 9.8 | 0.0003 | | 6 Citrix additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [SonicWall](/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-88779: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88779 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-88771: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88771 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-88772: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88772 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-19490: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19490 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/citrix/ --- # 6 SonicWall CVEs reached the KEV catalog in twelve months KEV LAG LEDGER, SONICWALL, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA listed 6 SonicWall CVEs between 10 Nov 2025 and 9 Nov 2026, a median 0 days after NVD publication. 16.7 percent scored CVSS below 7; the median EPSS on the day of listing was 0.0059 across the 2 with a score that day. 2 carry CISA's known ransomware flag. | CVE | Vendor and product | Added to KEV | NVD published | Days | CVSS | EPSS on listing day | Ransomware | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [CVE-2026-19868](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19868) | SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN | 2026-11-06 | 2026-11-06 | 0 | 7.5 | no score that day | | | [CVE-2026-83548](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83548) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-01 | 1 | 10 | 0.0027 | | | [CVE-2026-83549](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83549) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-01 | 1 | 7.8 | 0.0092 | | | [CVE-2026-15409](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15409) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 10 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2026-15410](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15410) | SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances | 2026-07-14 | 2026-07-14 | 0 | 7.2 | no score that day | known | | [CVE-2025-40602](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40602) | SonicWall SMA1000 appliance | 2025-12-17 | 2025-12-18 | -1 | 6.6 | no score that day | | 6 SonicWall additions. ## Other vendors - [Microsoft](/ledger/vendor/microsoft/) - [Cisco](/ledger/vendor/cisco/) - [Fortinet](/ledger/vendor/fortinet/) - [Apple](/ledger/vendor/apple/) - [Google](/ledger/vendor/google/) - [Linux](/ledger/vendor/linux/) - [Ivanti](/ledger/vendor/ivanti/) - [Adobe](/ledger/vendor/adobe/) - [Citrix](/ledger/vendor/citrix/) ## Sources - CISA KEV catalog JSON: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-19868: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19868 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-83548: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83548 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-83549: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83549 (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD record for CVE-2026-15409: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15409 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/vendor/sonicwall/ --- # CVSS v3.1 scores how severe a flaw is in itself, not how likely anyone is to exploit it SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS v3.1 is the FIRST severity score from 0.0 to 10.0, built from eight base metrics and a published formula. It measures technical severity, not exploitation. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 313 of 318 listings carry a v3.1 score, and 10.4 percent of the 318 score below 7.0. - **Maintained by:** FIRST, through the CVSS Special Interest Group - **Scale:** 0.0 to 10.0; None 0.0, Low 0.1 to 3.9, Medium 4.0 to 6.9, High 7.0 to 8.9, Critical 9.0 to 10.0 - **Current version:** v3.1 (kept as an archive on first.org; v4.0 followed on 2023-11-01) - **Updated:** Static specification; scores are set per CVE by the CNA or NVD - **Answers:** The severity of a flaw if it is exploited, in the reasonable worst case ## What the score is CVSS v3.1 is a published scoring method. The specification at first.org states that its outputs are "numerical scores indicating the severity of a vulnerability relative to other vulnerabilities" and that it has three metric groups: Base, Temporal and Environmental. The Base Score reflects intrinsic characteristics that stay constant over time and assumes the reasonable worst case impact across deployed environments. A v3.1 score is therefore a statement about the flaw, not about an attacker or an organization. Two vulnerabilities with the same vector string score the same whether one is under mass exploitation and the other has never been seen outside a lab. That is the design, and it is also the reason a program cannot rank by this number alone. ## The formula The Base Score depends on three sub-formulas, quoted here from section 7.1 of the specification. ISS = 1 - [(1 - Confidentiality) x (1 - Integrity) x (1 - Availability)]. Impact is 6.42 x ISS when Scope is Unchanged, and 7.52 x (ISS - 0.029) - 3.25 x (ISS - 0.02)^15 when Scope is Changed. Exploitability = 8.22 x AttackVector x AttackComplexity x PrivilegesRequired x UserInteraction. BaseScore is 0 if Impact is 0 or less. Otherwise, with Scope Unchanged, it is Roundup(Minimum[(Impact + Exploitability), 10]); with Scope Changed, it is Roundup(Minimum[1.08 x (Impact + Exploitability), 10]). Roundup returns the smallest number, to one decimal place, that is equal to or higher than its input. Worked example from the Table 16 constants: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H gives ISS = 1 - 0.44 x 0.44 x 0.44 = 0.9148, Impact = 6.42 x 0.9148 = 5.873, Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.85 x 0.85 = 3.887, sum 9.76, rounded up to 9.8. Appendix A of the specification addresses a practical trap. Roundup is defined as the smallest number, to one decimal place, that is equal to or higher than its input, and the appendix gives advice to implementers on avoiding small floating point inaccuracies that can push a result up by 0.1. An analyst who re-derives scores in a spreadsheet to answer an auditor should follow that advice, or the check will disagree with the scanner on a few vectors. | Metric | Values and constants (Table 16) | | --- | --- | | Attack Vector | Network 0.85, Adjacent 0.62, Local 0.55, Physical 0.2 | | Attack Complexity | Low 0.77, High 0.44 | | Privileges Required | None 0.85, Low 0.62 (0.68 if Scope Changed), High 0.27 (0.5 if Scope Changed) | | User Interaction | None 0.85, Required 0.62 | | Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability | High 0.56, Low 0.22, None 0 | ## Temporal and environmental layers The specification adds two optional layers. TemporalScore = Roundup(BaseScore x ExploitCodeMaturity x RemediationLevel x ReportConfidence), so a temporal score can only hold the base score or lower it. The Environmental Score recomputes the formula with Modified Base metrics and security requirements that the consumer sets. The ledger on this site uses the NVD base score, so the layers are outside its figures. The exploit code maturity input is the only place where v3.1 touches exploitation at all, and it is a value someone has to set and keep current. ## What the KEV Lag Ledger shows about it The KEV Lag Ledger covers the 318 CISA KEV additions from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09. Each has a CVSS score taken from the NVD record, v3.1 first. Of the 318, 313 are v3.1 and 5 are v3.0. The median score is 8.8, 45.9 percent (146) score 9.0 or above, and 285 (89.6 percent) score 7.0 or above. That leaves 33 listings, 10.4 percent, with a score below 7.0. A program that treated CVSS High and Critical as the whole queue would have held back one in ten of the vulnerabilities CISA confirmed as exploited. It would also have queued far more than it needed: the same ledger shows that of the 123 listings scored 9.0 or above that had an EPSS value on listing day, 88 (71.5 percent) sat below 0.1. The distribution is also narrow at the bottom. Only one of the 318 listings has a score below 4.0. The 33 below 7.0 are therefore almost all Medium. A policy that sets the remediation floor at High would have excluded those 33 from its fastest queue, while a policy that adds KEV membership as an override would have captured them on the day CISA listed them. ## Where it fits in a ranking Use v3.1 for what it states: the technical consequence and the conditions of the attack. It is a sound input to a severity floor, to a service level by asset tier, and to the question an auditor asks first, which is how the score was derived. It is a weak input to the question of what attackers are doing this week. FIRST publishes both specifications, so a program has to decide which one its policy cites. State the version in the policy text, because scores under the two methods are different measurements. See the CVSS v3.1 against v4.0 page for how they differ. For the auditor, the record of a CVSS-based decision is short: the version, the vector string, the computed value, the source of the vector (NVD or a named CNA), and the date it was read. With those five fields, anyone can recompute the value from the Table 16 constants and confirm it. ## Limits to state in the policy First, the score is assigned by people. The specification itself describes the qualitative rating bands as optional, and states that there is no requirement to publish them. Second, the base metrics assume the worst reasonable case, so they cannot account for a deployment where the vulnerable function is disabled. Third, v3.1 is a frozen version. FIRST now documents v4.0 with a new Threat group and nomenclature (CVSS-B, CVSS-BT, CVSS-BE, CVSS-BTE) that v3.1 does not use. Labeling a number as v3.1 Base, with the vector string beside it, removes most arguments about what it means. A fourth limit concerns change. A CNA or the NVD can rescore a CVE after publication, so the value read on one date can differ from the value read later. Store the read date, as this site does for every figure. ## Comparisons with this system - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification document (sections 5, 7.1, 7.4, Table 16): https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 specification document (nomenclature, version history): https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD news and updates: https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/cvss-v3-1/ --- # CVSS v4.0 adds a Threat group and sharper nomenclature, but the score the NVD shows is still mostly the Base score SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS v4.0, published by FIRST on 2023-11-01, keeps the 0.0 to 10.0 scale and adds Attack Requirements, a Threat group and a Supplemental group. Scores come from 270 expert-ranked MacroVectors, not from the v3.1 formula. NVD corrected about 4,500 v4.0 records in April 2026. - **Maintained by:** FIRST, through the CVSS Special Interest Group - **Scale:** 0.0 to 10.0; same qualitative bands as v3.1 (Low 0.1 to 3.9 up to Critical 9.0 to 10.0) - **Current version:** v4.0 (v1.2 of the specification document, 2024-06-18) - **Updated:** Specification versions 1.0 on 2023-11-01, 1.1 on 2023-11-09, 1.2 on 2024-06-18 - **Answers:** The severity of a flaw, adjusted for current threat evidence ## What changed from v3.1 The v4.0 specification states that CVSS consists of four metric groups: Base, Threat, Environmental and Supplemental. The Base group represents intrinsic qualities that are constant over time and across environments. The Threat group reflects characteristics that change over time. The Environmental group captures what is unique to a user's environment. The Supplemental group adds extrinsic information that does not change the score. The Base group gains Attack Requirements (AT), which captures prerequisite deployment and execution conditions, and replaces v3.1 Scope with separate impact metrics for the vulnerable system (VC, VI, VA) and for subsequent systems (SC, SI, SA). User Interaction becomes None, Passive or Active. The Supplemental group is worth separate mention, because it does not move the score. The specification lists Automatable, Recovery, Value Density, Vulnerability Response Effort and Provider Urgency among its metrics, and says consumers may give them more, less or no effect on categorization. Automatable asks whether an attacker can automate exploitation events across multiple targets, and it is the same concept that the CISA SSVC tree uses as a decision point. ## How the score is computed v4.0 has no closed formula like the v3.1 one. The specification describes scoring using MacroVectors and interpolation: the 15 million CVSS-BTE vectors are gathered into 270 disjoint equivalence sets of comparable qualitative severity, experts compared vectors from each set, and the comparison data was used to order the vectors from least to most severe. A lookup then returns a score for the MacroVector, and interpolation adjusts within it. The practical consequence is that an analyst cannot reproduce a v4.0 score by hand from a short formula. A calculator or a published implementation is required. This is a real difference for an auditor, who in v3.1 could check the arithmetic with the constants in Table 16. The Base Score documented by FIRST assumes the highest severity for the Threat and Environmental metrics when they are not set. A score with only Base metrics is therefore CVSS-B, a worst-case figure, and the specification asks that it be labeled that way. ## The Threat group and the nomenclature The Threat group has one metric, Exploit Maturity (E), described as based on exploit techniques, exploit code availability or active in-the-wild exploitation. When it is not defined the score assumes the highest severity, so a missing value does not lower anything. The specification also requires labeling: because a numerical score means different things depending on the metrics used, scores should carry nomenclature. CVSS-B is Base only, CVSS-BT is Base and Threat, CVSS-BE is Base and Environmental, and CVSS-BTE is all three. A score printed without that label cannot be compared with another. For a program, the nomenclature is the main practical change. A report column headed CVSS has no meaning in v4.0 unless it says which of the four labels applies. When the NVD or a CNA publishes only Base metrics, the honest label is CVSS-B 4.0. | Label | Metrics used | | --- | --- | | CVSS-B | Base | | CVSS-BT | Base and Threat | | CVSS-BE | Base and Environmental | | CVSS-BTE | Base, Threat and Environmental | ## What the NVD publishes The NVD news page records an April 2026 incident. On 2026-04-28 NIST announced that about 4,500 CVE records, 19 percent of the records with a v4.0 score, carried a numerical score higher than the correctly calculated value, and fewer than 30 carried a lower one. Only the numerical scores were affected. NIST said it would run a correction script on 2026-04-28 at 9:00 pm EDT and update the modified date on each record. The same page records the NVD policy change of 2026-04-15: the NVD will no longer routinely provide its own severity score for CVEs where the CNA has already provided one. A v4.0 number in a feed may therefore come from the CNA, not NIST. A program that ingests scores should store the source field next to the value. Reproduction matters for an audit. The specification points to Section 2.5 of the User Guide for the MacroVector approach, and FIRST provides a calculator and a JSON and XML data representation for exchanging scores. Check that a tool's v4.0 output matches the FIRST calculator on a sample of vectors before trusting a bulk import. ## What the KEV Lag Ledger shows In the ledger of 318 KEV additions (2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09), the CVSS field is v3.1 for 313 rows and v3.0 for 5. None of the 318 selects a v4.0 score under the ledger rule of v3.1, then v3.0, then v4.0, then v2. That rule was chosen so that a single comparable number exists for every row, and it means this site's severity statistics describe the v3 family. For a program that has moved its policy to v4.0, the check is to rerun the same cut: how many exploited vulnerabilities fall below your v4.0 cutoff. The method is in the ledger introduction. The v3 result of 10.4 percent below 7.0 is a starting point, not a measurement of v4.0. ## Using it in a ranking Cite the version and the nomenclature in policy: for example, CVSS-BT 4.0 with the vector string. Use Threat only when a named, dated source sets Exploit Maturity, such as KEV membership. Treat Supplemental values (Automatable, Safety, Provider Urgency) as context for a human reviewer. Do not mix v3.1 and v4.0 scores in one sorted list. The scales and the qualitative bands are the same, but the scoring methods differ, so a single vulnerability can land in a different band under each. Adopt v4.0 when the sources you rely on publish it. Where a feed carries both versions, record both and name the one the policy uses. Re-check the NVD source field before importing, given the April 2026 correction. ## Comparisons with this system - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 specification document (metric groups, nomenclature, MacroVectors, version history): https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD news: v4.0 score correction (2026-04-28) and enrichment policy (2026-04-15): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/cvss-v4-0/ --- # EPSS gives a daily probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, and most KEV entries score low on the day they are listed SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** EPSS, from the FIRST EPSS SIG, is a machine-learning probability from 0 to 1 that a published CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days, refreshed daily. In the KEV Lag Ledger the median EPSS on listing day was 0.0066, and 75.8 percent of 260 scored listings sat below 0.1. - **Maintained by:** FIRST EPSS Special Interest Group; scores generated by Empirical Security - **Scale:** Probability 0 to 1, with a percentile for every CVE - **Current version:** Model v2026.06.15 (version 5 per FIRST research page), per the CSV header on 2026-11-10 - **Updated:** Daily, typically a minute or two after 13:30 UTC - **Answers:** The likelihood of exploitation in the wild in the next 30 days, across all organizations ## What it is FIRST describes EPSS as a data-driven machine-learning model that estimates the probability that a published CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days. It publishes a probability between 0 and 1, with ranking percentiles, every day for every CVE, free through CSV, an API and a GitHub repository. The CSV file carries its own version on the first line. On 2026-11-10 the header read #model_version:v2026.06.15, with a score_date of 2026-11-10. The FAQ states that retraining has occurred approximately annually and is triggered by sustained drift toward the random baseline, measured by comparing scores from 30 days earlier with the exploitation seen in the following 30 days. The data sit in a public repository as well, which allows historical scores to be pulled by date. This site's ledger uses that: the FIRST API call returns the score and percentile for a given CVE and date, and the ledger asks for the dateAdded of each KEV entry. The result is the score as published that day, not the later score. ## Inputs and method The How It Works page states that each daily record is built from approximately 2,850 features, including exploit code and offensive tooling, and that EPSS draws on nearly a dozen separate sources of exploitation activity across four sensor types. FIRST names VulnCheck KEV, the Shadow Server Foundation and LevelBlue as data partners, among others. Two details matter to an auditor. Exploitation activity trains the model but does not drive daily scoring, so a confirmed event does not move tomorrow's score directly. And the training data and operational pipeline are not published, because data partners share telemetry under agreements that prohibit redistribution. The inputs, architecture and held-out performance are documented; the pipeline is not. ## Reading probability and percentile The FIRST article on probability and percentile bins gives the working example. A score of 0.10 sits in the 88th percentile, the top 12 percent of 170,000 or more scored vulnerabilities, even though 10 percent is a low absolute probability. Out of vulnerabilities at 10 percent, about 1 in 10 is expected to be exploited in the next 30 days. FIRST's guidance is to communicate the probability as the EPSS score and to show the percentile beside it, for example 15.3% (92nd). The EPSS SIG does not bin scores into labels, because bin cutoffs are subjective and compress scores that differ by 0.002 into opposite categories. A program that adds its own bins should record the cutoff and who set it. A related point from the same article: percentiles are calculated over every published CVE, so the percentile for a subset of vulnerabilities in your environment changes while the probability does not. If a report shows percentiles, state the population they were computed over. ## What the KEV Lag Ledger shows Among the 318 KEV additions in the ledger window, 260 had an EPSS value from the FIRST API on the day CISA listed them. The other 58 had none that day, which is typical of a CVE only a day or two old. For the 260, the median EPSS on listing day was 0.0066 (0.006555), and 75.8 percent (197) were below 0.1. The upper end is large too: 63 listings (24.2 percent) were at or above 0.1, 34 (13.1 percent) at or above 0.5, and 75 (28.8 percent) in the 90th percentile or higher. A threshold of 0.1 on listing day would have flagged one in four of these confirmed vulnerabilities and missed three of every four. This is a listing-day snapshot and does not measure the 30 days before it. ## Documented limits The How It Works page lists its own limits. Scores are population-level and not tailored to an organization or technology stack. Newly disclosed vulnerabilities have sparse signals, so a score on day one is thin. Training labels reflect only exploitation that data partners can observe. FIRST also states that a low score is not a declaration of safety: across 10,000 vulnerabilities at 5 percent, about 500 exploitation events are expected. The Using EPSS page adds two rules for a policy. Do not multiply EPSS by an ordinal such as CVSS to produce a combined score; FIRST calls that score laundering. And when a vulnerability appears on KEV, treat it as actively exploited regardless of its EPSS score. The FAQ also answers a question auditors ask: how often scores are generated. Daily, typically within a minute or two after 13:30 UTC. A dashboard that refreshes EPSS weekly is showing stale values, and a policy should state the refresh interval it actually uses. ## Using it in a ranking Use the probability for the large population KEV does not cover. The Using EPSS page puts the base rate of exploitation at roughly 2 to 3 percent, and note that half of published vulnerabilities score above about 0.7 percent, so a threshold needs to be set from the distribution, not from intuition. Pair it with KEV: KEV answers what has already happened, EPSS what is likely next. See the pages comparing EPSS with CVSS and with KEV for the combinations, and the SSVC page for how CERT/CC and CISA propose feeding EPSS into a decision tree. Thresholds are a program decision with a cost on each side. The How It Works page frames the choice as coverage against efficiency: a lower threshold flags more vulnerabilities and captures more of the exploited ones, at the cost of effort spent on vulnerabilities never exploited. Record the threshold, the date it was chosen and the coverage you accepted. ## Comparisons with this system - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, EPSS home: https://www.first.org/epss/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, How EPSS works (features, limitations): https://www.first.org/epss/how-it-works (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS (thresholds, misuses, KEV guidance): https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Probability, percentile and bins: https://www.first.org/epss/articles/prob_percentile_bins (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS FAQ (daily publication, retraining): https://www.first.org/epss/faq (read 10 Nov 2026) - EPSS daily CSV (model version header, 2026-11-10): https://epss.cyentia.com/epss_scores-current.csv.gz (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/epss/ --- # The CISA KEV catalog is the one list of vulnerabilities with evidence of exploitation, and it lists after the fact, not before SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog lists CVEs with reliable evidence of active exploitation. It held 1,779 entries on 2026-11-10. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 318 were added over 365 days, with a median of 10.5 days from NVD publication to listing and 17.3 percent published over a year earlier. - **Maintained by:** CISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) - **Scale:** Binary: listed or not listed; fields include dateAdded, dueDate, knownRansomwareCampaignUse - **Current version:** Catalog version 2026.11.10, 1,779 entries (JSON feed read 2026-11-10) - **Updated:** On each addition; the feed carries catalogVersion and dateReleased - **Answers:** Whether there is reliable evidence that a CVE is being exploited in the wild ## What it is and what the law says BOD 22-01, issued 2021-11-03, was the original KEV directive and is now superseded. It established the catalog and stated that CISA would determine inclusion based on reliable evidence that the exploit is being actively used to exploit public or private organizations by a threat actor. It set default remediation times of two weeks, and six months for CVEs assigned before 2021. On 2026-06-10 CISA issued BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, the directive now in force. It states that it supersedes and revokes BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01. The catalog continues: BOD 26-04 requires agencies to monitor KEV updates and remediate in accordance with the KEV remediation timelines. For federal readers this changes the citation, not the catalog. The catalog URL and the JSON feed are separate things. The feed is the machine-readable file this site fetched; the web page presents the same entries with filters. For reproducible work, cite the feed and the catalogVersion. ## The data in the feed The JSON feed at cisa.gov carries a title, catalogVersion, dateReleased and a count, followed by the entries. On 2026-11-10 the catalogVersion was 2026.11.10 and the count was 1,779. Each entry has cveID, vendorProject, product, vulnerabilityName, dateAdded, shortDescription, requiredAction, dueDate, knownRansomwareCampaignUse, notes and cwes. The feed has changed with BOD 26-04. Current entries also carry a forensicTriage field: on 2026-11-10, 103 of the 1,779 entries had the value Yes. In the 92 entries added from 2026-09-01 through 2026-11-10, 70 have a dueDate 3 days after dateAdded and 22 have one 14 days after, computed from the feed. The older two-week default is no longer the only deadline. The ransomware field has two values in the data read: Known and Unknown. On 2026-11-10 the feed showed 361 entries marked Known out of 1,779, about 20 percent of the catalog. Among the 318 additions in the ledger window the share is 29, or 9.1 percent, lower than the whole catalog, and the field can be updated after an entry is listed. ## How BOD 26-04 uses it BOD 26-04 sets remediation urgency from four variables: asset exposure, KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact. CISA states that it publishes KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact for every CVE through the Vulnrichment program, and that agencies answer exposure themselves. The CERT/CC SSVC documentation describes the same four decision points as the CISA Response Timeline decision tree. The outcomes are Fix on system upgrade, 60 days, 14 days, 3 days, and 3 days with forensic investigation. KEV is a decision point inside the tree, not the whole tree: a KEV entry on an internal asset with low impact can land on a different timeline than one on an internet-facing asset with total control. | Outcome (SSVC key) | Definition | | --- | --- | | Fix on system upgrade (FSU) | Remediate at the next scheduled major upgrade or rebuild | | 60 days (60D) | Remediate within 60 days | | 14 days (14D) | Remediate within 14 days | | 3 days (3D) | Remediate within 3 days | | 3 days and forensic investigation (3DF) | Remediate within 3 days and carry out a forensic triage of the asset | ## What the KEV Lag Ledger measures The ledger takes every KEV entry with a dateAdded in the 365 days to the 2026-11-09 release: 318 additions. For each it takes the NVD published date and computes days from publication to listing in UTC calendar days. The median is 10.5 days. 144 additions (45.3 percent) were listed within 7 days of NVD publication, 192 (60.4 percent) within 30 days, and 55 (17.3 percent) more than 365 days after publication. Eight were listed before the NVD published the record, giving negative values. The longest gap is 6,507 days. Additions per month ran from 9 in 2025-11 (a partial month) to 43 in 2026-09; 29 of the 318 carry knownRansomwareCampaignUse of Known. Counting by month, additions ran 20 in 2025-12, 28 in 2026-02, 31 in 2026-04, 31 in 2026-08, 43 in 2026-09 and 36 in 2026-10. The 2026-11 figure is 7 because the window closes on 2026-11-09. A sizing exercise for remediation capacity should use the recent months, not the 318 divided by twelve. ## What the lag means A fast median hides a split. Almost half the additions are fresh vulnerabilities that attackers used within a week, and a sixth are old ones that surfaced again. For the fresh group, KEV adds confirmation after exploitation has begun. For the old group, a scanner that retired an old finding as low severity was holding something CISA later confirmed. Keep two lists: new CVEs for which the question is whether they will reach KEV, and the existing backlog for which the question is whether KEV has since caught up. CISA publishes the catalog but not a prediction, so the first list needs EPSS or an equivalent. ## Limits to state in the policy KEV is a confirmed-exploitation list built from the evidence CISA has, and the original directive defined inclusion by significant risk to the federal enterprise. Absence from the catalog is not evidence of safety. The NVD, in its 2026-04-15 notice, gives KEV membership the top enrichment priority, with a goal of one business day, which makes KEV entries the best-documented records in the NVD. The feed is a snapshot that moves daily. When a report cites a KEV count, cite the catalogVersion beside it. For an auditor, the useful record is the list of KEV entries that applied to the organization, with the dateAdded, the dueDate the feed gave, and the date remediation completed. Those three dates produce the compliance figure directly. ## Comparisons with this system - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed (catalogVersion 2026.11.10): https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04 (June 10, 2026), archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20261110120100/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 22-01 (November 3, 2021, superseded), archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2025/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC SSVC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD news (2026-04-15 enrichment priorities): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/cisa-kev/ --- # SSVC is a decision method, not a score: it turns a few decision points into an action such as defer, scheduled, out-of-cycle or immediate SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** SSVC, Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization, was developed by CERT/CC and is used by CISA. It maps decision points such as exploitation, automatable and technical impact to an action, not a number. CISA has published SSVC data in CVE records through Vulnrichment, and NVD began showing it on 2026-06-17. - **Maintained by:** CERT/CC; CISA publishes SSVC data as an Authorized Data Publisher - **Scale:** None; the output is a category, for example Defer, Scheduled, Out-of-cycle, Immediate - **Current version:** NVD schema ssvc-v2.0.3 (deployed 2026-06-17); CISA outcome group cisa:BOD2604:1.0.0 - **Updated:** Decision trees are versioned; CISA scores per CVE in Vulnrichment - **Answers:** The action a stakeholder should take on a vulnerability, and how fast ## What it is The CERT/CC documentation describes SSVC as a methodology for prioritizing vulnerabilities based on the needs of the stakeholders involved. It states the contrast with other systems directly: unlike systems that rate technical severity or exploitability, SSVC rates vulnerabilities on risk to the concerned stakeholder, using a stakeholder-defined decision model. It also states that it is not a one-size-fits-all solution. The output is an action category. For suppliers and deployers the overview defines four: Defer (do not act at present), Scheduled (work during regularly scheduled time), Out-of-cycle (act more quickly, potentially with extra resources) and Immediate (use all possible resources, potentially pausing normal operations). The overview adds that Defer means do not act at present, not do not act at all, and suggests resolving deferred items in due time, perhaps within 90 days. The documentation distinguishes the roles. Suppliers decide how to respond to a flaw in their own product, deployers decide how to respond to a flaw in software they run, and coordinators decide about triage and publication. A vulnerability management program is a deployer, so the deployer tree and the CISA Response Timeline are the relevant ones. ## Decision points A decision point is a question with a small set of answers. The overview lists supplier decision points (Exploitation, Utility, Technical Impact, Public Safety Impact) and deployer decision points (Exposure, Automatable, Human Impact). Each combination of answers maps to an outcome through a decision tree or table that the stakeholder can change. Because the tree is explicit, an auditor can read it. There is no formula to recompute, but there is a table to inspect: every outcome traces to named answers. That is the main advantage over a score, and the cost is that someone must answer the questions for each vulnerability or accept answers from a publisher. Writing the tree down is also the control. The CERT/CC pages describe how to customize decision points and how to treat items that land on the same priority. A program that adopts the CISA tree unchanged can cite it; a program that edits it should keep the edited table under change control. ## What CISA publishes The CISA Vulnrichment repository describes its process: CISA takes each CVE through an SSVC scoring process, adding Exploitation, Automatable and Technical Impact. CVEs rated Total Technical Impact, Automatable, or with Exploitation of Proof of Concept or Active get further analysis, including CWE and CVSS data where the CNA has not supplied them. CISA states that it never overwrites the CNA's own container. On 2026-06-17 the NVD began including SSVC data from the CISA Authorized Data Publisher in its feeds and API, under schema ssvc-v2.0.3, with a Computed SSVC Score showing how the priority was decided. NVD said the deployment touched approximately 95 percent of existing records, each with a new change log entry. A program that syncs from the NVD received this data without a separate integration. ## The federal use: BOD 26-04 BOD 26-04 (2026-06-10) says its remediation timelines table is informed by SSVC. The CERT/CC page for the CISA Response Timeline names four binary decision points: In KEV, Publicly Exposed, Automatable and Technical Impact. These yield five outcomes: Fix on system upgrade, 60 days, 14 days, 3 days, and 3 days with a forensic investigation. The KEV feed on 2026-11-10 shows the effect: of the 92 entries added from 2026-09-01, 70 carry a 3 day due date and 22 a 14 day one. Note what the KEV row does in that tree. In KEV is one of four binary points, so the 16 combinations produce the five outcomes. A KEV listing alone does not fix the timeline for a federal agency: exposure, automation and technical impact also count. For a non-federal program the same structure is a reasonable template, with the deadlines changed to its own service levels. ## SSVC and EPSS The SSVC documentation has a page on using EPSS: EPSS probability as an input to the Exploitation decision point, and EPSS percentiles as an amplifier. This is the documented way to combine a probability with a decision tree without multiplying scores, which FIRST's Using EPSS page warns against. In the KEV Lag Ledger, the Exploitation answer for a new CVE is the hard part: 58 of 318 KEV additions had no EPSS value on the day of listing, and 197 of the 260 that did sat below 0.1. A tree that relies on a high EPSS to reach Out-of-cycle or Immediate would route most of those entries to a lower category, unless KEV membership overrides it. The CISA tree does that by making In KEV a decision point. ## Limits SSVC needs inputs that a vulnerability database cannot supply for you: exposure, mission impact and safety impact are about your assets. CISA supplies the vulnerability-side answers; the asset-side answers come from your inventory. The method is also relatively new for most programs and has less tooling than CVSS. Document the tree you adopt, its version, who set each branch, and when it was last reviewed. The CERT/CC documentation provides a calculator and an explorer for this. A practical start is to answer the four CISA questions for the KEV entries in your own inventory, compare the outcome with your current priority, and look at the entries where they differ. ## Comparisons with this system - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - CERT/CC, SSVC documentation: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, SSVC overview (outcomes and decision points): https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/tutorials/ssvc_overview/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, Vulnrichment repository README: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD news (2026-06-17 SSVC deployment): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04, archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20261110120100/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/ssvc/ --- # The NVD is the reference database for CVE records, and since April 2026 it enriches only a prioritized part of them SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The National Vulnerability Database, run by NIST, adds severity scores, product lists and weakness data to CVE records. On 2026-04-15 NIST moved to risk-based enrichment: KEV entries first, with a one business day goal. CVE submissions rose 263 percent from 2020 to 2025, and 130 of 318 recent KEV records carry an NVD-sourced score. - **Maintained by:** NIST, Information Technology Laboratory - **Scale:** Not a scale; carries CVSS (v2, v3.x, v4.0) from NVD or CNAs, plus CWE, CPE and, since 2026-06-17, CISA SSVC data - **Current version:** API 2.0; SSVC schema v2.0.3; CVE Affected v1.0 - **Updated:** Continuously; announcements on the NVD news page - **Answers:** What the CVE record says about affected products, weakness and scored severity ## What it is NIST states on the NVD home page that it maintains the National Vulnerability Database as a repository of information on software and hardware flaws that can compromise computer security. The database holds the CVE record, the NVD analysis added to it, and fields from other sources such as the CNA that assigned the CVE and CISA. Every statistic on this site that mentions a CVE's published date, its CVSS value or its source comes from NVD API 2.0 (services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0). The published date in that record is the start of the lag clock in the KEV Lag Ledger. The NVD is also the place where CISA data meets the CVE record. The 2026-05-28 notice says NVD already included KEV catalog data and other enrichment present in the CVE record, and would add SSVC data and affected-product information in the feed and API. That makes NVD one integration point for three of the signals on this site: CVSS, KEV and SSVC. ## The April 2026 change On 2026-04-15 NIST announced a risk-based model driven by record CVE growth. Its figures: CVE submissions rose 263 percent between 2020 and 2025, submissions in the first three months of 2026 ran nearly one-third above the same period of 2025, and NIST enriched nearly 42,000 CVEs in 2025, 45 percent more than in any earlier year. From 2026-04-15 NIST prioritizes three groups for enrichment: CVEs in the CISA KEV catalog, with a goal of one business day from receipt; CVEs for software used within the federal government; and CVEs for critical software as defined by Executive Order 14028. Other CVEs are still added but categorized Lowest Priority, not scheduled for immediate enrichment. Users can ask NVD to enrich a specific CVE by email. The notice states that these criteria may not catch every potentially high-impact CVE, which is why NIST offers the email request route. A vulnerability management lead should expect some CVEs with a high EPSS score and no NVD severity, and plan to take the CNA score or the CISA data in that case. ## Severity scores: who supplies them The same notice states that NIST will no longer routinely provide a separate severity score for CVEs where the CNA has already provided one. Users can request one for a specific CVE. The ledger shows how mixed the source already is. Of 318 KEV additions, 130 (40.9 percent) take their CVSS score from nvd@nist.gov; the rest come from CNAs, among them secure@microsoft.com (28 entries) and psirt@cisco.com (16). A program that treats an NVD score as one authority's number is mixing scores from many assessors. Store the source field. The scope of the 2026-04-28 correction is worth noting. NIST said only the calculated numerical v4.0 scores were affected, that scores had been too high in about 4,500 records and too low in fewer than 30, and that API users who sync with lastModStartDate and lastModEndDate would pick up corrections automatically; users who do not would need to refresh. The ledger takes one more thing from the NVD record: the CVSS version. Of the 318 scores, 313 are v3.1 and 5 are v3.0, which reflects what the NVD and the CNAs had published for these CVEs by the read date. A program planning for v4.0 should check what share of its own open findings carry a v4.0 vector from any source before changing its policy. | Date | NVD notice | Effect on a program | | --- | --- | --- | | 2026-04-15 | Risk-based enrichment; no routine NIST score where a CNA scored | Unenriched CVEs may have no product list; severity may come from the CNA | | 2026-04-28 | About 4,500 v4.0 records corrected (19 percent of v4.0 records) | Resync scores using lastModStartDate and lastModEndDate | | 2026-05-28 | Announcement of SSVC and affected data in CVE feed and API | Plan for larger payloads | | 2026-06-17 | SSVC (ssvc-v2.0.3) and CVE Affected v1.0 deployed; about 95 percent of records touched | Larger CVE-Modified feed for eight days | | 2026-08-26 | Audit history entries link to the CVE on GitHub instead of embedding affected data | Change feed parsers | ## What the KEV Lag Ledger measured against it The ledger matched all 318 KEV additions in its window to an NVD record. For each it records the NVD published date and computes days from publication to listing. The median is 10.5 days, 45.3 percent fall within 7 days, and 17.3 percent (55) were published more than 365 days before listing. Because NVD publication is the clock start, the lag is not the time from first exploitation. Eight additions have negative values: CISA listed them before the NVD published the record. The metric describes how long a CVE sat visible in the NVD before CISA confirmed exploitation, which is what a scanner feed could have shown. The 55 additions published more than a year before listing are a reminder that NVD age and risk are separate. An old record can be fully enriched, carry a Critical score for years and still reach KEV only when attackers take it up. NVD completeness does not predict exploitation. The same holds in reverse: an unenriched record is not a low-risk record, and the 2026-04-15 notice says so, calling the criteria a way to focus on the CVEs with the greatest potential for widespread impact, not a ruling on the rest. ## Using it in a ranking Use the NVD for identity and affected products, and treat its CVSS value as one assessor's. Fields to store with each score: source, version, vector string, and the lastModified timestamp. After 2026-04-15, a CVE with no NVD product list is a CVE NVD has not yet prioritized, not a CVE with no affected product. KEV entries are the best-enriched records by policy. For everything else, expect a delay, and let the CNA's data, EPSS and the CISA SSVC fields carry the ranking until enrichment arrives. A sensible store keeps a raw copy of the NVD JSON per CVE with the fetch date, so any later question about what the NVD said on a given day has an answer. ## Comparisons with this system - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - NVD news and updates (2026-04-15, 04-28, 05-28, 06-17, 08-26): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, Vulnrichment README: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS: https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/nvd/ --- # Vendor ratings such as VPR, TruRisk and the Nucleus Threat Rating are proprietary scores; publish their scale and method before ranking by them SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Tenable VPR, Qualys TruRisk and the Nucleus Threat Rating are vendor ratings, each described only on vendor pages. Tenable publishes a 0 to 10 scale. Qualys and Nucleus publish no numeric scale or method in the sources read on 2026-11-10. None can be recomputed from outside the vendor. - **Maintained by:** Tenable (VPR), Qualys (TruRisk, QDS), Nucleus Security (Nucleus Threat Rating) - **Scale:** VPR 0 to 10 (Tenable); TruRisk and QDS none found on 2026-11-10; Nucleus rating described as low to existential, no numeric scale found - **Current version:** Not versioned in the pages read - **Updated:** VPR nightly; Nucleus Threat Rating daily; TruRisk not stated in the pages read - **Answers:** A vendor-specific view of exploitation likelihood or risk, from the vendor's own data ## How to read these Each of these is the vendor's rating, produced from the vendor's own data and described on the vendor's own pages. This page labels every statement by who made it. A vendor rating can be useful, but it is a different category of evidence from CVSS, EPSS and KEV, whose specifications or data are public. The test this site applies is plain: is the scale published, is the method published, and can the rating be recomputed or checked against public data. The table gives the result for the three ratings as of 2026-11-10. Two of the three vendor pages describe the rating inside a larger platform product. TruRisk appears on both the VMDR and Enterprise TruRisk Management pages, and the Nucleus Threat Rating sits inside Nucleus Insights. A rating that is part of a platform is usually available only through that platform, which limits an outside check. | Rating | Scale published | Method published | Vendor claim read | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Tenable VPR | Yes: 0 to 10 | Described as machine learning and real-world exploit data; no formula or feature list found | Recalculated nightly across 280,000+ vulnerabilities | | Qualys TruRisk and QDS | None found on 2026-11-10 | None found; page cites 25+ real-time threat intelligence sources | TruRisk used to prioritize vulnerabilities exploited by ransomware; QDS filter offered | | Nucleus Threat Rating | None found; described as low to existential | None found | Refreshed daily for every CVE | ## Tenable VPR Tenable's capability page states that VPR gives each vulnerability a priority rating on a scale from 0 to 10 and calculates prioritization nightly for more than 280,000 distinct vulnerabilities. Tenable says VPR uses machine learning and real-world exploit data, and that it tested VPR against CVSS, EPSS and CISA KEV. Tenable also states that VPR reduces the volume of CVEs requiring action from about 160,000 (CVSS-based) to about 4,000 (VPR-based) while maintaining strong exploit coverage. That is Tenable's claim. The page read gives no definition of coverage, no date range and no data set, so the ledger cannot test it. A reader can ask Tenable for the denominator and the window. Cite the Tenable page with its read date of 2026-11-10, because a vendor can change a claim, a count or a scale without a version number, and a saved copy is the only proof of what was said on a given day. The Tenable page presents CVSS, EPSS and KEV as comparators for VPR. That is a useful framing for a buyer, because it names the public benchmarks. The ledger supplies the same benchmarks over one year of KEV listings, so the question to put to the vendor is how VPR performed on the 318 CVEs on the date each was added. ## Qualys TruRisk and QDS Qualys's VMDR page states that VMDR measures risk with TruRisk using 25 or more sources of real-time threat intelligence, prioritizes vulnerabilities exploited in the wild by ransomware using TruRisk and MITRE ATT&CK, and offers a filter on the Qualys Detection Score (QDS). The Enterprise TruRisk Management page adds a TruLens layer that correlates 25+ threat feeds and TruConfirm, an exploit validation capability covering 1,800+ CVEs, by Qualys's count. In the pages read, Qualys states no numeric scale and no formula for TruRisk or QDS. That is recorded as none found on 2026-11-10, not as proof that none exists elsewhere in Qualys documentation. Qualys's claims of 25+ sources and 1,800+ CVEs are counts, not performance measures. A count of feeds says how much input there is; it says nothing about how well the rating separates exploited from unexploited vulnerabilities. ## Nucleus Threat Rating Nucleus states on its Insights page that the Nucleus Threat Rating is refreshed daily and is an exploitation-centric risk signal for every CVE, and describes it as a defensible rating from low to existential. The page gives no numeric scale and no method. Nucleus also published a white paper claiming that between October 2025 and March 2026 its research reviewed every new KEV addition and found that 22 vulnerabilities, 18 percent, showed meaningful exploitation or exploitability signals before formal listing. The window ends 2026-03 and the ledger runs 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09, so the two overlap only in part. That claim is the vendor's and has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog on this site. ## What the ledger can and cannot say The KEV Lag Ledger can show what public signals did on listing day: median EPSS 0.0066, 75.8 percent of 260 below 0.1, 10.4 percent of 318 with CVSS below 7. Those are the benchmarks a vendor rating has to beat, and the ledger lists every row so a vendor can be tested on the same 318 CVEs. It cannot score a proprietary rating, because the rating is not public per CVE. A buyer can ask each vendor for its per-CVE rating on the ledger's CVE list as of each dateAdded, and compare. The ledger data is on this site for that purpose. Where a vendor rating is used in a federal context, the binding references remain public. BOD 26-04 names KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact, all of which are public data fields. ## Audit practice Treat a vendor rating as one input, record its name, and keep the public inputs next to it. If a ranking mixes a vendor rating with CVSS, EPSS and KEV, the auditor's question is which input decided the order for each item. A rating whose scale is unpublished cannot answer that, so keep KEV and a documented EPSS threshold as the backstop. Do not describe a vendor rating in a policy as an industry standard. State the vendor, the product, the date of the rating and the export used. Some programs allow a vendor rating to override the public order. If yours does, write the override rule and review it against the public signals every quarter. ## Comparisons with this system - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - Tenable, Vulnerability Priority Rating: https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating (read 10 Nov 2026) - Qualys, VMDR (TruRisk, QDS): https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Qualys, Enterprise TruRisk Management (TruLens, TruConfirm): https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Nucleus Security, Nucleus Insights (Nucleus Threat Rating): https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS (public benchmark): https://www.first.org/epss/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/vendor-priority-ratings/ --- # Public exploit code shows a flaw can be attacked, but only observed exploitation shows that it is SCORING SYSTEM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Exploit-DB, Metasploit modules and CISA's Vulnrichment record different strengths of exploit evidence: public proof-of-concept code, a ready-to-run module, and an assessed exploitation status. CISA Vulnrichment adds SSVC Exploitation values of none, proof of concept or active. KEV lists confirmed exploitation, and 29 of 318 recent KEV additions carry a ransomware flag. - **Maintained by:** OffSec (Exploit-DB); the Metasploit project (Metasploit Framework); CISA (Vulnrichment) - **Scale:** Presence of public code; SSVC Exploitation: none, proof of concept, active - **Current version:** Continuously updated archives - **Updated:** Per submission or per CVE - **Answers:** Whether public attack code exists and whether anyone is using it ## Three kinds of evidence Exploit evidence comes in strengths. Exploit-DB states that it is a CVE compliant archive of public exploits and corresponding vulnerable software, maintained by OffSec as a non-profit public service, and it is a repository of exploits and proofs of concept rather than advisories. The Metasploit documentation describes a free, open-source Metasploit Framework. A module in it means the exploit has been written into a tool that can be run by a person with moderate skill. CISA's Vulnrichment repository adds an assessed status. CISA takes each CVE through SSVC scoring and records Exploitation as none, proof of concept or active. These are three different claims about the same CVE, and a program should not merge them into one flag. CISA states how Vulnrichment fits the CVE record: the results are pushed back into the CVE corpus through the Authorized Data Publisher program launched in 2024, and consumers who already read live CVE data need not track the repository. For a program, the SSVC Exploitation field is thus available through the same CVE feed as the CVSS and CWE data. | Source | What a hit means | What a miss means | | --- | --- | --- | | Exploit-DB | A public exploit or proof of concept exists | Nothing: private and unpublished exploits do not appear | | Metasploit module | A framework module exists for the CVE | Nothing about other tools or private code | | Vulnrichment Exploitation | CISA assessed none, proof of concept or active | None found in the record for CVEs not yet assessed | | CISA KEV | Reliable evidence of active exploitation, by CISA inclusion criteria | The CVE is not confirmed as exploited by CISA | ## How the scoring systems consume it CVSS v4.0 has one threat input, Exploit Maturity, based on exploit techniques, exploit code availability or active in-the-wild exploitation. CVSS v3.1 has the Temporal Exploit Code Maturity factor. In both, someone has to set the value and keep it current. EPSS uses exploit evidence as a model feature. The How It Works page states that the presence of public exploit code is one of the strongest signals in the model, and that EPSS asks what kind of exploit code, published where and how widely. EPSS does not publish the feature weights, but it states exploit code and offensive tooling as a feature category among approximately 2,850 features. ## What happens on listing day The KEV Lag Ledger lets this be checked on one set. The 318 KEV additions were confirmed by CISA as exploited, and 260 had an EPSS value on the day of listing. Of those, 197 (75.8 percent) were below 0.1, with a median of 0.0066. Many of them therefore reached KEV without a public-exploit signal strong enough to lift the score, or before that signal had accumulated. The EPSS How It Works page explains the likely reason. Newly disclosed vulnerabilities have sparse signals, and EPSS trains on exploitation that data partners can observe. Among the 144 additions listed within 7 days, 86 had an EPSS value that day, and 81 of those 86 (94.2 percent) were below 0.1. The conclusion for ranking is that absence of public exploit code on the day of listing is not evidence of low risk. The ledger can only count what the FIRST API recorded, but it shows that public signals trail confirmed exploitation for a sizeable share of new KEV entries. ## Malware and ransomware evidence KEV carries a knownRansomwareCampaignUse field with values Known and Unknown. In the ledger window, 29 of 318 additions are flagged Known (9.1 percent). The median EPSS on listing day for those flagged entries was 0.0114, higher than the all-entries median of 0.0066 but still low in absolute terms. The flag reflects the evidence CISA holds at the time of the export, so a dated export matters. Qualys states that VMDR prioritizes vulnerabilities exploited by ransomware, which is a vendor feature built on this kind of evidence; the method is not published in the page read. ## Using it in a ranking Rank in this order: confirmed exploitation (KEV, with the ransomware flag), then assessed active exploitation (Vulnrichment), then a weaponized module, then a public proof of concept, then probability from EPSS. Each step down is weaker evidence about the present and stronger evidence about the possible. Record the date you checked. Exploit-DB and Metasploit are archives that grow, so a CVE with no public code on one date can have a module the next. A policy that cites public exploit evidence should state which sources it checks and how often. For a team that checks exploit code manually, the minimum record is the CVE, the source checked, the URL of the exploit or module, the date found and the date checked. For a team that relies on a platform's exploit flag, ask which of the sources above feed it. ## Limits Public archives hold what was published. Exploitation by actors who do not publish is invisible to them, which FIRST names as observation bias in the EPSS training labels. A missing exploit is not a safe vulnerability. This page describes the evidence types and cites the ledger for listing-day behavior. It does not count Exploit-DB or Metasploit entries per CVE, and no ledger figure here is a count of those archives. A second limit is time. Evidence about a CVE grows after publication: an exploit appears, a module is written, a threat actor adopts it. A single check at publication is a snapshot. The 17.3 percent of KEV additions listed more than a year after publication are the clearest case, because the evidence arrived long after the record was created. ## Comparisons with this system - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - Exploit-DB, About the Exploit Database (OffSec): https://www.exploit-db.com/about-exploit-db (read 10 Nov 2026) - Metasploit documentation home: https://docs.metasploit.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, Vulnrichment README: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, How EPSS works: https://www.first.org/epss/how-it-works (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 specification (Exploit Maturity): https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/exploit-evidence/ --- # Eight systems and signals, each with its formula and source SCORES, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS rates technical severity from 0 to 10. EPSS gives the probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. The KEV catalog records exploitation already seen. SSVC turns those facts into a decision. Each page says who maintains the system, its scale, its version and what it answers. - [CVSS v3.1](/scores/cvss-v3-1/): CVSS v3.1 scores how severe a flaw is in itself, not how likely anyone is to exploit it - [CVSS v4.0](/scores/cvss-v4-0/): CVSS v4.0 adds a Threat group and sharper nomenclature, but the score the NVD shows is still mostly the Base score - [EPSS](/scores/epss/): EPSS gives a daily probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, and most KEV entries score low on the day they are listed - [CISA KEV catalog](/scores/cisa-kev/): The CISA KEV catalog is the one list of vulnerabilities with evidence of exploitation, and it lists after the fact, not before - [SSVC](/scores/ssvc/): SSVC is a decision method, not a score: it turns a few decision points into an action such as defer, scheduled, out-of-cycle or immediate - [NVD](/scores/nvd/): The NVD is the reference database for CVE records, and since April 2026 it enriches only a prioritized part of them - [Vendor priority ratings](/scores/vendor-priority-ratings/): Vendor ratings such as VPR, TruRisk and the Nucleus Threat Rating are proprietary scores; publish their scale and method before ranking by them - [Public exploit and malware evidence](/scores/exploit-evidence/): Public exploit code shows a flaw can be attacked, but only observed exploitation shows that it is Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/scores/ --- # CVSS says how bad a flaw is and EPSS says how likely it is to be attacked; rank by likelihood first and use severity to set the floor COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS scores severity from 0.0 to 10.0 with a published formula; EPSS gives a daily probability that a CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days. In the KEV Lag Ledger, all 63 listings with EPSS of 0.1 or more also scored CVSS 7.0 or above, while 173 listings scored 7.0 or above with EPSS under 0.1. - **Maintained by:** CVSS: FIRST CVSS-SIG. EPSS: FIRST EPSS SIG, scores generated by Empirical Security - **Scale:** CVSS: 0.0 to 10.0. EPSS: probability 0 to 1 plus percentile - **Current version:** CVSS v3.1 and v4.0. EPSS model v2026.06.15 (CSV header, 2026-11-10) - **Updated:** CVSS: when a CNA or NVD scores or rescores. EPSS: daily - **Answers:** CVSS: the severity of the flaw. EPSS: the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days ## The two questions CVSS and EPSS answer different questions, and the specifications say so. The CVSS specification describes its outputs as scores indicating the severity of a vulnerability relative to other vulnerabilities, with a Base Score that assumes the reasonable worst case impact. FIRST's EPSS page describes a model that estimates the probability that a published CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days. The two are not rivals for the same job. A CVSS score is fixed by the flaw's characteristics and moves only when someone rescores. An EPSS score is recalculated daily from about 2,850 features and moves as exploit code, discussion and other signals appear. One is a property of the flaw; the other is an estimate about attackers. | Property | CVSS v3.1 / v4.0 | EPSS | | --- | --- | --- | | Output | Severity score 0.0 to 10.0 and a band (Low to Critical) | Probability 0 to 1 and a percentile | | Method | Published formula (v3.1) or MacroVector lookup (v4.0) | Machine-learning model; training data and pipeline not published | | Refresh | On rescoring | Daily, after 13:30 UTC | | Organization-specific | Environmental metrics, optional | Population-level; FIRST says it is not tailored to an organization | ## What each gets right CVSS is reproducible. With the Table 16 constants any analyst can recompute a v3.1 Base Score: ISS = 1 - (1 - C)(1 - I)(1 - A), Impact = 6.42 x ISS for unchanged scope, Exploitability = 8.22 x AV x AC x PR x UI, and BaseScore = Roundup(Min[Impact + Exploitability, 10]). An auditor can check the arithmetic. Scores also exist for nearly every CVE within days of publication. EPSS is calibrated. FIRST states that a score of 0.05 means a 5 percent probability, about 1 in 20 within 30 days across the population, and that low scores cluster most vulnerabilities because exploitation is rare. The base rate of exploitation is roughly 2 to 3 percent, so a probability can be compared with a base rate. A CVSS 7.0 cannot be compared with any rate. Each has a documented weak point. FIRST lists the EPSS limits itself: scores are population-level, a newly disclosed vulnerability has a sparse record, and the training labels reflect only the exploitation that data partners can observe. For CVSS the specification states that the Base Score assumes the reasonable worst case, and that the qualitative bands are optional. Neither weakness is hidden, and both can be written into a policy as stated assumptions. ## What the ledger shows The KEV Lag Ledger holds 318 vulnerabilities that CISA confirmed as exploited between 2025-11-10 and 2026-11-09. Every one has a CVSS score: median 8.8, with 285 (89.6 percent) at 7.0 or above and 33 (10.4 percent) below. Of the 318, 260 have an EPSS value from the listing day: median 0.0066, with 197 (75.8 percent) below 0.1. Cross the two for those 260. 63 listings had both CVSS 7.0 or above and EPSS 0.1 or above. 173 had CVSS 7.0 or above and EPSS below 0.1. 24 had neither. None had EPSS at 0.1 or above with CVSS below 7.0. At a CVSS cutoff of 9.0, the counts are 35 (both), 88 (CVSS only), 28 (EPSS only) and 109 (neither). A CVSS High cutoff captured more of these confirmed exploited vulnerabilities than an EPSS 0.1 cutoff did. | Listing-day cell (260 KEV additions with EPSS) | CVSS 7.0 or above | CVSS below 7.0 | | --- | --- | --- | | EPSS 0.1 or above | 63 | 0 | | EPSS below 0.1 | 173 | 24 | ## What the ledger cannot show This is coverage, not efficiency. The ledger holds only vulnerabilities that were exploited, so it can say how many a threshold would have caught but not how many unexploited vulnerabilities the threshold would also have queued. A CVSS cutoff of 7.0 catches 89.6 percent of the 318 and also queues whatever share of all published CVEs scores 7.0 or above, a denominator the ledger does not hold. FIRST's How It Works page frames this as the coverage and efficiency tradeoff, with CVSS-based thresholds plotted as points on the same axes as the EPSS curve, and states that the EPSS curve sits substantially above both the random baseline and the CVSS points at most coverage levels. That is FIRST's published finding, and its plots should be read for the threshold you intend to use. ## How to combine them FIRST's Using EPSS page warns against multiplying EPSS by an ordinal such as CVSS: EPSS is a calibrated probability, CVSS is an ordinal ranking with no empirical calibration, and the product has no interpretable meaning. Combine them by rule, not by arithmetic. A workable rule set has three lines. Rank by EPSS probability, with a documented threshold, for everything not already confirmed as exploited. Use CVSS to set the minimum service level by asset tier. Keep CVSS Critical as an escalation when no EPSS value exists yet, since 58 of the 318 ledger additions had none on their listing day. The ledger lets a threshold be sized. At an EPSS cutoff of 0.01, 116 of the 260 scored listings (44.6 percent) were flagged. At the 90th percentile or higher, 75 (28.8 percent). At 0.1, 63 (24.2 percent). At 0.5, 34 (13.1 percent). A lower cutoff catches more of the confirmed set and sends more of the whole CVE population to the queue, and only the second half of that tradeoff depends on your environment, so measure it on your own open findings. ## Reading the result The ledger supports one clear statement for a policy: neither number alone flagged the exploited set on listing day. EPSS at 0.1 or above flagged 24.2 percent of the 260 scored listings, CVSS at 9.0 or above flagged 45.9 percent of the 318, and CVSS at 7.0 or above flagged 89.6 percent. See the CVSS against KEV and EPSS against KEV pages for those comparisons, and the three-way page for the ordering the ledger supports. For an audit file, record the EPSS model version from the first line of the CSV (v2026.06.15 on 2026-11-10), the date of the score, and the CVSS version with its vector. FIRST notes that the model changes about annually, so a score from before a retraining is not comparable with one after it. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by KEV status first, since BOD 26-04 builds its timelines on it, and use CVSS technical severity and EPSS only for the CVEs not in the catalog. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by EPSS probability first with a documented threshold, because CVSS Critical alone would queue far more work than a large enterprise can close. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by EPSS first across clients, because it is one public, daily, comparable number, and report CVSS beside it because every client contract already quotes it. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by EPSS first to replace the exploitation-likelihood part of the old risk score, and keep CVSS as the severity floor the old score hid. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank infrastructure CVEs by EPSS first and application findings by CVSS first, because EPSS covers published CVEs and most application findings have none. ## Other comparisons - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification (section 7.1, Table 16): https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 specification: https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS home: https://www.first.org/epss/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, How EPSS works (coverage and efficiency, limitations): https://www.first.org/epss/how-it-works (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS (score laundering, base rate): https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) - EPSS daily CSV (model version header, 2026-11-10): https://epss.cyentia.com/epss_scores-current.csv.gz (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/epss-vs-cvss/ --- # KEV confirms exploitation after it starts; CVSS exists at publication but cannot tell you who is already being attacked COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS gives every CVE a severity score at publication; the CISA KEV catalog lists only CVEs with reliable evidence of exploitation. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 33 of 318 recent KEV additions (10.4 percent) scored below CVSS 7.0, and 17.3 percent were published more than a year before listing. - **Maintained by:** CVSS: FIRST. KEV: CISA - **Scale:** CVSS: 0.0 to 10.0. KEV: listed or not listed - **Current version:** CVSS v3.1 and v4.0. KEV catalog 2026.11.10, 1,779 entries - **Updated:** CVSS: on scoring. KEV: on each addition - **Answers:** CVSS: the severity of the flaw. KEV: whether exploitation is confirmed ## Different evidence, different timing A CVSS score is available when a CVE is scored, usually near publication, and rests on the flaw's characteristics. A KEV entry exists only after CISA holds reliable evidence of exploitation. BOD 22-01, the original KEV directive and now superseded, stated the inclusion test as reliable evidence that the exploit is being actively used to exploit public or private organizations by a threat actor. The result is a trade. CVSS is early and broad but silent on attackers. KEV is late and narrow but states a fact. The KEV Lag Ledger measures how late: the median gap from NVD publication to KEV listing was 10.5 days across 318 additions, with 144 (45.3 percent) listed within 7 days and 192 (60.4 percent) within 30. | Property | CVSS | KEV | | --- | --- | --- | | Evidence type | Flaw characteristics | Observed exploitation | | Available | Near publication | After CISA confirms | | Coverage | Nearly every CVE | 1,779 entries on 2026-11-10 | | Reproducible | Yes, formula or lookup | Yes, public JSON feed with catalogVersion | | Fits | Severity floor, SLA by tier | Override, deadline, escalation | ## Where CVSS misses KEV Of the 318 additions, 33 (10.4 percent) scored below 7.0 and one scored below 4.0. A program that scheduled only High and Critical CVSS findings would not have scheduled those 33 until KEV listed them. For them, KEV supplied the missing information. Timing matters as much as score. The 13 low-scoring entries listed within 7 days of publication left a window of days. The three low-scoring entries listed more than 365 days after publication show the other side: an old Medium finding in a backlog that changed meaning on one date. ## Where KEV misses CVSS KEV does not list a flaw that is dangerous but not yet attacked, or attacked but not yet seen. The median CVSS across the additions is 8.8, and 146 of 318 (45.9 percent) are 9.0 or above, so CVSS scored this set high more often than not. The ledger holds only listed CVEs, so it cannot show how many other CVEs share those scores. The ledger shows the lead time. For additions scored 9.0 or above the median gap to listing was 8.0 days; for those below 7.0 it was 27 days. A CVSS Critical finding in the first week is therefore a candidate for early action even though it is not in KEV. KEV is silent about it until CISA acts. CVSS also varies by assessor. In the ledger, 130 of the 318 scores (40.9 percent) come from nvd@nist.gov and the rest from CNAs such as secure@microsoft.com (28) and psirt@cisco.com (16). The same flaw can carry a different score from different assessors, and the NVD announced on 2026-04-15 that it will no longer routinely add its own score where a CNA has supplied one. KEV has one maintainer and one inclusion test. ## What the law asks BOD 26-04, issued 2026-06-10, supersedes BOD 22-01 and BOD 19-02. It sets remediation urgency from asset exposure, KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact. CISA states that technical impact is similar to the CVSS base score's concept of severity. The CERT/CC page for the directive's decision tree lists four inputs and none is a CVSS score; a binary Technical Impact plays that role. The consequence for a federal reader is that KEV is a required input and CVSS is a supporting one. The KEV feed shows the timelines at work: 70 of the 92 entries added from 2026-09-01 carry a 3 day due date and 22 a 14 day one. The feed also carries a due date. For the 92 entries added from 2026-09-01 through 2026-11-10, computed from the dueDate and dateAdded fields, 70 fall due in 3 days and 22 in 14 days. CVSS has no deadline field, so a severity-based program writes its own service levels, while a KEV-based program receives them. ## A combined rule Put KEV membership first, as an override on any asset where the CVE is present. Place CVSS Critical and High below it, with the version and the vector string recorded. Add EPSS for the rest. Every item then has a stated reason: confirmed exploited, severe, or likely. Record the date of the KEV check. The feed is a snapshot with a catalogVersion, so a report that says the asset had no KEV findings should name the version. The ransomware field adds a second KEV attribute with no CVSS counterpart. 29 of the 318 additions are marked Known. They are a small share, and the flag is the only public attribute in these three signals that records use by ransomware operators. A program may set a faster service level for flagged entries. ## What to put in the policy Name both signals and their roles in one sentence: KEV determines whether the vulnerability is already being exploited, CVSS determines how severe it is if it is. Name the CVSS version. Name the KEV source and its refresh interval. State who may override and how the override is logged. The ledger is the evidence for including both. KEV alone would have queued nothing until a listing. CVSS alone would have missed the 33. Capacity planning follows from the monthly counts. KEV additions ran from 17 in 2026-01 to 43 in 2026-09 among full months, which is the load a KEV-first policy places on remediation teams. A CVSS-first policy places a load that depends on how many CVEs in your inventory score 7.0 or above, a number only your own data can give. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by KEV status first, because BOD 26-04 makes KEV membership a required input to the remediation timeline and CVSS only a supporting one. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by KEV first as an override on every asset tier, then by CVSS within the remaining queue, so the confirmed-exploited set never waits behind a severity sort. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by KEV first because it is one public list that every client can verify, and use CVSS to order each client's backlog. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by KEV first because a small team cannot argue with a confirmed-exploitation list, and use CVSS Critical and High only to fill the remaining capacity. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank infrastructure CVEs by KEV first and application findings by CVSS first, because KEV lists only CVEs and many code-level findings carry none. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed (catalogVersion 2026.11.10): https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04, archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20261110120100/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 22-01 (superseded), archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2025/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/cvss-vs-kev/ --- # KEV states what has been exploited and EPSS estimates what will be; on listing day most KEV entries scored below 0.1 COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The CISA KEV catalog lists CVEs with confirmed exploitation; EPSS estimates the chance a CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days. FIRST advises treating any KEV entry as exploited regardless of its EPSS score. In the KEV Lag Ledger, the median EPSS on listing day was 0.0066, and 75.8 percent of 260 scored listings were below 0.1. - **Maintained by:** EPSS: FIRST EPSS SIG, scores generated by Empirical Security. KEV: CISA - **Scale:** EPSS: probability 0 to 1. KEV: listed or not listed - **Current version:** EPSS model v2026.06.15. KEV catalog 2026.11.10, 1,779 entries - **Updated:** EPSS: daily. KEV: on each addition - **Answers:** EPSS: the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. KEV: whether exploitation is confirmed ## Prediction and record KEV is a record: CISA lists a CVE when it holds reliable evidence that the exploit is being actively used. EPSS is a prediction: a probability, published daily for every CVE, that exploitation will be seen in the next 30 days. A record covers the past and a prediction the near future, and the two can disagree without either being wrong. FIRST says so in its Using EPSS guidance: a confirmed exploitation report and a low EPSS score are not automatically contradictory, a low score means the signal profile resembled low-risk vulnerabilities right up to the event, and confirmed and recent exploitation evidence should take precedence over the score when it exists. | Property | EPSS | KEV | | --- | --- | --- | | Nature | Prediction, calibrated probability | Record of confirmed exploitation | | Scope | Every published CVE | 1,779 CVEs on 2026-11-10 | | Time | Next 30 days | Already happened | | Refresh | Daily | On each addition | | Failure mode | Low score on a CVE that is then attacked | Silent until CISA lists | ## The listing-day record The KEV Lag Ledger asks what EPSS said on the day CISA listed each CVE, taken from the FIRST API for that date. Of 318 additions, 260 had a score. The median was 0.0066 (0.006555). 197 (75.8 percent) were below 0.1, 116 (44.6 percent) were at 0.01 or above, 63 (24.2 percent) at 0.1 or above and 34 (13.1 percent) at 0.5 or above. 75 (28.8 percent) were in the 90th percentile or higher. The 58 additions with no EPSS value that day had a median gap of 0 days from NVD publication, so they were CVEs listed on or near the day they appeared. For them EPSS had not yet scored the CVE. A threshold-only policy has no answer for that group, while a KEV check does. The rank view tells the same story. 75 of the 260 scored additions (28.8 percent) sat in the 90th percentile or higher on listing day, and 55 (21.2 percent) in the 95th or higher. Three in ten of the confirmed set were therefore in the top tenth of the distribution, and seven in ten were not. ## Newest and oldest additions The ledger separates two groups. Of the 86 scored additions listed within 7 days of publication, 81 (94.2 percent) had EPSS below 0.1. The FIRST page on limits explains why: for a newly disclosed vulnerability the public signal is thin, exploit code may not exist, and EPSS still produces a score but from a sparse record. The 55 additions listed more than a year after publication look different: median EPSS on listing day was 0.347, and 23 of 55 were still below 0.1. Old CVEs accumulate signal, so EPSS tends to catch up, but it is not complete even then. The 29 additions marked with known ransomware use give a smaller sample: 25 of them had a listing-day score, with a median of 0.0114. That is higher than the 0.0066 median of all scored entries and still far below 0.1, so EPSS did not single out the ransomware-linked entries on the day they were listed. ## How EPSS and KEV feed each other The two are linked. FIRST names VulnCheck KEV, the Shadow Server Foundation and LevelBlue among the data partners for exploitation activity. FIRST also states that exploitation activity trains the model and does not drive the daily score, so a CISA listing does not push tomorrow's EPSS up. The Using EPSS page adds that a vulnerability added to KEV years ago reverts toward the probability its current features predict. FIRST's rule of thumb is explicit: when a vulnerability appears on CISA KEV, treat it as actively exploited and prioritize accordingly, regardless of EPSS score. EPSS remains useful for everything KEV does not cover, which FIRST describes as the large majority of the vulnerability population at any given time. ## A combined rule Use KEV as the override and EPSS as the ranking for the rest. For CVEs not in KEV, choose an EPSS threshold from the distribution: FIRST says the base rate of exploitation is roughly 2 to 3 percent and that the top half of published vulnerabilities sits above about 0.7 percent, so a threshold set by intuition, such as 50 percent, sits far above the median score. Review the queue against KEV each week. The ledger shows 17 to 43 additions in each full month, and the CVEs that enter KEV tomorrow are often ones EPSS ranked low today. A weekly check of which KEV entries had been in your EPSS-ranked queue tells you how the threshold performed on your assets. ## Reporting both Show EPSS as a probability with its percentile, for example 15.3% (92nd), as FIRST recommends, and show KEV as a dated yes or no. Do not display a combined number. The ledger is the baseline for the report: it states that on listing day a 0.1 threshold would have flagged one in four of the confirmed entries. A program can adopt a lower threshold to raise coverage, at the cost of effort, and should record that choice and the reason. If the two disagree on one CVE, write down which one decided. A KEV entry with a low EPSS is decided by KEV. An unlisted CVE with a high EPSS is decided by EPSS and reviewed by a person. The record of those disagreements, kept for a quarter, is the most useful evidence for adjusting a threshold. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by KEV first because BOD 26-04 requires it, and use EPSS only to order the CVEs that are not yet in the catalog. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by KEV first as the override and EPSS second as the queue for everything else, and review weekly which new KEV entries EPSS had ranked low. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by KEV first because it is the one list every client accepts without argument, then by EPSS for the open backlog in each client. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by KEV first because it is free and unambiguous, then by EPSS to replace the exploit-likelihood part of the old risk score. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank by KEV first for infrastructure and for any application component with a CVE, and use EPSS for open-source dependencies, which carry CVE identifiers. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, EPSS home (data partners, maintenance): https://www.first.org/epss/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS (KEV guidance, thresholds): https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, How EPSS works (limitations): https://www.first.org/epss/how-it-works (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 22-01 (superseded), archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2025/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/epss-vs-kev/ --- # SSVC returns an action for a stakeholder and CVSS returns a severity number; they answer different questions and CISA uses both COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS is a severity score from 0.0 to 10.0; SSVC is a decision method that returns an action such as defer, scheduled, out-of-cycle or immediate. CISA's BOD 26-04 uses an SSVC tree with four inputs and no CVSS score. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 33 of 318 KEV additions scored under CVSS 7.0. - **Maintained by:** SSVC: CERT/CC, with CISA publishing data. CVSS: FIRST - **Scale:** SSVC: action categories. CVSS: 0.0 to 10.0 - **Current version:** SSVC: CISA outcome group cisa:BOD2604:1.0.0. CVSS: v3.1 and v4.0 - **Updated:** SSVC: per CVE in Vulnrichment. CVSS: on scoring - **Answers:** SSVC: what this stakeholder should do and how fast. CVSS: the severity of the flaw ## Output and purpose The CERT/CC documentation contrasts the two directly. Unlike systems that rate technical severity or exploitability, SSVC rates vulnerabilities on risk to the concerned stakeholder, through a stakeholder-defined decision model. CVSS, in FIRST's wording, produces numerical scores indicating the severity of a vulnerability relative to other vulnerabilities. A CVSS output is a number a person must interpret against a policy. An SSVC output is already the policy: Defer, Scheduled, Out-of-cycle or Immediate for suppliers and deployers, or in the CISA tree Fix on system upgrade, 60 days, 14 days, 3 days, and 3 days with forensic investigation. Both are public methods, which is the property an auditor values. The CERT/CC site includes calculator and explorer tools for SSVC, and FIRST provides calculators for CVSS. Neither depends on a vendor product. The difference lies in what the user must supply: CVSS needs the metrics for the flaw, and SSVC needs the decision points for the flaw and, for deployers, for the asset. | Property | SSVC | CVSS | | --- | --- | --- | | Output | Action category | Score and band | | Inputs | Decision points: exploitation, exposure, automatable, technical impact, others | Eight base metrics (v3.1); more in v4.0 | | Reproducibility | Decision table, inspectable | Formula (v3.1) or MacroVector lookup (v4.0) | | Stakeholder-specific | Yes, by design | Base is not; Environmental is optional | | Effort per CVE | Answer the decision points or accept a publisher's answers | Usually supplied with the CVE | ## Where they overlap SSVC borrows from CVSS. The CERT/CC reference lists CVSS-based decision points, including a CVSS v4 analyst model, so the two can be used together. BOD 26-04 itself states that its Technical Impact concept is similar to the CVSS base score's concept of severity, and that the remediation table is informed by SSVC. Technical Impact in the CISA tree is binary: the adversary gains partial or total control of the asset. CVSS spreads similar information across confidentiality, integrity and availability impact, attack vector and privileges. The SSVC form discards detail in return for a decision. The KEV feed also shows SSVC at work in the data: current entries carry a forensicTriage field, which was Yes for 103 of the 1,779 entries on 2026-11-10. That field lines up with the 3 days and forensic investigation outcome in the CISA tree. CVSS has no counterpart to it, because a severity score carries no instruction about checking an asset for compromise. ## What CISA does with them CISA's Vulnrichment repository takes each CVE through SSVC scoring, recording Exploitation, Automatable and Technical Impact. For CVEs rated Total Technical Impact, Automatable, or with Exploitation of proof of concept or active, CISA considers adding CWE and CVSS data where the CNA has not. CISA therefore uses SSVC to decide where to spend effort on CVSS. The NVD, since 2026-06-17, carries CISA's SSVC data next to CVSS in the same record, with a Computed SSVC Score showing how the priority was decided. A program that reads the NVD receives both. Because CISA enriches the CVE record rather than a separate database, any consumer of CVE data can read it. The Vulnrichment README states that CISA never overwrites the originating CNA's data and adds its own values in the ADP container, so a CVSS value from a CNA and an SSVC answer from CISA can sit side by side in one record, each with its author. ## What the ledger shows CVSS performed as a severity indicator on the 318 KEV additions in the ledger window: median 8.8, 285 at 7.0 or above. It also left 33 below 7.0, which is 10.4 percent, and the median gap from NVD publication to listing was 27 days for those 33 against 8.0 days for entries scored 9.0 or above. An SSVC tree handles that gap by letting In KEV decide. The ledger cannot test an SSVC tree, because exposure is an asset property that a vulnerability dataset does not hold. It can show that the vulnerability-side inputs CISA publishes, KEV status among them, carry information that the CVSS score alone did not. ## Cost and adoption SSVC costs effort at the start: someone must define the tree, answer the decision points that are specific to the organization and keep the table under change control. CVSS costs nothing at the start, because the CNA or NVD supplies it. The CERT/CC pages organize getting started into steps titled Prepare, Collect, and Use and Respond. A staged adoption is workable. Keep CVSS for severity reporting, adopt the CISA tree for KEV-listed CVEs, and extend to other CVEs when asset exposure data is reliable. ## What to write down Record which tree is in use, its version and the date of the last review. Record, per decision, the answer to each decision point and who gave it. For CVSS, record the version, the vector, the source and the read date. The two records together let an auditor ask why an item received its category and get an answer in two lines. The questions an auditor can then ask are concrete: the tree that produced a timeline, its version, the person who answered the exposure decision point for the asset and the date, and the CVSS version and vector shown in the severity column. Each has a recorded answer, and neither method is accepted on reputation. A short register of these answers, one line per exception, is usually enough for a year-end review. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by the SSVC outcome first, using the CISA BOD 26-04 tree, because the directive's timelines come from it and CVSS is not one of its inputs. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by an SSVC-style decision first for tiered assets, because a decision table can carry exposure and business impact that a CVSS score cannot. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by CVSS first for the cross-client report, because every client already understands it, and add the CISA SSVC fields as a second column. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by CVSS first for severity and KEV as the override, and adopt the CISA SSVC tree later, since a small team needs to start with inputs it can fill. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank by CVSS first for application findings, which carry CVSS vectors from the testing tool, and by SSVC outcome for CVEs that CISA has assessed. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - CERT/CC, SSVC documentation: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, SSVC overview: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/tutorials/ssvc_overview/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, Vulnrichment README: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04, archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20261110120100/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD news (2026-06-17 SSVC deployment): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/ --- # EPSS is an input and SSVC is a decision: use EPSS to answer the exploitation question inside an SSVC tree COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** SSVC is a decision method that returns an action; EPSS is a daily probability of exploitation. The SSVC documentation describes feeding EPSS probability into the Exploitation decision point and using percentiles as an amplifier. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 58 of 318 KEV additions had no EPSS value on listing day. - **Maintained by:** SSVC: CERT/CC, with CISA publishing data. EPSS: FIRST EPSS SIG - **Scale:** SSVC: action categories. EPSS: probability 0 to 1 and percentile - **Current version:** SSVC: cisa:BOD2604:1.0.0. EPSS: model v2026.06.15 - **Updated:** SSVC: per CVE. EPSS: daily - **Answers:** SSVC: what to do and how fast. EPSS: the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days ## How they relate The two are different kinds of object. EPSS is a measurement that produces a probability for every published CVE. SSVC is a method that takes several measurements, including an exploitation measurement, and returns an action. The SSVC documentation has a page called Using EPSS with SSVC, with sections titled EPSS Probability as input to Exploitation and EPSS Percentiles as an Amplifier. This makes the comparison one of position in a process. EPSS sits upstream; SSVC sits at the decision. A program does not choose between them. It chooses how to map an EPSS value to an SSVC Exploitation answer, and writes the mapping down. | Property | SSVC | EPSS | | --- | --- | --- | | Role | Decision method | Input signal | | Output | Action category | Probability and percentile | | Needs asset data | Yes, for exposure and impact | No: population-level | | Method published | Decision tables and code | Model described; pipeline not published | | Refresh | Per decision | Daily | ## The mapping problem The Exploitation decision point in SSVC takes values such as none, proof of concept and active. EPSS is a continuous probability. A mapping needs thresholds, and FIRST warns that thresholds are subjective: bins compress scores that differ by a tiny amount into different categories, and there is no universal right cutoff. The EPSS SIG's own guidance is to communicate the probability with its percentile. A mapping in an SSVC tree should therefore name the probability cutoff, the percentile cutoff if used, the date it was chosen and the reviewer. The percentile deserves its own rule. FIRST explains that percentiles are computed over every published CVE, so the percentile of a CVE within your inventory can differ from its published percentile. A rule that uses percentiles as an amplifier should state which population it uses. A published percentile of 0.9 means a score above 90 percent of all scored CVEs, not above 90 percent of yours. ## What the ledger says about the mapping On listing day, EPSS was a weak indicator of confirmed exploitation in this window. Of 260 scored KEV additions, 197 (75.8 percent) were below 0.1 and the median was 0.0066. A mapping that required EPSS at 0.1 to set Exploitation to active would have set it wrongly for three in four of the confirmed entries. For 58 additions there was no score on that day. In an SSVC tree, a missing EPSS value must have a rule, such as defaulting to the Exploitation answer from Vulnrichment or from KEV. CISA's tree solves this by making KEV membership a separate decision point, In KEV, rather than a derived value. The missing-value group is not random. The 58 additions without a score on listing day had a median gap from NVD publication of 0 days, so they are the newest CVEs, the ones for which the exploitation question is most urgent. A tree that defaults to none when EPSS is absent would route exactly those CVEs to a slower category. ## What each contributes that the other cannot SSVC contributes the decision. EPSS says nothing about a specific asset, and FIRST states that the score is not about your environment. SSVC takes exposure and mission impact into account and returns a time to act. EPSS contributes breadth: it provides a score for every CVE, without anyone answering questions. CISA's data illustrates the split. CISA publishes SSVC answers for CVEs it assesses; EPSS publishes a number for all of them. A program with thousands of open CVEs will have many that CISA has not assessed, and EPSS is the fallback signal for those. Timing differs too. EPSS publishes a new score every day, typically within a minute or two after 13:30 UTC. An SSVC decision is made at an event: when a CVE is published, when it is listed, when an asset changes exposure. A program needs a rule for when to rerun the decision as the EPSS value moves, such as at every KEV addition and at each weekly review. ## A practical design Use the CISA tree for KEV-listed CVEs. For the rest, use EPSS to set the Exploitation input: below a documented low threshold, none; above a documented high threshold, treat as active for planning; in between, a reviewer decides. Record the thresholds in the policy. Test the design on the ledger's CVE list. Run each KEV addition through your mapping as of its listing day, using the EPSS value from the FIRST API for that date, and count how many your design would have routed below your fast category. That count is the miss rate. Keep the design small at the start, and record the first quarter of results before adding branches. Three Exploitation answers and two thresholds are enough to run. A tree with many branches and many thresholds produces results nobody can explain, and the CERT/CC documentation itself describes SSVC as a human-scale decision aid, with a section titled SSVC as a Human-Scale Bottleneck. ## Reporting Report the SSVC outcome as the priority and show the EPSS value, with its date, as supporting evidence. Do not publish a number that combines them. FIRST calls multiplying EPSS by an ordinal score laundering, and the same objection applies to any blend. The audit trail is then simple: outcome, decision points, EPSS value and date, source for each. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by the SSVC outcome first because BOD 26-04 prescribes it, and bring EPSS in only to help answer the exploitation question for CVEs outside the catalog. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by the SSVC outcome first for tiered assets and feed EPSS into its Exploitation input, because the decision has to carry asset context EPSS cannot. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by EPSS first because it needs no per-client asset answers and is comparable across clients, then add an SSVC outcome where a client supplies exposure data. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by EPSS first because a small team can adopt it in a day, and move to an SSVC decision when asset exposure data is reliable. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank by the SSVC outcome first where assets span code and infrastructure, since a decision table can hold both, and use EPSS for the CVE-bearing items only. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - CERT/CC, SSVC documentation (Using EPSS with SSVC): https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, SSVC overview: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/tutorials/ssvc_overview/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS home: https://www.first.org/epss/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, How EPSS works: https://www.first.org/epss/how-it-works (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Probability, percentile and bins: https://www.first.org/epss/articles/prob_percentile_bins (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS: https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/ --- # CVSS v4.0 changes the metrics, the scoring method and the labeling, so v3.1 and v4.0 scores must not share one sorted list COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS v4.0, published 2023-11-01, adds Attack Requirements, a Threat group and a Supplemental group, scores by 270 MacroVectors instead of the v3.1 formula, and requires labels such as CVSS-BT. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 313 of 318 scores are v3.1, 5 are v3.0 and none is v4.0. - **Maintained by:** FIRST CVSS-SIG, both versions - **Scale:** 0.0 to 10.0 in both, with the same qualitative bands - **Current version:** v3.1 (archive) and v4.0 (specification document v1.2, 2024-06-18) - **Updated:** v4.0 specification 1.0 on 2023-11-01, 1.1 on 2023-11-09, 1.2 on 2024-06-18 - **Answers:** Both: the severity of a flaw; v4.0 adds a Threat group for exploit maturity ## Side by side Both specifications are published by FIRST and share the 0.0 to 10.0 scale and the qualitative bands: None 0.0, Low 0.1 to 3.9, Medium 4.0 to 6.9, High 7.0 to 8.9, Critical 9.0 to 10.0. They differ in groups, metrics, method and labeling. The table lists the differences that matter to a program. | Property | CVSS v3.1 | CVSS v4.0 | | --- | --- | --- | | Metric groups | Base, Temporal, Environmental | Base, Threat, Environmental, Supplemental | | Impact metrics | C, I, A with Scope (Unchanged or Changed) | VC, VI, VA for the vulnerable system and SC, SI, SA for subsequent systems | | Attack conditions | Attack Complexity | Attack Complexity and Attack Requirements (AT) | | User Interaction | None or Required | None, Passive or Active | | Exploitation input | Temporal: Exploit Code Maturity | Threat: Exploit Maturity (E) | | Scoring method | Closed formula with Roundup | 270 MacroVectors, expert ordering, interpolation | | Labeling | Not required | CVSS-B, CVSS-BT, CVSS-BE, CVSS-BTE | ## Scoring method The v3.1 formula can be recomputed by hand: ISS = 1 - (1 - C)(1 - I)(1 - A), Impact = 6.42 x ISS (unchanged scope), Exploitability = 8.22 x AV x AC x PR x UI, and BaseScore = Roundup(Min[Impact + Exploitability, 10]). The worked case AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H gives 9.8. The v4.0 specification gathers 15 million CVSS-BTE vectors into 270 equivalence sets, uses expert comparison data to order them from least to most severe, and fixes the boundaries between qualitative bands to match the v3.x boundaries. A score is a lookup plus interpolation. An auditor needs the FIRST calculator or a verified implementation to reproduce it. The metric lists are worth stating in full. Under v4.0 the Base group has AV, AC, AT, PR, UI and the six impact metrics VC, VI, VA, SC, SI, SA. The Supplemental group contains Safety, Automatable, Recovery, Value Density, Vulnerability Response Effort and Provider Urgency, which the specification says consumers may weigh more, less or not at all. Under v3.1 the Base group has AV, AC, PR, UI, S, C, I and A. ## Exploitation and labeling v3.1 has a Temporal group that scales the Base Score down: TemporalScore = Roundup(BaseScore x ExploitCodeMaturity x RemediationLevel x ReportConfidence). v4.0 replaces it with a Threat group of one metric, Exploit Maturity, and states that when Threat and Environmental metrics are not defined the score assumes the highest severity. The labeling rule is the largest practical change. The v4.0 specification states that numerical scores should carry nomenclature because the usefulness of a score for prioritization is proportional to the metrics used to produce it. A column of v4.0 scores without labels mixes CVSS-B and CVSS-BT and cannot be sorted honestly. A reading of the vector strings makes the change visible. A v3.1 vector begins CVSS:3.1/ and lists AV, AC, PR, UI, S, C, I, A. A v4.0 vector begins CVSS:4.0/ and lists AV, AC, AT, PR, UI, VC, VI, VA, SC, SI, SA. A parser that assumes the v3.1 field list will fail or misread v4.0, so a data pipeline should branch on the prefix. ## In the data The KEV Lag Ledger takes its severity from the NVD record, v3.1 first, then v3.0, v4.0 and v2. All 318 additions were scored: 313 with v3.1 and 5 with v3.0, and none fell through to v4.0. For this set of exploited CVEs, the v3 family was what the NVD and CNAs had published. The NVD news page shows v4.0 data quality: on 2026-04-28 NIST announced that about 4,500 CVE records, 19 percent of those with a v4.0 score, carried a numerical score higher than the correct value, and fewer than 30 carried a lower one. NIST said it would correct them by script on 2026-04-28. A program that imported v4.0 scores before then should confirm that it picked up the correction. Who scores matters as much as which version. The ledger's score column names its source: of the 318 rows, 130 come from nvd@nist.gov and the rest from CNAs. Since 2026-04-15 the NVD does not routinely add a score where a CNA has supplied one, so whether a CVE has a v4.0 score depends on whether its CNA chose to publish one. ## Migration practice Run both versions in parallel for a period. Store each vector string with its version, compare the band each method assigns to the same CVEs, and look at the CVEs where the bands differ. Do not assume a mapping from a v3.1 score to a v4.0 score. Change the policy text at the same time: name the version in every threshold, such as CVSS-BT 4.0 of 7.0 or above, and set a date after which v3.1 scores are shown for reference only. Set a cutover plan with dates, and name an owner for each phase. Phase one stores both versions and reports v3.1. Phase two reports v4.0 where present and falls back to v3.1 with a flag. Phase three retires v3.1 from thresholds once the share of open findings with a v4.0 vector is high enough to be useful, a figure each program has to measure for itself. ## Which to cite Where a CVE carries only v3.1, cite v3.1. Where it carries both, cite the version your policy names. Where the policy names v4.0 and a CVE has only v3.1, record that the CVE was scored under the older method and apply the same band cutoffs, noting the substitution. Neither version replaces the exploitation signals. The ledger's 10.4 percent of KEV additions under CVSS 7.0 is a v3 figure, and the same test on v4.0 would need a fresh run. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by KEV status first and cite CVSS only with its version and vector string, since BOD 26-04 uses technical impact rather than either CVSS version. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by exploitation evidence first and cite CVSS-BT 4.0 where the source scored it, with v3.1 retained for reference during the migration. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by exploitation evidence first, and report both CVSS versions side by side because client exports may carry either one. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by EPSS and KEV first and keep to one CVSS version, whichever the new platform shows, so the severity column does not mix methods. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank by CVSS v4.0 first for application findings that testing tools score with Threat and Supplemental metrics, and by v3.1 for older infrastructure CVEs that carry only the older score. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 specification (version history, MacroVectors, nomenclature): https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - NVD news (2026-04-28 v4.0 score correction): https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/ --- # KEV is a public list anyone can audit; vendor ratings add coverage and speed but cannot be checked from outside COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA's KEV catalog is a public list of confirmed exploitation. Vendor ratings such as Tenable VPR, Qualys TruRisk and the Nucleus Threat Rating are proprietary. Only Tenable publishes a numeric scale (0 to 10). The KEV Lag Ledger lists 318 additions so any vendor can be tested against the same CVEs. - **Maintained by:** KEV: CISA. Vendor ratings: Tenable, Qualys, Nucleus Security - **Scale:** KEV: listed or not. VPR: 0 to 10. TruRisk and Nucleus Threat Rating: none found on 2026-11-10 - **Current version:** KEV catalog 2026.11.10. Vendor ratings: not versioned in the pages read - **Updated:** KEV: on each addition. VPR: nightly. Nucleus Threat Rating: daily - **Answers:** KEV: whether exploitation is confirmed. Vendor ratings: the vendor's view of risk or likelihood ## What differs KEV is open data. CISA publishes the catalog as a JSON feed with a catalogVersion, and anyone can recompute a count from it. A vendor rating is an output of the vendor's platform, derived from its own data, and the vendor's pages are the only description. This page labels each statement as the vendor's. The difference is verifiability. An auditor can check that a CVE is in KEV on a given catalogVersion. An auditor cannot check why a vendor rated a CVE 8.7 on a given night, because the pages read give no formula and no feature list. | Property | KEV | Tenable VPR | Qualys TruRisk | Nucleus Threat Rating | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Public per-CVE data | Yes | No | No | No | | Scale published | Listed or not | 0 to 10 | None found on 2026-11-10 | None found; low to existential | | Method published | Inclusion criteria | Machine learning and exploit data, no formula | 25+ intelligence sources named as a count | None found | | Refresh | On addition | Nightly | Not stated in the pages read | Daily | ## What vendors add Vendors cover what KEV does not. Tenable states that VPR is recalculated nightly across more than 280,000 vulnerabilities, so it rates the large part of the population that CISA has not listed. Nucleus states that its rating is refreshed daily for every CVE. Qualys states that TruRisk uses 25 or more sources of real-time threat intelligence. These are the vendors' claims. They also offer speed. KEV listing came a median 10.5 days after NVD publication in the ledger, and 144 of 318 additions (45.3 percent) within 7 days. A vendor that signals earlier than CISA lists would have value, and the claim is testable. Qualys adds a specific capability claim: the Enterprise TruRisk Management page describes TruConfirm, exploit validation covering 1,800 or more CVEs, by Qualys's own count. Validation of that kind is evidence of a different type from a rating, since it tests whether an exploit works, and is outside this site's scope except to note that it is a vendor feature. ## The claim to test Nucleus states in a white paper that between October 2025 and March 2026 it reviewed every new KEV addition and found that 22 vulnerabilities, 18 percent, showed meaningful exploitation or exploitability signals before formal listing. By the same count, 82 percent did not. Tenable states that VPR reduced the CVEs requiring action from about 160,000 under CVSS to about 4,000 while maintaining strong exploit coverage, without a definition in the page read. The ledger gives the means to test such claims: 318 CVEs with listing dates, NVD publication dates and the EPSS and CVSS values on those dates. Ask each vendor for its rating on the ledger's CVEs as of the day before each dateAdded and compute how many sat above its own action threshold. Nothing on this site has done that for any vendor yet. The ledger stores the CVE identifiers, listing dates and NVD publication dates in data/kev/ledger.json on this site, and a CSV copy of the same rows. A vendor can replicate the test with its own historical ratings in an afternoon, and a buyer can run it during a proof of concept. ## What the ledger sets as the benchmark On listing day the public numbers were these: median EPSS 0.0066, 75.8 percent of 260 scored additions below 0.1, CVSS below 7.0 for 10.4 percent of the 318. A vendor rating that flags most of the 318 before listing would beat both. A rating that flags few would match the public signals. Because the ledger lists only exploited CVEs, it measures coverage and not false positives. A vendor can reach full coverage by rating everything high. Ask also for the volume the rating sends to the action queue, as Tenable does when it quotes 4,000 against 160,000, and for the dates behind that count. A related caution concerns dates. A vendor rating exported today for a CVE that was listed last month reflects the vendor's current view, which may already include the KEV listing. The test only works with the rating as it stood before listing, so request the historical value or a dated export, not a present snapshot. ## How to use the two together Keep KEV as the public backstop. Add a vendor rating as a ranking aid for the CVEs not in KEV, with its name and the export date recorded. If a vendor rates a KEV-listed CVE low, KEV wins; FIRST gives the same rule for EPSS. In a platform migration, rebuild the rating from public inputs first. Kenna, for example, published a 0 to 100 risk score according to the Cisco API documentation, and the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale, so no mapping between them can be written from public pages. Switching from one rating to another is a data project. If the old rating was stored on tickets, those tickets keep the old value. Keep KEV and EPSS on every ticket as well, so the history stays comparable when the vendor changes. ## Questions to put to a vendor Ask for the scale, the update interval, the list of source feeds and the date range of any benchmark claim. Ask whether the per-CVE rating can be exported with its date, so that history can be audited. Ask what the rating does when KEV lists a CVE it rated low. Record the answers with the date. A vendor statement is a source, and the program should be able to show which source ranked each item. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by KEV first because it is the public input BOD 26-04 requires, and treat any vendor rating as supporting evidence recorded with its name and date. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by KEV first and a vendor rating second for the unlisted population, once the vendor has shown its rating on the ledger's CVEs. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by KEV first because it is the one signal common to all clients regardless of which vendor platform each runs. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by KEV first and use the new platform's rating second, since no published mapping carries the old risk score across and KEV needs no migration. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank by KEV first for CVE-bearing items and use the vendor rating for code-level findings only where the vendor documents how it scores them. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/) ## Sources - CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable, Vulnerability Priority Rating: https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating (read 10 Nov 2026) - Qualys, VMDR: https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Qualys, Enterprise TruRisk Management: https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Nucleus Security, Nucleus Insights: https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS (KEV guidance): https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) - Kenna API documentation (risk score 0 to 100): https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/ --- # Rank by KEV first, EPSS second and CVSS third; each answers a different question and the KEV Lag Ledger shows why one alone fails COMPARISON, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS rates severity, EPSS estimates the chance of exploitation in 30 days, and KEV lists confirmed exploitation. In the KEV Lag Ledger of 318 additions, median listing lag was 10.5 days, 10.4 percent scored under CVSS 7.0, and 75.8 percent of 260 scored below EPSS 0.1 on listing day. - **Maintained by:** CVSS: FIRST CVSS-SIG. EPSS: FIRST EPSS SIG. KEV: CISA - **Scale:** CVSS: 0.0 to 10.0. EPSS: 0 to 1. KEV: listed or not - **Current version:** CVSS v3.1 and v4.0. EPSS v2026.06.15. KEV catalog 2026.11.10 - **Updated:** CVSS: on scoring. EPSS: daily. KEV: on addition - **Answers:** Severity, likelihood and confirmation, in that order of availability ## Three questions CVSS answers how bad the flaw is, EPSS how likely exploitation is in the next 30 days, and KEV whether exploitation has been confirmed. Each has a published source: the FIRST specifications, the FIRST EPSS pages and daily CSV, and the CISA JSON feed. They are available at different times: CVSS near publication, EPSS daily from the first days, KEV after CISA holds evidence. A ranking that uses one of the three answers one question. The ledger shows what is lost in each case. | Property | CVSS | EPSS | KEV | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Question | How severe | How likely in 30 days | Is it confirmed exploited | | Output | 0.0 to 10.0 | Probability and percentile | Yes or no, with dateAdded | | Available | Near publication | Daily | After confirmation | | Reproducible | Formula or lookup | Documented, pipeline unpublished | Public feed | | Ledger signal | 10.4% of 318 under 7.0 | 75.8% of 260 under 0.1 | Median 10.5 days after NVD publication | ## What the ledger shows for each The KEV Lag Ledger holds 318 CISA KEV additions from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09. On CVSS: median 8.8, 89.6 percent at 7.0 or above, 45.9 percent at 9.0 or above, 10.4 percent below 7.0. On EPSS: 260 with a listing-day score, median 0.0066, 75.8 percent below 0.1, 24.2 percent at 0.1 or above. On KEV: median 10.5 days from NVD publication to listing, 45.3 percent within 7 days, 60.4 percent within 30 and 17.3 percent more than 365. Cross CVSS and EPSS for the 260: 63 had CVSS 7.0 or above and EPSS 0.1 or above, 173 had CVSS 7.0 or above and EPSS below 0.1, 24 had neither, and none had EPSS 0.1 or above with CVSS below 7.0. At a CVSS cutoff of 9.0 the cells are 35 (both), 88 (CVSS only), 28 (EPSS only) and 109 (neither). At the 7.0 cutoff EPSS found no exploited CVE that CVSS missed; at 9.0 it found 28. The month counts add scale. Additions per month in the ledger window ran from 17 in 2026-01 to 43 in 2026-09 across full months, with 29 of 318 marked as used by ransomware campaigns. These are public figures from the CISA feed and can be recomputed from the ledger file. ## The order and the reasons First, KEV. It states a fact, it is public, and BOD 26-04 requires it. A KEV-listed CVE on an asset goes to the front of the queue, with the deadline set by the exposure and impact answers in the CISA decision tree. FIRST gives the same instruction for EPSS: treat a KEV entry as actively exploited regardless of its score. Second, EPSS. It ranks the unlisted population by likelihood, daily, and 58 of the 318 additions had no score on their listing day, so a rule must say what happens when EPSS is missing. Third, CVSS. It sets the floor by asset tier and supplies the severity statement an auditor expects. The order reflects evidence strength about the present. It does not mean CVSS is the least useful. In the ledger, CVSS at 7.0 flagged 89.6 percent of listings, more than EPSS at 0.1, which flagged 24.2 percent of the scored ones. It says that a flag from KEV needs no further argument and a flag from CVSS needs a second signal. ## Failure modes Using KEV alone is reactive: it lists after exploitation is confirmed, 10.5 days after NVD publication at the median and a year or more after for 17.3 percent. Using EPSS alone misses the many listings that scored low on the day, 197 of 260. Using CVSS alone floods the queue with severity and still leaves 33 listings below 7.0. Blending the three into one number is the fourth failure. FIRST calls multiplying EPSS by an ordinal score laundering. Keep the three signals in separate columns and let the rule, not a formula, decide the order. A fifth point concerns time. Each signal ages differently. A CVSS score changes only when someone rescores. An EPSS score changes daily. A KEV listing persists, but FIRST notes that its value as a predictor of continued exploitation fades without other evidence of ongoing activity. Policies should state how often each signal is re-read, and the date on each report should be the date of the read. ## A rule set you can audit Write the rule as four lines. If the CVE is in KEV, apply the KEV timeline. Else if EPSS is at or above the documented threshold, apply the high-likelihood timeline. Else if CVSS is at or above the documented cutoff for the asset tier, apply the severity timeline. Else apply the standard cycle. Store, for each decision, the three values, the versions, the sources and the read date: KEV catalogVersion, the EPSS model version from the CSV header, and the CVSS version and vector. Keep the rule short enough to apply in a meeting. If three people read the rule and reach different orders for the same ten CVEs, it needs rewriting. The ledger rows are a convenient test set: take ten, apply the rule, and compare. ## What this site does not cover The ledger measures public signals on listing day. It does not measure presence on your assets, reachability, compensating controls or business impact, which are the inputs that SSVC and platform vendors add. Methods that test exploitability in your own environment are out of scope here. Re-run the ledger method on your own data each quarter. Its sources are the CISA KEV JSON, the NVD API 2.0 and the FIRST EPSS API. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Rank by KEV status first, as BOD 26-04 requires, then by the directive's exposure and impact answers, and use EPSS and CVSS only for what KEV does not list. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Rank by KEV first, EPSS second and CVSS as the tier floor, with the three values stored in separate columns so each decision can be defended. - **Managed security providers:** Rank by KEV first and EPSS second across every client, because both are public and comparable, and show CVSS in each client report. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Rank by KEV first and EPSS second, which replaces the exploit-likelihood part of the old risk score with two free public inputs, and keep CVSS for severity. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Rank by KEV first and EPSS second for CVE-bearing infrastructure and dependencies, and by CVSS first for code-level application findings that have no CVE. ## Other comparisons - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/) - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/) - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/) - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/) - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/) - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/) - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/) ## Sources - CISA, KEV catalog JSON feed: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 specification: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 specification: https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS home: https://www.first.org/epss/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, Using EPSS (KEV rule, score laundering): https://www.first.org/epss/using-epss (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04, archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/20261110120100/https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) - CERT/CC, CISA BOD 26-04 Response Model: https://certcc.github.io/SSVC/howto/cisa_response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/ --- # 8 comparisons, each with a verdict per situation COMPARE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** EPSS against CVSS, CVSS against KEV, EPSS against KEV, SSVC against both, CVSS v3.1 against v4.0, KEV against vendor intelligence, and all three together. Each comparison gives one verdict per buyer situation and checks its claims against the 318 additions in the KEV Lag Ledger. - [EPSS vs CVSS](/compare/epss-vs-cvss/): CVSS scores severity from 0.0 to 10.0 with a published formula; EPSS gives a daily probability that a CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days. - [CVSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-kev/): CVSS gives every CVE a severity score at publication; the CISA KEV catalog lists only CVEs with reliable evidence of exploitation. - [EPSS vs KEV](/compare/epss-vs-kev/): The CISA KEV catalog lists CVEs with confirmed exploitation; EPSS estimates the chance a CVE will be exploited in the next 30 days. - [SSVC vs CVSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-cvss/): CVSS is a severity score from 0.0 to 10.0; SSVC is a decision method that returns an action such as defer, scheduled, out-of-cycle or immediate. - [SSVC vs EPSS](/compare/ssvc-vs-epss/): SSVC is a decision method that returns an action; EPSS is a daily probability of exploitation. - [CVSS v3.1 vs v4.0](/compare/cvss-v3-1-vs-v4-0/): CVSS v4.0, published 2023-11-01, adds Attack Requirements, a Threat group and a Supplemental group, scores by 270 MacroVectors instead of the v3.1 formula, and requires labels such as CVSS-BT. - [KEV vs vendor intelligence](/compare/kev-vs-vendor-intelligence/): CISA's KEV catalog is a public list of confirmed exploitation. - [CVSS vs EPSS vs KEV](/compare/cvss-vs-epss-vs-kev/): CVSS rates severity, EPSS estimates the chance of exploitation in 30 days, and KEV lists confirmed exploitation. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/compare/ --- # Which platform exposes which signal, and who lets you weight it SIGNAL MATRIX, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Thirteen platforms, nine signals: CVSS, EPSS, the KEV catalog, SSVC, the vendor's own rating, exploit evidence, ransomware flags, third-party feeds and customer weighting. 8 platforms show KEV status with a source, 7 show EPSS, and 2 show SSVC. Every cell links to its evidence. | Platform | CVSS | EPSS | CISA KEV | CISA SSVC | Vendor risk or threat rating | Exploit or malware evidence | Ransomware indicator | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | Customer weighting of the score | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [Nucleus](/signals/nucleus/) | [partial](https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/solutions/federal-government/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | [yes](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals) | | [Brinqa](/signals/brinqa/) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/first-exploit-prediction-scoring-system) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities) | none found | [partial](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml) | [yes](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors) | | [Qualys](/signals/qualys/) | [partial](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/) | none found | none found | none found | [yes](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/) | [yes](https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management) | [yes](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/) | [yes](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/) | none found | | [Tenable](/signals/tenable/) | [yes](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm) | [none found](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating) | [none found](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating) | none found | [yes](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating) | [yes](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm) | none found | [partial](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm) | [none found](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm) | | [ServiceNow Vulnerability Response](/signals/servicenow-vr/) | none found | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/pOpQr_8sg9ShZm95b6MLtA/content) | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content) | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content) | [partial](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/WIUA8IIfuaIbgPEKF9w2Ug/content) | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/WIUA8IIfuaIbgPEKF9w2Ug/content) | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content) | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/16Miv0EjmvVF7qlqVbs6Aw/content) | [yes](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/jht3pkT8ag0bLoBQZpzkkw/content) | | [Phoenix Security](/signals/phoenix-security/) | none found | [yes](https://phoenix.security/) | [yes](https://phoenix.security/) | none found | [partial](https://phoenix.security/) | [yes](https://phoenix.security/pricing/) | [yes](https://phoenix.security/integrations-sitemap.xml) | [yes](https://phoenix.security/integrations-sitemap.xml) | none found | | [ArmorCode](/signals/armorcode/) | [yes](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management) | [yes](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | [yes](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | none found | [yes](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | [yes](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management) | none found | [yes](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management) | none found | | [Hackuity](/signals/hackuity/) | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/hackuity-launches-watchbot-to-automate-and-simplify-cve-monitoring) | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | none found | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/hackuity-launches-watchbot-to-automate-and-simplify-cve-monitoring) | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | [yes](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management) | [none found](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/pr-hackuitys-new-risk-based-vulnerability-management-platform-2-0) | | [Seemplicity](/signals/seemplicity/) | [none found](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/) | [yes](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/) | [yes](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/) | none found | [partial](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/) | [yes](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/) | none found | [yes](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/) | [none found](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/) | | [Zscaler UVM](/signals/zscaler-uvm/) | none found | none found | none found | none found | [partial](https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management) | [partial](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/product-insights/taming-cve-chaos-making-unified-vulnerability-management-reality-healthcare) | none found | [partial](https://www.zscaler.com/resources/product-tours/uvm-use-case-ticket-grouping) | [yes](https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management) | | [Rapid7](/signals/rapid7/) | [yes](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/) | none found | [yes](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/) | none found | [yes](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/) | [yes](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/using-exploit-exposure/) | none found | [yes](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/) | [partial](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/adjusting-risk-with-criticality/) | | [Vulcan Cyber](/signals/vulcan-cyber/) | none found | none found | none found | none found | [partial](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/) | [yes](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093208/https://vulcan.io/integrations/) | none found | [yes](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093208/https://vulcan.io/integrations/) | [yes](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/) | | [Cisco Vulnerability Management](/signals/cisco-vm/) | [yes](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md) | none found | none found | none found | [yes](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md) | [yes](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/download-zipped-vuln-data.md) | none found | [yes](https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/vulnerability-management/index.html) | [partial](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md) | Signal Matrix, read 10 Nov 2026. Each cell comes first from the sourced facts files in the evidence files, then from vendor documentation pages fetched on 2026-11-10. A cell is yes when a vendor page or document names the signal as exposed in the product, partial when the page names it only in part, and none found when the facts files and the pages read did not show it. None found records the reach of the search on one date. It is not a statement that the signal is absent. The vendor's words are labelled as the vendor's. Vulcan Cyber cells rest on archived pages dated 1 January 2025. **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Nucleus leads at 7.5, Qualys second at 7.0. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Brinqa leads at 8.0, Nucleus second at 6.9. - **Managed security providers:** Brinqa leads at 7.9, Nucleus second at 6.9. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Brinqa leads at 7.9, Nucleus second at 6.8. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Brinqa leads at 8.0, Nucleus second at 6.9. ## What the values mean - **yes:** The vendor's own page or documentation names the signal as exposed in the product. - **partial:** The vendor's page names the signal in part, or names a close variant, with the gap stated in the cell. - **none found:** none found on 2026-11-10 **Cite this.** Signal Matrix, EPSS vs CVSS, read 10 Nov 2026. https://epssvscvss.com/signals/ ## Sources - Nucleus: Nucleus states that risk scores from different tools are normalized to a standard format, : https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Brinqa: Brinqa's risk factors documentation includes factors keyed on CVSS v2 and v3 vector fields: https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors (read 10 Nov 2026) - Qualys: Qualys states VMDR accounts for "multiplying factors beyond CVSS scores"; CVSS as a named : https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable: Tenable's documentation lists the NVD CVSSv3 impact score as one of the seven key drivers : https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm (read 10 Nov 2026) - ServiceNow Vulnerability Response: ServiceNow's documentation says the EPSS integration is in the base system, active by defa: https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/pOpQr_8sg9ShZm95b6MLtA/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - Phoenix Security: Phoenix states prioritization combines runtime reachability, CISA KEV, EPSS and threat int: https://phoenix.security/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - ArmorCode: ArmorCode states its composite score combines CVSS technical severity with exploit status,: https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Hackuity: Hackuity's WatchBot release lists CVSS among the CVE filters; the True Risk Score is state: https://www.hackuity.io/blog/hackuity-launches-watchbot-to-automate-and-simplify-cve-monitoring (read 10 Nov 2026) - Seemplicity: Seemplicity's risk page names CVSS only as the static score to move beyond; CVSS as a disp: https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Zscaler UVM: Zscaler states it prioritizes with a customizable risk scoring model built on contextual r: https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Rapid7: Rapid7's documentation says its Active Risk strategy "uses the latest CVSS score" with thr: https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Vulcan Cyber: Vulcan's archived platform page (1 January 2025) describes a unified risk score; a separat: https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Cisco Vulnerability Management: Cisco's API documentation for vulnerabilities includes cvss_v2 and cvss_v3 objects with sc: https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/ --- # Brinqa and Nucleus tie at 6.9; the committed tie-break puts Brinqa first RANKED VIEW, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** With exploitation evidence weighted 40, Brinqa and Nucleus both total 6.9. The tie-break committed before scoring, the higher evidence score, puts Brinqa first: its documented KEV and EPSS connectors score 9 to Nucleus's 7. Nucleus wins the points back on seeing exposure before the scanner and public sector readiness. | Rank | Platform | Unifies every source (15) | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (40) | Automation at enterprise scale (15) | Sees exposure before the scanner (15) | AI under governance (5) | Public sector readiness (5) | Proof (5) | Total | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Brinqa | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 7 | 6.9 | | 2 | Nucleus | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 6.9 | | 3 | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 6.5 | | 4 | Qualys | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 5.8 | | 5 | Phoenix Security | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 5.7 | | 6 | ArmorCode | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 5.7 | | 7 | Hackuity | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 5.6 | | 8 | Tenable | 8 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 5.2 | | 9 | Vulcan Cyber | 7 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 5.0 | | 10 | Seemplicity | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 4.9 | | 11 | Rapid7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 4.7 | | 12 | Zscaler UVM | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 4.5 | | 13 | Cisco Vulnerability Management | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 3.5 | **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Brinqa leads at 6.9; Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9. The two totals are an exact tie, and the tie-break committed before scoring (the higher evidence score, 9 against 7) puts Brinqa first. Brinqa gains on exploitation evidence (9 against 7 at weight 40, +0.80); unifying sources (9 against 7 at weight 15, +0.30); automation (8 against 7 at weight 15, +0.15) and proof (7 against 6 at weight 5, +0.05); Nucleus wins back seeing exposure before the scanner (6 against 0 at weight 15, +0.90) and public sector readiness (9 against 1 at weight 5, +0.40). ## How firm it is The tie is exact. Raising any one Nucleus criterion by one point would put Nucleus first; lowering Nucleus's evidence score by one point would drop it to third behind ServiceNow. The Brinqa evidence score of 9 was set in the blind review stage, before the reviewer knew which vendor was which. ## Verdict by situation - **Federal agencies and contractors:** Nucleus leads at 7.5, Qualys second at 7.0. - **Large enterprises with ten or more scanners:** Brinqa leads at 8.0, Nucleus second at 6.9. - **Managed security providers:** Brinqa leads at 7.9, Nucleus second at 6.9. - **Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet:** Brinqa leads at 7.9, Nucleus second at 6.8. - **Application security and infrastructure in one queue:** Brinqa leads at 8.0, Nucleus second at 6.9. ## Picks by situation - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) ## Sources - A CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities connector ingests the KEV catalog and flags CVEs, including the (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) - A FIRST EPSS connector syncs EPSS probability, percentile and publication date per CVE.: https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/first-exploit-prediction-scoring-system (read 10 Nov 2026) - Home page: customizable risk scoring with asset context and business impact.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Insights page lists exploitation signal categories.: https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - The CISA KEV integration ingests the KEV catalog, runs as a daily scheduled job, and shows SSVC values and (excerpt): https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - The EPSS integration imports EPSS data from First.org into Vulnerability Response, is in the base system (excerpt): https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/pOpQr_8sg9ShZm95b6MLtA/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - VMDR measures risk with TruRisk using 25+ sources of real-time threat intelligence.: https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - TruConfirm provides exploit validation covering 1,800+ CVEs.: https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/ranked/ --- # Nucleus shows 8 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, NUCLEUS, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Nucleus is 2nd of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 6.9, with an evidence score of 7 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: EPSS, CISA KEV, CISA SSVC, Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence, Ransomware indicator, Third-party threat intelligence feeds, Customer weighting of the score. **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | partial | Nucleus states that risk scores from different tools are normalized to a standard format, and its risk page says "Go beyond CVSS"; a page naming CVSS as a score input was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | EPSS | yes | Nucleus's risk prioritization page (vendor marketing) lists "EPSS probability" among the signals used for vulnerability prioritization. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA KEV | yes | Nucleus's risk prioritization page (vendor marketing) lists "CISA KEV inclusion" among the signals used for prioritization. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA SSVC | yes | Nucleus states on its federal page: "Combine asset context and exploit intelligence with CISA's SSVC model". ([source](https://nucleussec.com/solutions/federal-government/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | Nucleus states that its Nucleus Threat Rating is refreshed daily for every CVE; the scale runs from low to existential, with no numeric scale found. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Nucleus states its Insights feed validates exploit and malware evidence as it is collected. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | yes | Nucleus's risk prioritization page (vendor marketing) lists "Ransomware association" among the signals used for prioritization. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Nucleus states its Insights page correlates AI-enriched research with CISA KEV, EPSS, vendor advisories and public proofs of concept. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | yes | Nucleus states the customer can "Adjust the importance of risk factors" and scores are recalculated automatically. ([source](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) | vendor-marketing | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 7 of 10. Named signals plus customer-adjustable factors; marketing cap 7. - Home page: customizable risk scoring with asset context and business impact. ([vendor page](https://nucleussec.com/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) - Home page: Nucleus Insights feed validating exploit and malware evidence as collected. ([vendor page](https://nucleussec.com/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) - Insights page lists exploitation signal categories. ([vendor page](https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) - Risk prioritization page: customer can adjust risk factors and scores are recalculated. ([vendor page](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) - Risk prioritization page lists asset context factors in risk scoring. ([vendor page](https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/?utm_source=epssvscvss.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=signals)) ## Sources - Nucleus states that risk scores from different tools are normalized to a standard format, and its ri: https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Nucleus's risk prioritization page (vendor marketing) lists "EPSS probability" among the signals use: https://nucleussec.com/platform/risk-prioritization/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Nucleus states on its federal page: "Combine asset context and exploit intelligence with CISA's SSVC: https://nucleussec.com/solutions/federal-government/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Nucleus states that its Nucleus Threat Rating is refreshed daily for every CVE; the scale runs from : https://nucleussec.com/platform/nucleus-insights/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Nucleus states its Insights feed validates exploit and malware evidence as it is collected.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Release lists new Insights capabilities including CISA SSVC enrichment.: https://nucleussec.com/news/introducing-nucleus-helix-ai-engine-exposure-management-programs/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/nucleus/ --- # Brinqa shows 7 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, BRINQA, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Brinqa is 1st of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 6.9, with an evidence score of 9 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, Exploit or malware evidence, Ransomware indicator, Third-party threat intelligence feeds, Customer weighting of the score. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | yes | Brinqa's risk factors documentation includes factors keyed on CVSS v2 and v3 vector fields (for example attack vector). ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors)) | vendor-doc | | EPSS | yes | Brinqa documents a FIRST EPSS connector that syncs EPSS probability, percentile and publication date per CVE. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/first-exploit-prediction-scoring-system)) | vendor-doc | | CISA KEV | yes | Brinqa documents a CISA KEV connector that flags CVEs with the required action and federal due date. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities)) | vendor-doc | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | partial | Brinqa's documentation says v2 and v2.1 risk factors support Brinqa Risk Intelligence; a separate named vendor threat rating was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors)) | vendor-doc | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Brinqa documents an "Exploited in the wild" risk factor for vulnerabilities whose exploit has been verified. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors)) | vendor-doc | | Ransomware indicator | yes | Brinqa's KEV connector documentation maps the field "knownRansomwareCampaignUse" into the vulnerability record. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities)) | vendor-doc | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Brinqa's documentation lists OffSec Exploit-DB, Mandiant and Recorded Future connectors. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml)) | vendor-doc | | Customer weighting of the score | yes | Brinqa documents risk factors that a configurator can use to raise or lower the base risk score. ([source](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors)) | vendor-doc | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 9 of 10. Documented KEV, EPSS, exploit intel with adjustable risk-factor formula and roles; between 7 and 9. [Verifier, blind: 8->9: Vendor-doc shows KEV and EPSS exposed per CVE and a customer-configurable formula (base plus customer-set risk factors), which meets anchor 9 in full; the reason names nothing missing.] - A CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities connector ingests the KEV catalog and flags CVEs, including the remediation action and federal due date. ([documentation](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities)) - A FIRST EPSS connector syncs EPSS probability, percentile and publication date per CVE. ([documentation](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/first-exploit-prediction-scoring-system)) - Additional threat/exploit intelligence connectors listed in docs: OffSec Exploit-DB, Mandiant, Recorded Future. ([documentation](https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml)) - Risk factors let a configurator raise or lower the base risk score; example factors include active exploitation in the wild and PII/PCI data on the host. ([documentation](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors)) - Final risk score equals base risk score plus the sum of risk factor scores on a 0-10 scale. ([documentation](https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors)) ## Sources - Brinqa's risk factors documentation includes factors keyed on CVSS v2 and v3 vector fields (for exam: https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/risk-factors (read 10 Nov 2026) - Brinqa documents a FIRST EPSS connector that syncs EPSS probability, percentile and publication date: https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/first-exploit-prediction-scoring-system (read 10 Nov 2026) - Brinqa documents a CISA KEV connector that flags CVEs with the required action and federal due date.: https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/cisa-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) - Brinqa's documentation lists OffSec Exploit-DB, Mandiant and Recorded Future connectors.: https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/brinqa/ --- # Qualys shows 4 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, QUALYS, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Qualys is 4th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 5.8, with an evidence score of 5 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence, Ransomware indicator, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | partial | Qualys states VMDR accounts for "multiplying factors beyond CVSS scores"; CVSS as a named score input was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) | vendor-marketing | | EPSS | none found | EPSS: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA KEV | none found | CISA KEV: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | Qualys states VMDR scores risk with TruRisk and a Qualys Detection Score (QDS) for individual detections. ([source](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Qualys states TruConfirm provides exploit validation covering 1,800+ CVEs. ([source](https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | yes | Qualys states VMDR prioritizes vulnerabilities "exploited in the wild by ransomware" using TruRisk and MITRE ATT&CK. ([source](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) | vendor-marketing | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Qualys states VMDR uses 25+ sources of real-time threat intelligence. ([source](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | none found | Customer-set weights on TruRisk: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 5 of 10. Multiple signals with business context; no customer control found. - VMDR measures risk with TruRisk using 25+ sources of real-time threat intelligence. ([vendor page](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) - VMDR prioritizes by ransomware exploitation using TruRisk and MITRE ATT&CK, and offers a Qualys Detection Score (QDS) filter. ([vendor page](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) - VMDR prioritization is described as using both threat and business context. ([vendor page](https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/)) - TruConfirm provides exploit validation covering 1,800+ CVEs. ([vendor page](https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management)) ## Sources - Qualys states VMDR accounts for "multiplying factors beyond CVSS scores"; CVSS as a named score inpu: https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Qualys states TruConfirm provides exploit validation covering 1,800+ CVEs.: https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/qualys/ --- # Tenable shows 3 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, TENABLE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Tenable is 8th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 5.2, with an evidence score of 5 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: CVSS, Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence. Each cell below names its evidence and the kind of page it came from. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | yes | Tenable's documentation lists the NVD CVSSv3 impact score as one of the seven key drivers of VPR. ([source](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm)) | vendor-doc | | EPSS | none found | Tenable's VPR page presents EPSS as a comparator it tested against; EPSS as a displayed field or score input was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA KEV | none found | Tenable's VPR page presents CISA KEV as a comparator it tested against; KEV as a displayed field or score input was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | Tenable states VPR is a 0 to 10 rating recalculated nightly across 280,000+ vulnerabilities. ([source](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Tenable's documentation lists Exploit Code Maturity (High, Functional, PoC, Unproven) as a VPR driver, from sources such as Exploit-db and Metasploit. ([source](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm)) | vendor-doc | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | partial | Tenable's documentation lists Threat Sources (social media, the dark web) and Threat Intensity as VPR drivers; a list of customer-ingested third-party feeds was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm)) | vendor-doc | | Customer weighting of the score | none found | Tenable's documentation states "VPR severity ratings cannot be edited or customized"; a customer weighting control for VPR was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm)) | vendor-doc | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 5 of 10. Anchor 5: VPR combining ML and exploit data with asset criticality; no customer control or named signals documented. - VPR is a 0 to 10 rating recalculated nightly across 280,000+ vulnerabilities and predicts near-future exploitation. ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating)) - VPR uses machine learning and real-world exploit data; Tenable benchmarked it against CVSS, EPSS and CISA KEV (the page presents these as comparators). ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating)) - Exposure signals fuse sensor data with risk scoring and asset context such as criticality and ownership. ([vendor page](https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one)) ## Sources - Tenable's documentation lists the NVD CVSSv3 impact score as one of the seven key drivers of VPR.: https://docs.tenable.com/cyber-exposure-studies/application-software-security/Content/VulnerabilitiesVPR.htm (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable's VPR page presents EPSS as a comparator it tested against; EPSS as a displayed field or sco: https://www.tenable.com/capabilities/vulnerability-priority-rating (read 10 Nov 2026) - Exposure signals fuse sensor data with risk scoring and asset context such as criticality and ownership.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/tenable/ --- # ServiceNow Vulnerability Response shows 7 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, SERVICENOW VULNERABILITY RESPONSE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** ServiceNow Vulnerability Response is 3rd of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 6.5, with an evidence score of 9 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: EPSS, CISA KEV, CISA SSVC, Exploit or malware evidence, Ransomware indicator, Third-party threat intelligence feeds, Customer weighting of the score. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | none found | CVSS as a named calculator input: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | EPSS | yes | ServiceNow's documentation says the EPSS integration is in the base system, active by default, and adds EPSS Score and Percentile fields. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/pOpQr_8sg9ShZm95b6MLtA/content)) | vendor-doc | | CISA KEV | yes | ServiceNow's documentation says the CISA KEV integration ingests the catalog as a daily scheduled job. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content)) | vendor-doc | | CISA SSVC | yes | ServiceNow's documentation says the KEV integration shows SSVC values on vulnerability entries. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content)) | vendor-doc | | Vendor risk or threat rating | partial | ServiceNow's documentation says Early Warning flags CVEs and assigns Admiralty scores; a single vendor threat rating was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/WIUA8IIfuaIbgPEKF9w2Ug/content)) | vendor-doc | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | ServiceNow's documentation says Early Warning uses honeypot activity, open-source intelligence and operational research to flag CVEs. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/WIUA8IIfuaIbgPEKF9w2Ug/content)) | vendor-doc | | Ransomware indicator | yes | ServiceNow's documentation says the KEV integration shows a known-ransomware indicator on vulnerability entries. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content)) | vendor-doc | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | ServiceNow's documentation lists NVD, Shodan Exploit and other integrations for Vulnerability Response. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/16Miv0EjmvVF7qlqVbs6Aw/content)) | vendor-doc | | Customer weighting of the score | yes | ServiceNow's documentation says customers can create or modify calculators and assign weightage percentages. ([source](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/jht3pkT8ag0bLoBQZpzkkw/content)) | vendor-doc | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 9 of 10. Documented KEV, EPSS, early warning in customizable weighted calculators; between 7 and 9. [Verifier, blind: 8->9: Vendor-doc shows KEV, EPSS and Early Warning fields on each finding and customer-built calculators with conditions and weight percentages, which is anchor 9's fully customizable weights with signals exposed per finding.] - The CISA KEV integration ingests the KEV catalog, runs as a daily scheduled job, and shows SSVC values and a known-ransomware indicator on vulnerability entries. ([documentation](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content)) - The EPSS integration imports EPSS data from First.org into Vulnerability Response, is in the base system and active by default, adding EPSS Score, Percentile and Last Modified fields to vulnerability entries. ([documentation](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/pOpQr_8sg9ShZm95b6MLtA/content)) - Early Warning for Security Exposure Management uses honeypot activity, open-source intelligence and operational research to flag CVEs, and its flags and Admiralty scores can be used as criteria in risk calculators. ([documentation](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/WIUA8IIfuaIbgPEKF9w2Ug/content)) - Vulnerability calculators set the Risk Score on vulnerable items; the first matching calculator applies, customers can create or modify calculators with condition filters (business impact, CI class, age) and assign weightage percentages; Tenable VPR can be used via a Tenable Risk Rule. ([documentation](https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/jht3pkT8ag0bLoBQZpzkkw/content)) ## Sources - ServiceNow's documentation says the EPSS integration is in the base system, active by default, and a: https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/pOpQr_8sg9ShZm95b6MLtA/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - ServiceNow's documentation says the CISA KEV integration ingests the catalog as a daily scheduled jo: https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/AoLfVZ74AoARGnJjGqlO5g/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - ServiceNow's documentation says Early Warning flags CVEs and assigns Admiralty scores; a single vend: https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/WIUA8IIfuaIbgPEKF9w2Ug/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - ServiceNow's documentation lists NVD, Shodan Exploit and other integrations for Vulnerability Respon: https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/16Miv0EjmvVF7qlqVbs6Aw/content (read 10 Nov 2026) - ServiceNow's documentation says customers can create or modify calculators and assign weightage perc: https://www.servicenow.com/docs/api/khub/maps/x8~ohSTeWLioGLVI5x3Vgg/topics/jht3pkT8ag0bLoBQZpzkkw/content (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/servicenow-vr/ --- # Phoenix Security shows 5 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, PHOENIX SECURITY, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Phoenix Security is 5th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 5.7, with an evidence score of 6 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: EPSS, CISA KEV, Exploit or malware evidence, Ransomware indicator, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | none found | CVSS as a named input: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | EPSS | yes | Phoenix states prioritization combines runtime reachability, CISA KEV, EPSS and threat intelligence. ([source](https://phoenix.security/)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA KEV | yes | Phoenix states prioritization combines runtime reachability, CISA KEV, EPSS and threat intelligence. ([source](https://phoenix.security/)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | partial | Phoenix advertises proprietary scoring systems; a named, scaled vendor rating was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://phoenix.security/)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Phoenix's pricing page lists exploit evidence signals by tier, including Nuclei weaponization, Exploit DB and evidence of exploit. ([source](https://phoenix.security/pricing/)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | yes | Phoenix's integrations list names a ransomware-KEV feed. ([source](https://phoenix.security/integrations-sitemap.xml)) | vendor-marketing | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Phoenix's integrations list names NVD, Exploit-DB, EPSS, CISA, Zero Day Initiative, Google Project Zero, Shadowserver, VulnCheck and Metasploit. ([source](https://phoenix.security/integrations-sitemap.xml)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | none found | Customer-set weights: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 6 of 10. Several named signals (KEV, EPSS, Nuclei, exploit DB) plus asset context; marketing only and no documented customer control, so 6. - Prioritization combines runtime reachability, CISA KEV, EPSS and threat intel. ([vendor page](https://phoenix.security/)) - Threat feeds listed in integrations include NVD, Exploit-DB, EPSS, CISA, Zero Day Initiative, Google Project Zero, Shadowserver, VulnCheck KEV/NVD, ransomware-KEV, Nuclei, Metasploit. ([vendor page](https://phoenix.security/integrations-sitemap.xml)) - The risk engine accounts for asset location, probability of exploitation, exploitability and business impact. ([vendor page](https://phoenix.security/security/)) - Pricing page lists exploit evidence signals by tier (EPSS, Nuclei/weaponization, Exploit DB, likelihood of exploitation, evidence of exploit, popularity of exploit, threat actor mapping). ([vendor page](https://phoenix.security/pricing/)) ## Sources - Phoenix states prioritization combines runtime reachability, CISA KEV, EPSS and threat intelligence.: https://phoenix.security/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Phoenix's pricing page lists exploit evidence signals by tier, including Nuclei weaponization, Explo: https://phoenix.security/pricing/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Phoenix's integrations list names a ransomware-KEV feed.: https://phoenix.security/integrations-sitemap.xml (read 10 Nov 2026) - The risk engine accounts for asset location, probability of exploitation, exploitability and business impact.: https://phoenix.security/security/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/phoenix-security/ --- # ArmorCode shows 6 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, ARMORCODE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** ArmorCode is 6th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 5.7, with an evidence score of 6 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | yes | ArmorCode states its composite score combines CVSS technical severity with exploit status, probability, threat intelligence and asset factors. ([source](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | EPSS | yes | ArmorCode's FAQ lists EPSS scores among the signals used by Adaptive Risk Scoring. ([source](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA KEV | yes | ArmorCode's FAQ lists CISA KEV among the signals used by Adaptive Risk Scoring. ([source](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | ArmorCode names Adaptive Risk Scoring and ArmorCode Advanced Threat Intelligence (AATI) as its own scoring and intelligence. ([source](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | ArmorCode states its composite score includes known exploit status and exploitation probability. ([source](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | ArmorCode states its composite score includes active threat intelligence, and its FAQ names AATI. ([source](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | none found | Customer-set weights on the score: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 6 of 10. Several signals (KEV, EPSS) with reachability and business impact; no customer control documented. [Verifier, blind: 5->6: Named KEV, EPSS, AATI and exploit status plus asset criticality, data sensitivity and business context, without customer control, is the same position Phoenix Security and Hackuity were given 6 for.] - ArmorCode's RBVM FAQ lists the exploitation signals used by Adaptive Risk Scoring, including CISA KEV and EPSS. ([vendor page](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) - The UVM page lists the components of its composite risk score. ([vendor page](https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management)) - ArmorCode's RBVM page names Adaptive Risk Scoring with reachability and business impact, and WAF/EDR control context. ([vendor page](https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) ## Sources - ArmorCode states its composite score combines CVSS technical severity with exploit status, probabili: https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - ArmorCode's FAQ lists EPSS scores among the signals used by Adaptive Risk Scoring.: https://www.armorcode.com/risk-based-vulnerability-management (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/armorcode/ --- # Hackuity shows 7 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, HACKUITY, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Hackuity is 7th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 5.6, with an evidence score of 6 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV, Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence, Ransomware indicator, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | yes | Hackuity's WatchBot release lists CVSS among the CVE filters; the True Risk Score is stated as severity x threat x asset criticality. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/hackuity-launches-watchbot-to-automate-and-simplify-cve-monitoring)) | vendor-marketing | | EPSS | yes | Hackuity states True Risk Score enrichment uses EPSS v4. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA KEV | yes | Hackuity states True Risk Score enrichment uses CISA KEV. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | Hackuity states its own True Risk Score is severity x threat x asset criticality. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Hackuity's WatchBot release lists exploit maturity and threat intensity among its filters. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/hackuity-launches-watchbot-to-automate-and-simplify-cve-monitoring)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | yes | Hackuity states enrichment includes ransomware campaigns and dark web signals. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Hackuity states SmartEx2 Enterprise adds commercial threat intelligence from Recorded Future, Mandiant and CERT-IST. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | none found | Hackuity's 2023 release describes configurable SLA and KPI settings; customer weights on the True Risk Score were none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/pr-hackuitys-new-risk-based-vulnerability-management-platform-2-0)) | vendor-marketing | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 6 of 10. KEV, EPSS, ransomware, dark web plus asset criticality, explainable; customer control not found. - True Risk Score combines severity, threat and asset criticality; enrichment with CISA KEV, EPSS v4, ransomware campaigns and dark web signals. ([vendor page](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) - Formula for the True Risk Score. ([vendor page](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) - SmartEx2 Enterprise adds commercial threat intel from Recorded Future, Mandiant, CERT-IST; scoring is explainable per finding. ([vendor page](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) - Asset context enrichment uses business criticality, network exposure and ownership; misconfigurations (Active Directory, cloud) are scored alongside CVEs. ([vendor page](https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management)) - A 2023 press release says TRS combines threat intelligence, severity and business context; a customer-configurable scoring mechanism was not found documented beyond SLA/KPI settings. ([vendor page](https://www.hackuity.io/blog/pr-hackuitys-new-risk-based-vulnerability-management-platform-2-0)) ## Sources - Hackuity's WatchBot release lists CVSS among the CVE filters; the True Risk Score is stated as sever: https://www.hackuity.io/blog/hackuity-launches-watchbot-to-automate-and-simplify-cve-monitoring (read 10 Nov 2026) - Hackuity states True Risk Score enrichment uses EPSS v4.: https://www.hackuity.io/use-cases/risk-based-vulnerability-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Hackuity's 2023 release describes configurable SLA and KPI settings; customer weights on the True Ri: https://www.hackuity.io/blog/pr-hackuitys-new-risk-based-vulnerability-management-platform-2-0 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/hackuity/ --- # Seemplicity shows 4 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, SEEMPLICITY, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Seemplicity is 10th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 4.9, with an evidence score of 6 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: EPSS, CISA KEV, Exploit or malware evidence, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. Each cell below names its evidence and the kind of page it came from. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | none found | Seemplicity's risk page names CVSS only as the static score to move beyond; CVSS as a displayed or weighted input was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/)) | vendor-marketing | | EPSS | yes | Seemplicity's integrations page lists EPSS among its threat intelligence integrations. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA KEV | yes | Seemplicity's integrations page lists CISA KEV and VulnCheck KEV. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/)) | vendor-marketing | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | partial | Seemplicity states scoring considers in-the-wild exploitation, exploit code, EPSS and asset context; a named vendor rating was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Seemplicity's FAQ says scoring considers in-the-wild exploitation and exploit code. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Seemplicity's integrations page lists Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike and Google Threat Intelligence. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | none found | Seemplicity's FAQ does not describe customization of scoring; customer weights were none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/)) | vendor-marketing | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 6 of 10. Exploitation and EPSS signals plus asset context; no customization documented. [Verifier, blind: 5->6: Named KEV, EPSS, VulnCheck, in-the-wild and exploit-code signals plus asset value and business context, without customer control, matches the 6 given to Phoenix Security and Hackuity.] - Threat intelligence integrations listed include CISA KEV, CISA Vulnrichment, EPSS, VulnCheck KEV, Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike and Google Threat Intelligence. ([vendor page](https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/)) - The risk-based VM page FAQ says scoring considers in-the-wild exploitation, exploit code, EPSS and asset context; it does not name KEV or describe customization. ([vendor page](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/)) - Threat intelligence and business context are layered onto asset value. ([vendor page](https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/)) ## Sources - Seemplicity's risk page names CVSS only as the static score to move beyond; CVSS as a displayed or w: https://seemplicity.ai/risk-based-vulnerability-management/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Seemplicity's integrations page lists EPSS among its threat intelligence integrations.: https://seemplicity.ai/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/seemplicity/ --- # Zscaler UVM shows 1 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, ZSCALER UVM, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Zscaler UVM is 12th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 4.5, with an evidence score of 5 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: Customer weighting of the score. Each cell below names its evidence and the kind of page it came from. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | none found | CVSS as a named input: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | EPSS | none found | EPSS: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA KEV | none found | CISA KEV: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | partial | Zscaler states it prioritizes with a customizable risk scoring model built on contextual risk factors; a named vendor rating was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | partial | Zscaler's healthcare blog says UVM factors in exploitation in the wild rather than severity score alone; a named exploit evidence field was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/product-insights/taming-cve-chaos-making-unified-vulnerability-management-reality-healthcare)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator on findings: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | partial | Zscaler publishes a UVM walkthrough on prioritizing with ThreatLabz data; a list of ingested third-party feeds was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://www.zscaler.com/resources/product-tours/uvm-use-case-ticket-grouping)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | yes | Zscaler states: "Adjust the weight of any risk factor or mitigating control based on your specific needs". ([source](https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management)) | vendor-marketing | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 5 of 10. Customizable risk model with threat context and controls, but exploitation signals not named. - Zscaler Exposure Management prioritizes by contextual risk factors, threat context and controls, and a customizable risk scoring model. ([vendor page](https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management)) - The page lists prebuilt risk calculations that account for risk factors and mitigating controls. ([vendor page](https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management)) - The Healthcare-CISO blog from Zscaler says UVM factors in exploitation in the wild and business context rather than severity score alone. ([vendor page](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/product-insights/taming-cve-chaos-making-unified-vulnerability-management-reality-healthcare)) ## Sources - Zscaler states it prioritizes with a customizable risk scoring model built on contextual risk factor: https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/exposure-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Zscaler's healthcare blog says UVM factors in exploitation in the wild rather than severity score al: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/product-insights/taming-cve-chaos-making-unified-vulnerability-management-reality-healthcare (read 10 Nov 2026) - Zscaler publishes a UVM walkthrough on prioritizing with ThreatLabz data; a list of ingested third-p: https://www.zscaler.com/resources/product-tours/uvm-use-case-ticket-grouping (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/zscaler-uvm/ --- # Rapid7 shows 5 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, RAPID7, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Rapid7 is 11th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 4.7, with an evidence score of 5 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: CVSS, CISA KEV, Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | yes | Rapid7's documentation says its Active Risk strategy "uses the latest CVSS score" with threat feed intelligence, on a scale of 0-1000. ([source](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/)) | vendor-doc | | EPSS | none found | EPSS: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA KEV | yes | Rapid7's documentation lists the CISA KEV list among the threat feeds behind Active Risk. ([source](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/)) | vendor-doc | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | Rapid7's documentation names Active Risk as its recommended built-in strategy, a threat-aware score on a 0-1000 scale. ([source](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/)) | vendor-doc | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Rapid7's Exploit Exposure documentation says each discovered vulnerability shows whether there is an associated exploit, using the Metasploit framework. ([source](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/using-exploit-exposure/)) | vendor-doc | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Rapid7's documentation lists AttackerKB, Metasploit, ExploitDB, Project Lorelei, the CISA KEV list and third-party dark web sources as Active Risk inputs. ([source](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/)) | vendor-doc | | Customer weighting of the score | partial | Rapid7's documentation describes a criticality tag that applies a multiplier to the original risk score; weights on CVSS or threat inputs were none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/adjusting-risk-with-criticality/)) | vendor-doc | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 5 of 10. Exploit likelihood with asset criticality; KEV/EPSS not named, no customer control. - Prioritization uses exploit likelihood, reachability, severity and business context. ([vendor page](https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/exposure-management/)) - Package list includes a threat-aware active risk score and dynamic asset tagging with criticality rating. ([vendor page](https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/pricing/)) - Exposure Command risk score accounts for toxic combinations. ([vendor page](https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/exposure-management/)) ## Sources - Rapid7's documentation says its Active Risk strategy "uses the latest CVSS score" with threat feed i: https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/legacy-risk-strategies-end-of-life-announcement/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Rapid7's Exploit Exposure documentation says each discovered vulnerability shows whether there is an: https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/using-exploit-exposure/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Rapid7's documentation describes a criticality tag that applies a multiplier to the original risk sc: https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/adjusting-risk-with-criticality/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Prioritization uses exploit likelihood, reachability, severity and business context.: https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/exposure-management/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Package list includes a threat-aware active risk score and dynamic asset tagging with criticality rating.: https://www.rapid7.com/products/command/pricing/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/rapid7/ --- # Vulcan Cyber shows 3 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, VULCAN CYBER, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Vulcan Cyber is 9th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 5.0, with an evidence score of 7 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: Exploit or malware evidence, Third-party threat intelligence feeds, Customer weighting of the score. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | none found | CVSS as a named input (archived pages from 2025-01-01): none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | EPSS | none found | EPSS (archived pages from 2025-01-01): none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA KEV | none found | CISA KEV (archived pages from 2025-01-01): none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC (archived pages from 2025-01-01): none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | partial | Vulcan's archived platform page (1 January 2025) describes a unified risk score; a separately named threat rating was none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/)) | vendor-marketing | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Vulcan's archived integrations page lists exploitDB, Metasploit, Malware Exploit Database, 0day.today and Packet Storm. ([source](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093208/https://vulcan.io/integrations/)) | vendor-marketing | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator (archived pages from 2025-01-01): none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Vulcan's archived pages list Recorded Future and Mandiant among threat and exploit intelligence sources. ([source](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093208/https://vulcan.io/integrations/)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | yes | Vulcan's archived platform page says the customer can configure the weight of each criterion in the risk score. ([source](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/)) | vendor-marketing | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 7 of 10. Customer-configurable criterion weights and threat feeds; KEV/EPSS not named. [Verifier, blind: 6->7: Anchor 7 is met at the marketing cap: named exploit sources (exploitDB, Metasploit, M.E.D, Mandiant, Recorded Future), business-context tagging and customer-configurable weights; KEV/EPSS by name is not a rubric requirement.] - Catalog lists threat/exploit intelligence sources including Recorded Future, Mandiant, exploitDB, Metasploit, Malware Exploit Database (M.E.D), 0day.today, Packet Storm. ([vendor page](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093208/https://vulcan.io/integrations/)) - Platform page: customer can configure the weight of each criterion in the risk score, tag business context and mark accepted risk. ([vendor page](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/)) - Platform page: built-in threat feeds with environmental and temporal intelligence, and remediation intelligence database. ([vendor page](https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/)) ## Sources - Vulcan's archived platform page (1 January 2025) describes a unified risk score; a separately named : https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093214/https://vulcan.io/platform/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Vulcan's archived integrations page lists exploitDB, Metasploit, Malware Exploit Database, 0day.toda: https://web.archive.org/web/20250101093208/https://vulcan.io/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/vulcan-cyber/ --- # Cisco Vulnerability Management shows 4 of nine signals with a source SIGNALS, CISCO VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Cisco Vulnerability Management is 13th of 13 on the exploitation-evidence ranking at 3.5, with an evidence score of 5 of 10. Signals found with a source on 10 Nov 2026: CVSS, Vendor risk or threat rating, Exploit or malware evidence, Third-party threat intelligence feeds. | Signal | Found | Evidence | Kind | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | yes | Cisco's API documentation for vulnerabilities includes cvss_v2 and cvss_v3 objects with score and temporal score. ([source](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md)) | vendor-doc | | EPSS | none found | EPSS: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA KEV | none found | CISA KEV: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | CISA SSVC | none found | SSVC: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Vendor risk or threat rating | yes | Cisco's API documentation calls the 0 to 100 per-vulnerability score the Cisco Security Risk Score, continuously updated. ([source](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md)) | vendor-doc | | Exploit or malware evidence | yes | Cisco's API documentation lists threat attributes including easily_exploitable, malware_exploitable and predicted_exploitable. ([source](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/download-zipped-vuln-data.md)) | vendor-doc | | Ransomware indicator | none found | Ransomware indicator: none found on 2026-11-10 in the facts file or the vendor pages read. | | | Third-party threat intelligence feeds | yes | Cisco states more than 19 threat intelligence feeds and Cisco Talos zero-day vulnerability intelligence. ([source](https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/vulnerability-management/index.html)) | vendor-marketing | | Customer weighting of the score | partial | Cisco's API documentation says a customer can manually override a vulnerability risk score and the override is logged; weights across inputs were none found on 2026-11-10. ([source](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md)) | vendor-doc | ## Evidence score Prioritizes on exploitation evidence: 5 of 10. Anchor 5: several named exploitation attributes and asset-group risk, manual override logged; no KEV/EPSS and no scoring formula control, so not 7. - API documentation: per-vulnerability risk score is an integer 0 - 100, called the Cisco Security Risk Score, continuously updated; manual override stops dynamic updates and is logged. ([documentation](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md)) - Customer can manually override a vulnerability risk score; the override is logged for audit. ([documentation](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md)) - Vulnerability threat attributes in the API include popular_target, active_internet_breach, easily_exploitable, malware_exploitable, remote_code_execution, predicted_exploitable. ([documentation](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/download-zipped-vuln-data.md)) - Risk Meters are asset-group risk scores; Remediation Score (premium) measures Coverage, Efficiency, Velocity and Capacity. ([documentation](https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/check-remediation-score.md)) ## Sources - Cisco's API documentation for vulnerabilities includes cvss_v2 and cvss_v3 objects with score and te: https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/list-vulnerabilities.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - Cisco's API documentation lists threat attributes including easily_exploitable, malware_exploitable : https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/download-zipped-vuln-data.md (read 10 Nov 2026) - Cisco states more than 19 threat intelligence feeds and Cisco Talos zero-day vulnerability intellige: https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/vulnerability-management/index.html (read 10 Nov 2026) - Risk Meters are asset-group risk scores; Remediation Score (premium) measures Coverage, Efficiency, (excerpt): https://apidocs.kennasecurity.com/reference/check-remediation-score.md (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/signals/cisco-vm/ --- # Exploitation evidence carries 40, fixed before any score METHOD, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Platforms are ranked on how they turn exploitation evidence into a priority: evidence 40, seeing exposure before the scanner 15, unifying sources 15, automation 15, and 5 each for AI governance, public sector readiness and proof. The weights were committed before scoring, and the scorer saw coded evidence, never names. ## The weights | Criterion | Weight | What is scored | | --- | --- | --- | | Unifies every source | 15 | Number and kind of sources ingested as documented, a way to add one not on the list, correlation and de-duplication. | | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | 40 | Uses exploitation-in-the-wild evidence (KEV, exploit and malware evidence, EPSS or similar prediction) with asset and business context, and lets the customer shape the scoring. | | Automation at enterprise scale | 15 | Rules and workflows that assign, ticket and track without a person per finding, at volumes the vendor documents. | | Sees exposure before the scanner | 15 | Answers 'are we exposed' to a new disclosure before scan signatures arrive. | | AI under governance | 5 | Agents and assistants with approval, audit and limits the customer sets. | | Public sector readiness | 5 | FedRAMP status and support for federal directives and frameworks. | | Proof | 5 | Analyst recognition, validations with the commissioner named, named customer statements. | Total = the sum of each weight times the criterion score (0 to 10), divided by 100, so totals run from 0 to 10. Note on the split: 'the other three 15 between them' split 5/5/5. ## The five situations and their weights Each situation page ranks the platforms on sale on that situation's own weights, committed on the same day as the site weights and before any score. The weights are the same on all three sites of this publication group, because the buyer is the same. | Situation | Unifies every source | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | Automation at enterprise scale | Sees exposure before the scanner | AI under governance | Public sector readiness | Proof | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Federal agencies and contractors | 15 | 20 | 15 | 5 | 5 | 30 | 10 | | Large enterprises with ten or more scanners | 30 | 20 | 30 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 10 | | Managed security providers | 25 | 20 | 30 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 10 | | Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet | 20 | 30 | 20 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 15 | | Application security and infrastructure in one queue | 35 | 20 | 25 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 10 | ## How the scores were made - Evidence first. Researchers collected public facts for every platform, each with its source URL and read date, from the vendor's documentation, its marketing pages, government records (the GSA FedRAMP Marketplace data) and third parties. - Blind scoring. A scorer received the rubric and the evidence with vendor and product names replaced by codes and URLs removed. It gave every platform an integer from 0 to 10 on each of the seven criteria. - Blind review. A second reviewer, also working on the coded evidence, checked all 91 scores against the anchors and proposed 13 corrections, all applied before the codes were opened. They are listed below. - Totals by script. Every total and every order on this site is computed by one scoring script from the committed scores and weights. Nobody types a total. - Ties. Exact ties are broken by the higher evidence score, then the higher unify score, then alphabetically, a rule committed with the weights. ## The rounding rule Rankings use the exact totals, which have at most two decimals because the weights are whole numbers. Pages show one decimal, rounded half up (7.05 shows as 7.1). Where two platforms in the same table would show the same one-decimal figure, that table prints two decimals, so a printed tie is always a real tie. ## What kind of evidence the scores rest on A criterion supported only by a vendor's marketing pages scores at most 7. Technical documentation, government records or third-party sources can lift a score above 7. Outcome numbers (percent reductions, findings per day) are vendor claims and count for at most one point. Nucleus's evidence is 69 marketing facts and 2 government records out of 71, with no public technical documentation found on 10 Nov 2026; that is why four of its seven scores sit at exactly 7, the marketing ceiling. Leaders that pass 7 on a criterion do so on documentation. | Platform | Facts | Technical docs | Marketing | Government | Third party | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Nucleus | 71 | 0 | 69 | 2 | 0 | | Brinqa | 38 | 17 | 21 | 0 | 0 | | Qualys | 32 | 4 | 26 | 2 | 0 | | Tenable | 31 | 2 | 28 | 1 | 0 | | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 22 | 16 | 0 | 4 | 2 | | Phoenix Security | 36 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 1 | | ArmorCode | 31 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 0 | | Hackuity | 33 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 | | Seemplicity | 32 | 0 | 28 | 0 | 4 | | Zscaler UVM | 28 | 0 | 27 | 1 | 0 | | Rapid7 | 25 | 5 | 19 | 1 | 0 | | Vulcan Cyber | 27 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 0 | | Cisco Vulnerability Management | 24 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 1 | A larger evidence file does not raise a score by itself: each anchor asks for a kind of evidence, not a count. Some competitor files are thinner because pages were unreachable on the read date (ServiceNow's newsroom returned errors, so its proof score of 0 means none found, not known absent). ## How firm the positions are - The ranked view is an exact tie (Brinqa 6.90, Nucleus 6.90) settled by the committed tie-break on the evidence score. - One point on any Nucleus criterion would put it first; one point off its evidence score would put it third. - The KEV Lag Ledger is computed, not scored: it has no weights and changes only when the public data does. ## The rubric anchors ### Unifies every source (weight 15) - **0:** No documented ingestion of third-party findings (single-vendor scanner only). - **3:** Ingests its own scanner plus a few third-party sources; no documented de-duplication. - **5:** Documented connectors across infrastructure and one other kind (appsec, cloud, pentest); de-duplication documented or claimed. - **7:** Documented connectors across infrastructure, application security, cloud and asset sources; documented correlation and de-duplication; a generic import (CSV/API) for unlisted sources. - **9:** As 7, plus a documented universal or custom connector framework for unlisted sources and documented normalization across finding types. - **10:** As 9, with third-party confirmation. ### Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (weight 40) - **0:** CVSS only. - **3:** One exploitation signal (for example KEV flag) beside CVSS; no customer control. - **5:** Several exploitation signals combined into a proprietary score; asset criticality used; limited customer control. - **7:** Several named exploitation signals plus asset and business context; documented customer-adjustable scoring or rules. - **9:** As 7, with documented, fully customizable scoring formula or weights and the signals named and exposed per finding. - **10:** As 9, with third-party confirmation. ### Automation at enterprise scale (weight 15) - **0:** Manual export only. - **3:** Manual ticket creation from the console; one ticketing integration. - **5:** Automated ticket creation to at least two ticketing systems; basic assignment rules. - **7:** Rule-based ownership assignment, bi-directional ticket sync, SLA tracking, automated closure on verification. - **9:** As 7, with documented enterprise volume figures or a documented workflow/automation engine beyond ticketing. - **10:** As 9, with third-party confirmation. ### Sees exposure before the scanner (weight 15) - **0:** None found. - **3:** Threat intelligence alerts on new disclosures without matching to the customer's assets. - **5:** Matches new disclosures to an inventory (software, SBOM, asset attributes) without waiting for a scanner plug-in, described in marketing only. - **7:** Documented capability matching new disclosures to the customer's inventory before scanner signatures. - **9:** As 7 with documented speed or zero-day workflow. - **10:** As 9, with third-party confirmation. ### AI under governance (weight 5) - **0:** No AI assistant or agent found. - **3:** Chat assistant for questions only; no governance controls described. - **5:** Assistant or agents that take actions, governance controls not documented. - **7:** Agents or assistant with at least one documented governance control (approval step, audit log, role-based limits). - **9:** Agents with documented approval, audit and customer-set limits. - **10:** As 9, with third-party confirmation. ### Public sector readiness (weight 5) - **0:** None found. - **3:** Claims public-sector customers or compliance mapping without FedRAMP. - **5:** FedRAMP In Process or Ready (Marketplace), or FedRAMP for a different product of the same vendor that does not cover this one. - **7:** FedRAMP Authorized (Marketplace) for the product, Moderate, or Authorized claim not confirmed on the Marketplace. - **9:** FedRAMP Authorized on the Marketplace, plus documented support for CISA directives (BOD/KEV reporting) or CMMC / NIST RMF. - **10:** As 9 at High impact level, or with DoD IL4+. ### Proof (weight 5) - **0:** None found. - **3:** Unnamed customer stories only. - **5:** Named customer statements, or one analyst mention (any placement). - **7:** Analyst report placement (for example Gartner MQ any quadrant, Forrester Wave, IDC MarketScape) plus named customer statements. - **9:** Leader placement in a major analyst evaluation of this category plus named customers. - **10:** Leader placement in two or more major evaluations plus named customers. ## Rules applied to every score - Score only from the evidence file. Anything not in the evidence is 'none found on 2026-11-10' and earns nothing. - Evidence kinds: vendor-doc (technical documentation, API reference, help center, integration catalog), vendor-marketing (product pages, blogs, press releases, outcome numbers), third-party (analyst, press, review site, partner, customer outside the vendor's site), government (FedRAMP Marketplace, CISA, NIST). - A criterion whose supporting evidence is only vendor-marketing scores at most 7. vendor-doc, third-party or government evidence confirming the capability lifts the cap. - Outcome numbers (percent reductions, findings per day, minutes to ticket) are vendor claims; they may support at most 1 point of any criterion and never lift the cap. - A product announced as end-of-sale or merged into another product is scored on its documented capabilities; its status is reported, not scored. - Breadth (raw connector count) contributes at most 2 points of the unify criterion, so it never carries more than 10 percent of any ranking (highest unify weight is 35). ## Score changes in the blind review | Platform | Criterion | From | To | Reason | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Phoenix Security | AI under governance | 6 | 7 | Anchor 7 needs one governance control; a stated developer-approval step on every AI PR meets it at the marketing cap, as Tenable and Qualys got 7 on the same kind of marketing evidence. | | ArmorCode | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | 5 | 6 | Named KEV, EPSS, AATI and exploit status plus asset criticality, data sensitivity and business context, without customer control, is the same position Phoenix Security and Hackuity were given 6 for. | | ArmorCode | AI under governance | 6 | 7 | Missed a fact: high-impact automated changes are routed to human review (an approval step), plus auditable decisions, meets anchor 7 at the marketing cap, consistent with Tenable/Qualys. | | Zscaler UVM | Sees exposure before the scanner | 2 | 0 | The cited fact is about mitigating before a patch window, not detecting exposure to new disclosures; no evidence touches anchor 3, so none found gives 0. | | Rapid7 | Proof | 6 | 5 | The customer quote is unattributed, so anchor 7's named-customer condition is unmet; an analyst Leader claim alone is anchor 5, as ArmorCode (IDC Leader, no named customers) got. | | Seemplicity | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | 5 | 6 | Named KEV, EPSS, VulnCheck, in-the-wild and exploit-code signals plus asset value and business context, without customer control, matches the 6 given to Phoenix Security and Hackuity. | | Brinqa | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | 8 | 9 | Vendor-doc shows KEV and EPSS exposed per CVE and a customer-configurable formula (base plus customer-set risk factors), which meets anchor 9 in full; the reason names nothing missing. | | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | Unifies every source | 5 | 4 | Anchor 5 needs de-duplication documented or claimed, but the docs say there is none across integrations, and the connector count is undocumented (0 breadth points); 4 sits between 3 and 5 for the custom-integration guidance. | | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | 8 | 9 | Vendor-doc shows KEV, EPSS and Early Warning fields on each finding and customer-built calculators with conditions and weight percentages, which is anchor 9's fully customizable weights with signals exposed per finding. | | Vulcan Cyber | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence | 6 | 7 | Anchor 7 is met at the marketing cap: named exploit sources (exploitDB, Metasploit, M.E.D, Mandiant, Recorded Future), business-context tagging and customer-configurable weights; KEV/EPSS by name is not a rubric requirement. | | Qualys | Unifies every source | 6 | 5 | No de-duplication is documented or claimed, so anchor 5 is not met; 3 plus a point for the documented CSV import and multi-kind catalog plus 1 breadth point (100+) caps it at 5, consistent with Rapid7 and ServiceNow Vulnerability Response. | | Qualys | Public sector readiness | 9 | 10 | The scorer treated anchor 9 as met, and the Marketplace lists the Government Platform as FedRAMP Authorized at High, which is anchor 10's extra condition (Nucleus got 9 on the same directive evidence at Moderate). | | Nucleus | AI under governance | 6 | 7 | An approved-actions step and role-based access controls on AI tool connections are documented governance controls; anchor 7 at the marketing cap, consistent with Tenable and Qualys. | No score has changed since the codes were opened on 10 Nov 2026. A score changes only when a sourced fact changes; the change is logged on the corrections page with the fact. ## The KEV Lag Ledger computation Every KEV entry with dateAdded in the trailing 365 days of the catalog release. NVD published date and CVSS base score (v3.1, else v3.0, else v4.0, else v2; NVD Primary first). EPSS score and percentile on the KEV dateAdded from the FIRST API. days_publication_to_kev = dateAdded minus NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. ## Sources - GSA FedRAMP Marketplace data file: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/FedRAMP/marketplace-fedramp-gov-data/main/data.json (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/method/ --- # Nucleus leads for federal agencies and contractors BEST FOR, FEDERAL, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** For federal agencies and contractors, Nucleus leads at 7.5 on this situation's weights, ahead of Qualys at 7.0 and Tenable at 6.3. Nucleus's lead over Qualys comes mostly from exploitation evidence (+0.40). The weights were committed before any score. The full ranking and the evidence are below. A federal agency or contractor weighs exploitation evidence as an obligation as well as a ranking input. BOD 26-04, issued 2026-06-10, is the directive in force; it revoked BOD 22-01, the original KEV directive, and it sets remediation timelines from four answers: whether the asset is publicly exposed, whether the CVE is in KEV, whether exploitation can be automated, and the technical impact. CISA publishes the KEV, automation and technical impact answers for every CVE through its Vulnrichment program. The evidence a federal buyer needs is therefore KEV status with its dates, the CISA SSVC fields, and reporting that can show them per asset. In the KEV feed read on 2026-11-10, 70 of the 92 entries added since 2026-09-01 carry a 3 day due date and 22 a 14 day one. On this situation's weights, Nucleus leads this situation at 7.45 against Qualys at 6.95, a margin of 0.50 on a weight of 30 for public sector. Qualys is ahead on that one criterion: the GSA FedRAMP data lists the Qualys Government Platform as Authorized at High, and Nucleus as Authorized at Moderate. Nucleus is ahead on unify, evidence and proof. A caution applies to the leader. ## The top three ### Rank 1: Nucleus (7.5) FedRAMP authorized, 183 listed integrations (vendor says 200+) Documented strength: a 183-entry integration catalog plus FlexConnect and a FedRAMP Moderate authorization. [Read the profile](/signals/nucleus/) ### Rank 2: Qualys (7.0) FedRAMP authorized, 100+ connectors, vendor count Qualys documents a catalog of 100+ connectors with a Generic CSV importer and InstaScan matching new advisories to inventory within minutes, plus FedRAMP High for its Government Platform. [Read the profile](/signals/qualys/) ### Rank 3: Tenable (6.3) FedRAMP authorized, 300+ connectors, vendor count Tenable documents a 300+ integration Exposure Data Fabric with correlation and de-duplication plus a FedRAMP Moderate authorization for Tenable One. [Read the profile](/signals/tenable/) Nucleus leads at 7.5, ahead of Qualys at 7.0. Nucleus gains on exploitation evidence (7 against 5 at weight 20, +0.40); unifying sources (7 against 5 at weight 15, +0.30) and proof (6 against 5 at weight 10, +0.10); Qualys wins back public sector readiness (10 against 9 at weight 30, +0.30). **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). ## The full ranking | Rank | Platform | Unifies every source (15) | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (20) | Automation at enterprise scale (15) | Sees exposure before the scanner (5) | AI under governance (5) | Public sector readiness (30) | Proof (10) | Total | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Nucleus | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 7.5 | | 2 | Qualys | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 7.0 | | 3 | Tenable | 8 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6.3 | | 4 | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 5.9 | | 5 | Brinqa | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 7 | 5.7 | | 6 | Rapid7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 5.4 | | 7 | Zscaler UVM | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 5.1 | | 8 | Phoenix Security | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 5.0 | | 9 | Hackuity | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4.8 | | 10 | ArmorCode | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 4.3 | | 11 | Seemplicity | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 4.0 | ## This situation's weights Committed on 10 Nov 2026, before any platform was scored, and published here unchanged. - **Unifies every source:** weight 15. Number and kind of sources ingested as documented, a way to add one not on the list, correlation and de-duplication. - **Prioritizes on exploitation evidence:** weight 20. Uses exploitation-in-the-wild evidence (KEV, exploit and malware evidence, EPSS or similar prediction) with asset and business context, and lets the customer shape the scoring. - **Automation at enterprise scale:** weight 15. Rules and workflows that assign, ticket and track without a person per finding, at volumes the vendor documents. - **Sees exposure before the scanner:** weight 5. Answers 'are we exposed' to a new disclosure before scan signatures arrive. - **AI under governance:** weight 5. Agents and assistants with approval, audit and limits the customer sets. - **Public sector readiness:** weight 30. FedRAMP status and support for federal directives and frameworks. - **Proof:** weight 10. Analyst recognition, validations with the commissioner named, named customer statements. ## The other situations - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) ## Sources - Home page: ingest, correlate and normalize data from all tools into one hub.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Aggregation page documents asset deduplication across scanning tools.: https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Integrations page header counts 183 listed integrations (the REST listing at /wp-json/wp/v2/integration (excerpt): https://nucleussec.com/platform/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - The connector catalog is titled as 100+ integrations and centralizes Qualys and third-party findings into (excerpt): https://www.qualys.com/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - A Generic CSV connector imports third-party vulnerability data into ETM by mapping CSV columns to Qualys (excerpt): https://www.qualys.com/connectors/csv (read 10 Nov 2026) - ETM aggregates vulnerabilities, misconfigurations and web app risks from Qualys and non-Qualys sources for (excerpt): https://www.qualys.com/apps/enterprise-trurisk-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable One advertises 300+ data integrations feeding its Exposure Data Fabric.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one (read 10 Nov 2026) - A Tenable One Open Connector ingests data from other tools, internal systems, spreadsheets or files.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - Connector entries link to per-connector documentation (for example AWS EC2, AWS Inspector, Microsoft TVM, (excerpt): https://www.tenable.com/partners/technology (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/best-for/federal/ --- # Brinqa leads for large enterprises with ten or more scanners; Nucleus is second BEST FOR, LARGE ENTERPRISE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** For large enterprises with ten or more scanners, Brinqa leads at 8.0 on this situation's weights. Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9 and Tenable third at 6.3. Brinqa's lead over Nucleus comes mostly from unifying sources (+0.60). The weights were committed before any score. A large enterprise with ten or more scanners and several ticketing systems weighs exploitation evidence as something that has to arrive in one record per CVE, from every scanner, without disagreement. The same CVE may carry a CVSS score from three assessors, a vendor rating from two platforms and one EPSS value. The buyer's question is which of those is kept, which is shown, and whether KEV status and the EPSS value are stored with their dates. The ledger indicates the stakes: of the 318 recent KEV additions, 17.3 percent were published a year or more before listing, so old findings that scanners had rated low can change meaning on one date. On this situation's weights, Brinqa leads this situation at 7.95, with Nucleus second at 6.85, a margin of 1.10. The reasons are in the weights: unify counts 30, and Brinqa scores 9 against 7 (a gain of 0.60); evidence counts 20, with 9 against 7 (0.40); automation counts 30, with 8 against 7 (0.30). Nucleus recovers 0.30 on the before-scanner criterion, which is not enough. Brinqa's documentation describes a CISA KEV connector with federal due dates and a FIRST EPSS connector exposing probability and percentile per CVE. ## The top three ### Rank 1: Brinqa (8.0) 260+ connectors, vendor count Brinqa's clearest documented strength is breadth of ingestion (260+ integrations) paired with a customer-configurable risk score and KEV and EPSS connectors. [Read the profile](/signals/brinqa/) ### Rank 2: Nucleus (6.9) FedRAMP authorized, 183 listed integrations (vendor says 200+) Documented strength: a 183-entry integration catalog plus FlexConnect and a FedRAMP Moderate authorization. [Read the profile](/signals/nucleus/) ### Rank 3: Tenable (6.3) FedRAMP authorized, 300+ connectors, vendor count Tenable documents a 300+ integration Exposure Data Fabric with correlation and de-duplication plus a FedRAMP Moderate authorization for Tenable One. [Read the profile](/signals/tenable/) **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Brinqa leads at 8.0; Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9. Brinqa gains on unifying sources (9 against 7 at weight 30, +0.60); exploitation evidence (9 against 7 at weight 20, +0.40); automation (8 against 7 at weight 30, +0.30) and proof (7 against 6 at weight 10, +0.10); Nucleus wins back seeing exposure before the scanner (6 against 0 at weight 5, +0.30). ## The full ranking | Rank | Platform | Unifies every source (30) | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (20) | Automation at enterprise scale (30) | Sees exposure before the scanner (5) | AI under governance (5) | Proof (10) | Total | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Brinqa | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 8.0 | | 2 | Nucleus | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6.9 | | 3 | Tenable | 8 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 6.3 | | 4 | ArmorCode | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6.2 | | 5 | Seemplicity | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 6.0 | | 6 | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 5.9 | | 7 | Phoenix Security | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5.9 | | 8 | Hackuity | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5.80 | | 9 | Qualys | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 5.75 | | 10 | Zscaler UVM | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5.4 | | 11 | Rapid7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4.8 | ## This situation's weights Committed on 10 Nov 2026, before any platform was scored, and published here unchanged. - **Unifies every source:** weight 30. Number and kind of sources ingested as documented, a way to add one not on the list, correlation and de-duplication. - **Prioritizes on exploitation evidence:** weight 20. Uses exploitation-in-the-wild evidence (KEV, exploit and malware evidence, EPSS or similar prediction) with asset and business context, and lets the customer shape the scoring. - **Automation at enterprise scale:** weight 30. Rules and workflows that assign, ticket and track without a person per finding, at volumes the vendor documents. - **Sees exposure before the scanner:** weight 5. Answers 'are we exposed' to a new disclosure before scan signatures arrive. - **AI under governance:** weight 5. Agents and assistants with approval, audit and limits the customer sets. - **Public sector readiness:** weight 0. FedRAMP status and support for federal directives and frameworks. - **Proof:** weight 10. Analyst recognition, validations with the commissioner named, named customer statements. ## The other situations - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) ## Sources - Brinqa documentation describes the connector framework as covering APIs, database extracts, and CSV, JSON (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - A CSV Connector ingests delimited flat files with attributes derived dynamically from the header row (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/csv-connector (read 10 Nov 2026) - Documentation connector pages exist for scanners Tenable (io, sc, nessus), Qualys (VM, WAS, container, (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml (read 10 Nov 2026) - Home page: ingest, correlate and normalize data from all tools into one hub.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Aggregation page documents asset deduplication across scanning tools.: https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Integrations page header counts 183 listed integrations (the REST listing at /wp-json/wp/v2/integration (excerpt): https://nucleussec.com/platform/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable One advertises 300+ data integrations feeding its Exposure Data Fabric.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one (read 10 Nov 2026) - A Tenable One Open Connector ingests data from other tools, internal systems, spreadsheets or files.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - Connector entries link to per-connector documentation (for example AWS EC2, AWS Inspector, Microsoft TVM, (excerpt): https://www.tenable.com/partners/technology (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/best-for/large-enterprise/ --- # Brinqa leads for managed security providers; Nucleus is second BEST FOR, MSSP, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** For managed security providers, Brinqa leads at 7.9 on this situation's weights. Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9 and ArmorCode third at 6.3. Brinqa's lead over Nucleus comes mostly from unifying sources (+0.50). The weights were committed before any score. The full ranking and the evidence are below. A managed security provider runs programs for many customers and needs exploitation evidence that is the same for every one of them. KEV and EPSS fit that need because they are public, dated and identical across tenants. A vendor rating is a different matter, since it ties each customer's priority to one platform's proprietary view. The provider also reports to customers who know CVSS, so the report needs a severity column beside the exploitation columns. The ledger's 29 KEV additions marked with known ransomware use out of 318 are the kind of item an MSSP can promise to escalate for every client. On this situation's weights, Brinqa leads at 7.85 and Nucleus is second at 6.85, a margin of 1.00. Unify counts 25 here and gives Brinqa 0.50; evidence gives it 0.40 and automation, which counts 30, gives it 0.30. Nucleus's before-scanner lead returns 0.30. Multi-tenancy is not one of the seven scored criteria; the review reports it as a profile fact, so a provider should ask each platform about tenant separation directly. ## The top three ### Rank 1: Brinqa (7.9) 260+ connectors, vendor count Brinqa's clearest documented strength is breadth of ingestion (260+ integrations) paired with a customer-configurable risk score and KEV and EPSS connectors. [Read the profile](/signals/brinqa/) ### Rank 2: Nucleus (6.9) FedRAMP authorized, 183 listed integrations (vendor says 200+) Documented strength: a 183-entry integration catalog plus FlexConnect and a FedRAMP Moderate authorization. [Read the profile](/signals/nucleus/) ### Rank 3: ArmorCode (6.3) 350+ connectors, vendor count ArmorCode documents 350+ out-of-the-box integrations spanning infrastructure, application, cloud and pen-test sources with CISA KEV and EPSS in its risk scoring. [Read the profile](/signals/armorcode/) **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Brinqa leads at 7.9; Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9. Brinqa gains on unifying sources (9 against 7 at weight 25, +0.50); exploitation evidence (9 against 7 at weight 20, +0.40); automation (8 against 7 at weight 30, +0.30) and proof (7 against 6 at weight 10, +0.10); Nucleus wins back seeing exposure before the scanner (6 against 0 at weight 5, +0.30). ## The full ranking | Rank | Platform | Unifies every source (25) | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (20) | Automation at enterprise scale (30) | Sees exposure before the scanner (5) | AI under governance (10) | Proof (10) | Total | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Brinqa | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 7.9 | | 2 | Nucleus | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6.9 | | 3 | ArmorCode | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6.3 | | 4 | Tenable | 8 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 6.2 | | 5 | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 6.1 | | 6 | Phoenix Security | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5.90 | | 7 | Seemplicity | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 5.90 | | 8 | Qualys | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 5.85 | | 9 | Hackuity | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5.7 | | 10 | Zscaler UVM | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5.2 | | 11 | Rapid7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4.7 | ## This situation's weights Committed on 10 Nov 2026, before any platform was scored, and published here unchanged. - **Unifies every source:** weight 25. Number and kind of sources ingested as documented, a way to add one not on the list, correlation and de-duplication. - **Prioritizes on exploitation evidence:** weight 20. Uses exploitation-in-the-wild evidence (KEV, exploit and malware evidence, EPSS or similar prediction) with asset and business context, and lets the customer shape the scoring. - **Automation at enterprise scale:** weight 30. Rules and workflows that assign, ticket and track without a person per finding, at volumes the vendor documents. - **Sees exposure before the scanner:** weight 5. Answers 'are we exposed' to a new disclosure before scan signatures arrive. - **AI under governance:** weight 10. Agents and assistants with approval, audit and limits the customer sets. - **Public sector readiness:** weight 0. FedRAMP status and support for federal directives and frameworks. - **Proof:** weight 10. Analyst recognition, validations with the commissioner named, named customer statements. ## The other situations - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) ## Sources - Brinqa documentation describes the connector framework as covering APIs, database extracts, and CSV, JSON (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - A CSV Connector ingests delimited flat files with attributes derived dynamically from the header row (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/csv-connector (read 10 Nov 2026) - Documentation connector pages exist for scanners Tenable (io, sc, nessus), Qualys (VM, WAS, container, (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml (read 10 Nov 2026) - Home page: ingest, correlate and normalize data from all tools into one hub.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Aggregation page documents asset deduplication across scanning tools.: https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Integrations page header counts 183 listed integrations (the REST listing at /wp-json/wp/v2/integration (excerpt): https://nucleussec.com/platform/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - ArmorCode's integrations page states a count of out-of-the-box integrations.: https://www.armorcode.com/integrations (read 10 Nov 2026) - The UVM page says UVM ingests infrastructure scanners, application security tools, cloud platforms, (excerpt): https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - ArmorCode AI Correlation (RSA, May 6 2024) correlates findings across SAST, DAST and runtime scanners (excerpt): https://www.armorcode.com/news/introducing-armorcode-ai-correlation (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/best-for/mssp/ --- # Brinqa leads for mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet; Nucleus is second BEST FOR, MID-SIZE, REPLACING KENNA, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** For mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet, Brinqa leads at 7.9 on this situation's weights. Nucleus is 2nd at 6.8 and ArmorCode third at 6.10. Brinqa's lead over Nucleus comes mostly from exploitation evidence (+0.60). The weights were committed before any score. A mid-size team replacing Cisco Vulnerability Management (Kenna) or a spreadsheet weighs exploitation evidence most heavily of any situation: the weight on evidence is 30. The old risk score was an integer from 0 to 100 according to the Cisco API documentation, and none of the vendor ratings read on 2026-11-10 publishes a mapping from it. Cisco's bulletin EOL15812 sets end-of-sale on 10 Mar 2026 and last date of support on 30 Jun 2028. The practical step is to rebuild the exploitation part of the score from public inputs first: KEV status, EPSS probability with percentile, and CVSS as the severity floor. Each is free and none needs a migration. On this situation's weights, Brinqa leads at 7.85 and Nucleus is second at 6.80, a margin of 1.05. Evidence at weight 30 gives Brinqa 0.60, from a score of 9 against 7, and unify adds 0.40. Nucleus's before-scanner lead returns 0.30. Brinqa's documents describe KEV and EPSS per CVE and risk factors that a configurator sets on top of the base score, which is the documented way to set customer weights on top of a base score. ## The top three ### Rank 1: Brinqa (7.9) 260+ connectors, vendor count Brinqa's clearest documented strength is breadth of ingestion (260+ integrations) paired with a customer-configurable risk score and KEV and EPSS connectors. [Read the profile](/signals/brinqa/) ### Rank 2: Nucleus (6.8) FedRAMP authorized, 183 listed integrations (vendor says 200+) Documented strength: a 183-entry integration catalog plus FlexConnect and a FedRAMP Moderate authorization. [Read the profile](/signals/nucleus/) ### Rank 3: ArmorCode (6.10) 350+ connectors, vendor count ArmorCode documents 350+ out-of-the-box integrations spanning infrastructure, application, cloud and pen-test sources with CISA KEV and EPSS in its risk scoring. [Read the profile](/signals/armorcode/) **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Brinqa leads at 7.9; Nucleus is 2nd at 6.8. Brinqa gains on exploitation evidence (9 against 7 at weight 30, +0.60); unifying sources (9 against 7 at weight 20, +0.40); automation (8 against 7 at weight 20, +0.20) and proof (7 against 6 at weight 15, +0.15); Nucleus wins back seeing exposure before the scanner (6 against 0 at weight 5, +0.30). ## The full ranking | Rank | Platform | Unifies every source (20) | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (30) | Automation at enterprise scale (20) | Sees exposure before the scanner (5) | AI under governance (10) | Proof (15) | Total | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Brinqa | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 7.9 | | 2 | Nucleus | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6.8 | | 3 | ArmorCode | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6.10 | | 4 | Tenable | 8 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 6.05 | | 5 | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 6.0 | | 6 | Phoenix Security | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5.9 | | 7 | Seemplicity | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 5.8 | | 8 | Qualys | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 5.7 | | 9 | Hackuity | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5.5 | | 10 | Zscaler UVM | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5.1 | | 11 | Rapid7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4.7 | ## This situation's weights Committed on 10 Nov 2026, before any platform was scored, and published here unchanged. - **Unifies every source:** weight 20. Number and kind of sources ingested as documented, a way to add one not on the list, correlation and de-duplication. - **Prioritizes on exploitation evidence:** weight 30. Uses exploitation-in-the-wild evidence (KEV, exploit and malware evidence, EPSS or similar prediction) with asset and business context, and lets the customer shape the scoring. - **Automation at enterprise scale:** weight 20. Rules and workflows that assign, ticket and track without a person per finding, at volumes the vendor documents. - **Sees exposure before the scanner:** weight 5. Answers 'are we exposed' to a new disclosure before scan signatures arrive. - **AI under governance:** weight 10. Agents and assistants with approval, audit and limits the customer sets. - **Public sector readiness:** weight 0. FedRAMP status and support for federal directives and frameworks. - **Proof:** weight 15. Analyst recognition, validations with the commissioner named, named customer statements. ## The other situations - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) ## Sources - Brinqa documentation describes the connector framework as covering APIs, database extracts, and CSV, JSON (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - A CSV Connector ingests delimited flat files with attributes derived dynamically from the header row (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/csv-connector (read 10 Nov 2026) - Documentation connector pages exist for scanners Tenable (io, sc, nessus), Qualys (VM, WAS, container, (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml (read 10 Nov 2026) - Home page: ingest, correlate and normalize data from all tools into one hub.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Aggregation page documents asset deduplication across scanning tools.: https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Integrations page header counts 183 listed integrations (the REST listing at /wp-json/wp/v2/integration (excerpt): https://nucleussec.com/platform/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - ArmorCode's integrations page states a count of out-of-the-box integrations.: https://www.armorcode.com/integrations (read 10 Nov 2026) - The UVM page says UVM ingests infrastructure scanners, application security tools, cloud platforms, (excerpt): https://www.armorcode.com/platform/unified-vulnerability-management (read 10 Nov 2026) - ArmorCode AI Correlation (RSA, May 6 2024) correlates findings across SAST, DAST and runtime scanners (excerpt): https://www.armorcode.com/news/introducing-armorcode-ai-correlation (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/ --- # Brinqa leads for application security and infrastructure in one queue; Nucleus is second BEST FOR, APPSEC PLUS INFRASTRUCTURE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** For application security and infrastructure in one queue, Brinqa leads at 8.0 on this situation's weights. Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9 and Tenable third at 6.4. Brinqa's lead over Nucleus comes mostly from unifying sources (+0.70). The weights were committed before any score. A team with application security findings and infrastructure findings in one queue weighs exploitation evidence unevenly. Infrastructure CVEs have KEV status and EPSS scores. A code-level finding from a static or dynamic test often has neither, because it has no CVE, and only a CVSS vector from the testing tool. A ranking that treats a missing EPSS value as zero will put those findings last, and the ledger shows why that is unsafe: 58 of 318 KEV additions had no EPSS value on their listing day. The buyer needs a stated rule for items with no public exploitation data. On this situation's weights, Brinqa leads this situation at 8.00, with Nucleus second at 6.85, a margin of 1.15. Unify counts 35 here and gives Brinqa 0.70. Evidence gives it 0.40 and automation 0.25. Nucleus's before-scanner lead returns 0.30. This situation has the widest margin because unify carries its largest weight here, 35, and Brinqa's lead is greatest on that criterion. ## The top three ### Rank 1: Brinqa (8.0) 260+ connectors, vendor count Brinqa's clearest documented strength is breadth of ingestion (260+ integrations) paired with a customer-configurable risk score and KEV and EPSS connectors. [Read the profile](/signals/brinqa/) ### Rank 2: Nucleus (6.9) FedRAMP authorized, 183 listed integrations (vendor says 200+) Documented strength: a 183-entry integration catalog plus FlexConnect and a FedRAMP Moderate authorization. [Read the profile](/signals/nucleus/) ### Rank 3: Tenable (6.4) FedRAMP authorized, 300+ connectors, vendor count Tenable documents a 300+ integration Exposure Data Fabric with correlation and de-duplication plus a FedRAMP Moderate authorization for Tenable One. [Read the profile](/signals/tenable/) **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Brinqa leads at 8.0; Nucleus is 2nd at 6.9. Brinqa gains on unifying sources (9 against 7 at weight 35, +0.70); exploitation evidence (9 against 7 at weight 20, +0.40); automation (8 against 7 at weight 25, +0.25) and proof (7 against 6 at weight 10, +0.10); Nucleus wins back seeing exposure before the scanner (6 against 0 at weight 5, +0.30). ## The full ranking | Rank | Platform | Unifies every source (35) | Prioritizes on exploitation evidence (20) | Automation at enterprise scale (25) | Sees exposure before the scanner (5) | AI under governance (5) | Proof (10) | Total | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Brinqa | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 8.0 | | 2 | Nucleus | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6.9 | | 3 | Tenable | 8 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 7 | 6.4 | | 4 | ArmorCode | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6.2 | | 5 | Phoenix Security | 7 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6.0 | | 6 | Seemplicity | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 5.90 | | 7 | Hackuity | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5.85 | | 8 | ServiceNow Vulnerability Response | 4 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 5.70 | | 9 | Qualys | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 5.65 | | 10 | Zscaler UVM | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5.4 | | 11 | Rapid7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4.8 | ## This situation's weights Committed on 10 Nov 2026, before any platform was scored, and published here unchanged. - **Unifies every source:** weight 35. Number and kind of sources ingested as documented, a way to add one not on the list, correlation and de-duplication. - **Prioritizes on exploitation evidence:** weight 20. Uses exploitation-in-the-wild evidence (KEV, exploit and malware evidence, EPSS or similar prediction) with asset and business context, and lets the customer shape the scoring. - **Automation at enterprise scale:** weight 25. Rules and workflows that assign, ticket and track without a person per finding, at volumes the vendor documents. - **Sees exposure before the scanner:** weight 5. Answers 'are we exposed' to a new disclosure before scan signatures arrive. - **AI under governance:** weight 5. Agents and assistants with approval, audit and limits the customer sets. - **Public sector readiness:** weight 0. FedRAMP status and support for federal directives and frameworks. - **Proof:** weight 10. Analyst recognition, validations with the commissioner named, named customer statements. ## The other situations - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) ## Sources - Brinqa documentation describes the connector framework as covering APIs, database extracts, and CSV, JSON (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - A CSV Connector ingests delimited flat files with attributes derived dynamically from the header row (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/connectors/csv-connector (read 10 Nov 2026) - Documentation connector pages exist for scanners Tenable (io, sc, nessus), Qualys (VM, WAS, container, (excerpt): https://docs.brinqa.com/sitemap.xml (read 10 Nov 2026) - Home page: ingest, correlate and normalize data from all tools into one hub.: https://nucleussec.com/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Aggregation page documents asset deduplication across scanning tools.: https://nucleussec.com/platform/vulnerability-aggregation/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Integrations page header counts 183 listed integrations (the REST listing at /wp-json/wp/v2/integration (excerpt): https://nucleussec.com/platform/integrations/ (read 10 Nov 2026) - Tenable One advertises 300+ data integrations feeding its Exposure Data Fabric.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one (read 10 Nov 2026) - A Tenable One Open Connector ingests data from other tools, internal systems, spreadsheets or files.: https://www.tenable.com/products/tenable-one/connectors (read 10 Nov 2026) - Connector entries link to per-connector documentation (for example AWS EC2, AWS Inspector, Microsoft TVM, (excerpt): https://www.tenable.com/partners/technology (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/ --- # Five situations, each ranked on its own weights BEST FOR, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Nucleus leads for federal agencies and contractors at 7.45, ahead of Qualys at 6.95, on its FedRAMP Moderate authorization. Brinqa leads the other four situations by 1.00 to 1.15, carried by documented KEV and EPSS connectors and customer-set risk factors. Nucleus is second in each of those four. - [Federal agencies and contractors](/best-for/federal/) - [Large enterprises with ten or more scanners](/best-for/large-enterprise/) - [Managed security providers](/best-for/mssp/) - [Mid-size teams replacing Kenna or a spreadsheet](/best-for/mid-size-replacing-kenna/) - [Application security and infrastructure in one queue](/best-for/appsec-plus-infra/) **Where Nucleus is behind.** Nucleus's intelligence feed and its KEV research are its own: the Nucleus Threat Rating has no published numeric scale or method, and its claim that 18 percent of new KEV entries from October 2025 to March 2026 showed exploitation signals before listing has not yet been checked against CISA's catalog. Its headline figures are vendor claims that do not agree with each other (9 billion findings a day on the home page, 8 billion on its aggregation page). Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/best-for/ --- # Attack complexity GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Attack complexity (AC) is a CVSS base metric rating the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist for the attack to work. Values are Low and High. In v3.1, Low weighs 0.77 and High weighs 0.44. High lowers the score but does not stop exploitation. v4.0 keeps AC and moves the prerequisite deployment conditions into a new metric, Attack Requirements. The split makes it possible to say a flaw needs an unusual setting without calling the exploit itself hard. Do not treat AC:H as a reason to defer. The ledger contains a plain counterexample from this quarter. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-109618 (PHP) is scored AC:H with AT:P in CVSS v4.0, yet CISA listed it in KEV on 2026-10-26, five days after NVD published it, and its EPSS was 0.99981 on that day. ## Related terms - [Attack requirements](/glossary/attack-requirements/) - [Attack vector](/glossary/attack-vector/) - [EPSS probability](/glossary/epss-probability/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Attack complexity: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/attack-complexity/ --- # Attack requirements GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Attack requirements (AT) is a CVSS v4.0 base metric, absent from v3.1. It captures prerequisite deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system, such as a race condition or a specific configuration. Values are None (N) and Present (P). It separates target conditions from attacker effort. In v3.1 such conditions were folded into Attack Complexity. v4.0 separates them so that AC describes only what the attacker must overcome in the attack itself, such as bypassing a defense, and AT describes what must be true of the target. When you compare a v3.1 and a v4.0 score for the same CVE, an AT:P value is one reason the numbers can differ. Record the version with every comparison. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-109618 (PHP, KEV dateAdded 2026-10-26) carries AT:P in its CVSS:4.0 vector alongside AC:H and a base score of 9.2. ## Related terms - [Attack complexity](/glossary/attack-complexity/) - [CVSS vector string](/glossary/cvss-vector-string/) - [Privileges required](/glossary/privileges-required/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Attack requirements: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/attack-requirements/ --- # Attack vector GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Attack vector (AV) is a CVSS base metric describing how close the attacker must be to the vulnerable component: Network, Adjacent, Local or Physical. Network is the most severe value. In v3.1 the numeric weights are Network 0.85, Adjacent 0.62, Local 0.55 and Physical 0.2. AV is one of the four terms multiplied into Exploitability (8.22 x AV x AC x PR x UI). Moving from Network to Local lowers that product by 35 percent for the same other values. It correlates with exposure but does not measure it. Whether an asset is reachable from the internet is a fact about your network, which is why BOD 26-04 asks agencies to tag publicly exposed assets separately. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-33824, listed in KEV on 2026-08-18, is scored AV:N (Network) in its NVD record, the value that carries the 0.85 weight. ## Related terms - [Attack complexity](/glossary/attack-complexity/) - [Privileges required](/glossary/privileges-required/) - [CVSS vector string](/glossary/cvss-vector-string/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Attack vector: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/attack-vector/ --- # BOD 22-01 GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** BOD 22-01, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, was issued by CISA on 2021-11-03 and established the KEV catalog. It is superseded: BOD 26-04, issued 2026-06-10, revokes it together with BOD 19-02. The catalog continues under the new directive. Cite a KEV due date with the directive in force on its dateAdded. Entries added before 2026-06-10 carry due dates set under BOD 22-01, which is now revoked, and entries added after carry BOD 26-04 dates. In the ledger window, 162 additions predate BOD 26-04 and 156 follow it. The catalog action text for current entries cites BOD 26-04, not BOD 22-01. ## A sourced example CISA's BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, last updated 2026-08-25, states that BOD 26-04 supersedes and revokes BOD 22-01 (2021-11-03) and BOD 19-02 (2019-04-29). ## Related terms - [BOD 26-04](/glossary/bod-26-04/) - [KEV dueDate](/glossary/kev-due-date/) - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) ## Sources - Source for the example: BOD 22-01: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/bod-22-01/ --- # BOD 26-04 GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, is the CISA directive issued on 2026-06-10 that supersedes and revokes BOD 22-01 and BOD 19-02. It sets remediation timelines for federal civilian agencies from asset exposure, KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact. It says CVSS is no longer required for prioritization. Phase I took effect immediately: agencies update vulnerability management policy, monitor the KEV catalog and report KEV status through the CDM dashboard. Phase II follows within 60 days and Phase III, the Table 1 timelines and external-asset tagging, within 180 days. The timeline starts at the earlier of KEV listing or the agency finding the vulnerability on an asset. The implementation guidance gives one example read as text: a publicly exposed asset with total technical impact and an automatable vulnerability gets a 3-day deadline. The day counts for other cases sit in a table that the page shows only as an image, so this site does not restate them. ## A sourced example CISA's KEV catalog page, read on 2026-11-10, cites BOD 26-04 in the action text of every one of the 20 newest entries, from CVE-2026-125350 (dateAdded 2026-11-10) back to CVE-2026-111497 (dateAdded 2026-10-27). ## Related terms - [BOD 22-01](/glossary/bod-22-01/) - [KEV dueDate](/glossary/kev-due-date/) - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) ## Sources - Source for the example: BOD 26-04: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/bod-26-04/ --- # CISA Vulnrichment GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CISA Vulnrichment is a public GitHub program in which CISA acts as an Authorized Data Publisher and adds data to CVE records: SSVC decision points, CWE, sometimes a CVSS v3.1 block, and a KEV block with dateAdded. It leaves the CNA's data untouched. The SSVC data uses the CISA Coordinator decision tree and reports exploitation, automatable and technical impact. If a CNA later supplies its own CWE or CVSS, CISA removes its own. CPE enrichment ended on 2024-12-10. Since 2026-06-17 NVD also carries the CISA-ADP SSVC data in its feeds and API, using SSVC schema version 2.0.3, and from 2026-08-26 displays it on the CVE detail page. ## A sourced example The NVD API record for CVE-2026-33824 carries a CISA-ADP SSVC entry, version 2.0.3, timestamped 2026-04-13, with exploitation active, automatable yes and technical impact total. ## Related terms - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/) - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) - [SSVC technical impact](/glossary/ssvc-technical-impact/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CISA Vulnrichment: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cisa-vulnrichment/ --- # CPE GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CPE, the Common Platform Enumeration, is the naming scheme NVD uses to say which product versions a CVE affects. An NVD record lists configurations built from CPE strings. A CVE with no configuration cannot be matched to an asset inventory by CPE. Matching depends on enrichment. NIST's 2026-04-15 notice says CVEs outside its priority categories are not immediately enriched, and the priority categories begin with KEV entries, which NIST aims to enrich within one business day. CISA's Vulnrichment stopped adding CPE strings on 2024-12-10, so CPE data from that source is not growing. On 2026-08-26 NVD began showing the CVE record's affected list on the detail page. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-109618 (PHP) holds 15 configuration entries on 2026-11-10, while CVE-2026-20320 (Cisco BroadWorks, KEV dateAdded 2026-11-10) held none. ## Related terms - [NVD analysis status](/glossary/nvd-analysis-status/) - [CWE](/glossary/cwe/) - [CISA Vulnrichment](/glossary/cisa-vulnrichment/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CPE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20320 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cpe/ --- # CVE identifier GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** A CVE identifier is the unique name of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in the form CVE-YYYY-N, where the year is the year of assignment or publication and N is a sequence of four or more digits. It is the join key between NVD, KEV, EPSS and vendor advisories. The year is not the year of the flaw's discovery or of its exploitation. CVE-2015-3306 was added to KEV on 2026-10-08, 4,161 days after NVD published it on 2015-05-18. Sequence numbers now exceed six digits within a year, so parsers that assume four or five digits fail. The ledger holds identifiers such as CVE-2026-110936 and CVE-2026-125350. ## A sourced example CVE-2015-3306 (ProFTPD) was added to the KEV catalog on 2026-10-08 with an NVD published date of 2015-05-18, a CVSS base score of 10.0 and an EPSS of 0.96752 on listing day. ## Related terms - [CVE Numbering Authority](/glossary/cve-numbering-authority/) - [KEV lag](/glossary/kev-lag/) - [CWE](/glossary/cwe/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVE identifier: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3306 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cve-identifier/ --- # CVE Numbering Authority GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** A CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) is an organization authorized by the CVE Program to assign CVE identifiers and publish records for vulnerabilities within its scope. Vendors, open source projects and research groups act as CNAs. The CNA is the first source of a record's description, CWE and often its CVSS score. In NVD records the CNA appears as sourceIdentifier. Scores from a CNA are labeled Secondary in the NVD API, and NVD's own score is Primary. On 2026-04-15 NIST said it would no longer routinely add a separate severity score where the CNA already provided one. So the CNA's score is more often the only one on the record, and its CVSS source should be recorded with it. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-59310 (Broadcom VMware vCenter) lists security@vmware.com as its source identifier and publishes that CNA's v3.1 score of 9.8. ## Related terms - [CVE identifier](/glossary/cve-identifier/) - [CVSS vector string](/glossary/cvss-vector-string/) - [NVD analysis status](/glossary/nvd-analysis-status/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVE Numbering Authority: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59310 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cve-numbering-authority/ --- # CVSS base score GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The CVSS base score is a number from 0.0 to 10.0 computed from a vulnerability's intrinsic metrics: attack vector, complexity, privileges, user interaction, and the impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability. It describes technical severity only. It carries no information about whether anyone is exploiting the flaw. In CVSS v3.1 the base score is Roundup(Minimum(Impact + Exploitability, 10)) when scope is unchanged, and Roundup(Minimum(1.08 x (Impact + Exploitability), 10)) when scope is changed. Exploitability is 8.22 x AV x AC x PR x UI. Impact is 6.42 x ISS, where ISS = 1 - [(1 - C) x (1 - I) x (1 - A)]. A program uses the base score as a severity label and as a tiebreaker, not as the exploitation signal. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 285 of 318 additions (89.6%) carry a base score of 7.0 or higher and 33 (10.4%) are below 7.0, so a base-score cutoff of 7.0 alone would have missed one listing in ten. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-33824 (Microsoft IKE service extension, listed in KEV on 2026-08-18) has the NVD-recorded v3.1 base score 9.8: ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 = 0.9148, Impact = 5.87, Exploitability = 3.89, sum 9.76 rounded up to 9.8. ## Related terms - [CVSS vector string](/glossary/cvss-vector-string/) - [CVSS severity rating](/glossary/cvss-severity-rating/) - [CVSS-BT](/glossary/cvss-bt/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS base score: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-base-score/ --- # CVSS environmental metrics GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CVSS environmental metrics let an organization restate a score for its own deployment. They add security requirements for confidentiality, integrity and availability (CR, IR, AR) and modified versions of the base metrics (MAV, MAC, MPR, MUI and others). Published scores almost never include them, so the consumer supplies them. In v3.1 the requirement values are High 1.5, Medium 1 and Low 0.5. The modified impact uses MISS = Minimum(1 - [(1 - CR x MC) x (1 - IR x MI) x (1 - AR x MA)], 0.915). Note the changed-scope exponent is 15 in the base formula and 13 in the environmental one. A program can use them to record asset context in a score, but exposure and asset value are often kept as separate fields in a ranking so each can be audited on its own. ## A sourced example The CVSS:4.0 vector for CVE-2026-109618 (PHP, listed in KEV on 2026-10-26) records CR:X, IR:X, AR:X and every modified metric as X, meaning the published 9.2 contains no environmental adjustment. ## Related terms - [CVSS threat metrics](/glossary/cvss-threat-metrics/) - [CVSS supplemental metrics](/glossary/cvss-supplemental-metrics/) - [CVSS-BT](/glossary/cvss-bt/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS environmental metrics: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-environmental-metrics/ --- # CVSS severity rating GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The CVSS qualitative severity rating maps a score to a label: None is 0.0, Low is 0.1 to 3.9, Medium is 4.0 to 6.9, High is 7.0 to 8.9 and Critical is 9.0 to 10.0. The same scale appears in the v3.1 and v4.0 specifications. Labels are what policies quote: patch Critical in X days, High in Y. The bands are coarse. A 6.9 and a 7.0 are separate labels with a 0.1 gap. In the ledger window, 146 of 318 KEV additions (45.9%) were Critical on base score, 139 were High and 33 (10.4%) were Medium or Low. Roughly one listing in ten was rated below High when CISA added it. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-48356 (Adobe Commerce and Magento) is rated 9.3, Critical, in NVD, and CISA listed it in KEV on 2026-10-27. ## Related terms - [CVSS base score](/glossary/cvss-base-score/) - [CVSS vector string](/glossary/cvss-vector-string/) - [Vendor priority rating](/glossary/vendor-priority-rating/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS severity rating: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-severity-rating/ --- # CVSS supplemental metrics GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CVSS v4.0 supplemental metrics carry extra context that does not change the score: Safety, Automatable, Recovery, Value Density, Vulnerability Response Effort and Provider Urgency. Each defaults to Not Defined (X). They exist so a consumer can apply its own policy to them. Per the v4.0 specification, Safety takes Present or Negligible, Automatable takes Yes or No, Recovery takes Automatic, User or Irrecoverable, Value Density takes Diffuse or Concentrated, Response Effort takes Low, Moderate or High, and Provider Urgency takes Red, Amber, Green or Clear. Automatable overlaps the SSVC decision point of the same name, which CISA publishes separately. A program that wants an automatable flag today has more records carrying the SSVC value than the CVSS supplemental one. ## A sourced example The CVSS:4.0 vector in the NVD record for CVE-2026-109618, listed in KEV on 2026-10-26, ends in S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X, so its CNA published none of the supplemental metrics. ## Related terms - [Vendor priority rating](/glossary/vendor-priority-rating/) - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) - [CVSS environmental metrics](/glossary/cvss-environmental-metrics/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS supplemental metrics: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-supplemental-metrics/ --- # CVSS threat metrics GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CVSS threat metrics adjust the base score for the current state of exploitation. In v3.1 they are the temporal group: exploit code maturity, remediation level and report confidence. In v4.0 the group is a single metric, Exploit Maturity. Scores that include them are named CVSS-BT. The v3.1 temporal score is Roundup(BaseScore x E x RL x RC), with E from 0.91 (Unproven) to 1 (High), RL from 0.95 (Official Fix) to 1, and RC from 0.92 (Unknown) to 1. The multipliers can only lower the base score, so the result never exceeds it. Most published scores stop at the base group. NVD displays base metrics, and the threat group is left for the consumer to fill from sources such as KEV. A KEV listing is direct evidence for setting Exploit Maturity to Attacked. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-33824, listed in KEV on 2026-08-18, shows a v3.1 base vector only, with no temporal metrics, so the 9.8 published there is a CVSS-B score. ## Related terms - [Exploit maturity](/glossary/exploit-maturity/) - [CVSS-BT](/glossary/cvss-bt/) - [CVSS environmental metrics](/glossary/cvss-environmental-metrics/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS threat metrics: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-threat-metrics/ --- # CVSS vector string GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** A CVSS vector string is the compact text that records every metric choice behind a score, such as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The prefix names the version. Anyone can recompute the score from the string, which makes it the item an auditor should ask for. The score alone cannot be audited, because two different vectors can produce the same number. The vector string lets a reviewer check each metric against the vendor advisory and rerun the formula from the FIRST specification. Store the vector string, the version prefix and the source that published it next to the score. In the ledger, 313 of 318 rows use a v3.1 score, 5 use v3.0, and the ledger method takes the NVD primary score first and a CNA score otherwise (130 rows come from nvd@nist.gov). ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-33824, listed in KEV on 2026-08-18, carries the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H from its CNA, secure@microsoft.com. ## Related terms - [CVSS base score](/glossary/cvss-base-score/) - [Attack vector](/glossary/attack-vector/) - [CVSS-BT](/glossary/cvss-bt/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS vector string: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-vector-string/ --- # CVSS-BT GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CVSS-BT is the v4.0 nomenclature for a score built from Base and Threat metrics. The specification also names CVSS-B (base only), CVSS-BE (base and environmental) and CVSS-BTE (all three). Writing the label next to every score tells a reader which inputs produced the number. The label matters because a base-only 9.2 and a threat-adjusted 9.2 are different claims. A ranking sheet that mixes them without labels cannot be reproduced. In v4.0, Exploit Maturity Not Defined (X) is scored as Attacked (A). A vector with E:X is therefore scored the same as one with E:A, so a CVSS-BT value for a KEV-listed flaw can equal its CVSS-B value. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-109618 (PHP, listed in KEV on 2026-10-26) is published with E:X and a v4.0 score of 9.2, which by the specification is already scored as if exploitation were Attacked. ## Related terms - [CVSS threat metrics](/glossary/cvss-threat-metrics/) - [Exploit maturity](/glossary/exploit-maturity/) - [CVSS base score](/glossary/cvss-base-score/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CVSS-BT: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cvss-bt/ --- # CWE GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CWE, the Common Weakness Enumeration, is a catalog of software weakness types such as CWE-416 (use after free) or CWE-22 (path traversal). A CVE record can cite one or several CWE identifiers, and each KEV catalog entry also carries a cwes field of its own. CWE answers what kind of defect it is, not how bad it is. Teams use it to group findings by root cause and to see which weakness classes recur in exploited flaws. Where the CNA gave no CWE, CISA's Vulnrichment may add one. If the CNA supplies its own later, CISA removes its assessment. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-109618 (PHP, KEV dateAdded 2026-10-26) lists four weaknesses from its CNA: CWE-416, CWE-755, CWE-824 and CWE-1325. ## Related terms - [CISA Vulnrichment](/glossary/cisa-vulnrichment/) - [CPE](/glossary/cpe/) - [CVE identifier](/glossary/cve-identifier/) ## Sources - Source for the example: CWE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/cwe/ --- # EPSS model version GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The EPSS model version identifies the trained model behind a day's scores. FIRST's daily score file carries it in a header comment. The file read on 2026-11-10 reads model_version:v2026.06.15. Scores from different versions are not directly comparable, so keep the version with every stored score. A model change can shift the whole distribution, so a ranking built from stored scores should keep the model version with each snapshot. FIRST's EPSS research page refers to Version 5 as the current line of the model. Record two dates for every EPSS value you rely on: the score date and the model version. The ledger stores the score date for each row and queries the FIRST API for the KEV dateAdded. ## A sourced example The FIRST EPSS score file downloaded on 2026-11-10 begins with the header #model_version:v2026.06.15,score_date:2026-11-10T12:00:24Z. ## Related terms - [EPSS probability](/glossary/epss-probability/) - [EPSS percentile](/glossary/epss-percentile/) - [KEV lag](/glossary/kev-lag/) ## Sources - Source for the example: EPSS model version: https://epss.empiricalsecurity.com/epss_scores-current.csv.gz (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/epss-model-version/ --- # EPSS percentile GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The EPSS percentile ranks a CVE's probability against all scored CVEs on the same day. FIRST defines it as the proportion of all values less than or equal to the current rank. A percentile of 0.99 means 99 percent of CVEs score at or below it. FIRST's guidance is to show the probability first and the percentile beside it, for example 15.3% (92nd). Because most CVEs score very low, a small probability can still sit high in the ranking: FIRST's article puts a probability of 0.10 at about the 88th percentile (data snapshot of March 2022). Use the percentile for ordering and the probability for the stated 30-day estimate. In the ledger, the median percentile on listing day was 0.5507 across the 260 scored additions. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-59310 (Broadcom VMware vCenter, flagged as used in ransomware campaigns) had EPSS 0.0114 at the 63.9th percentile on its KEV listing day, 2026-08-18, and 0.61668 at the 99.2nd percentile on 2026-11-10. ## Related terms - [EPSS probability](/glossary/epss-probability/) - [EPSS model version](/glossary/epss-model-version/) - [Known ransomware campaign use](/glossary/known-ransomware-campaign-use/) ## Sources - Source for the example: EPSS percentile: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-59310 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/epss-percentile/ --- # EPSS probability GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The EPSS probability is a number from 0 to 1 published daily by FIRST for every CVE. FIRST describes it as an estimate of the probability that a published CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days. A value of 0.10 means a 10 percent estimate. EPSS is a model output, refit periodically, so a score is only meaningful with its date. The same CVE moves over time as new exploitation evidence arrives. On KEV listing day the median EPSS among the 260 ledger additions that had a score was 0.0066, and 75.8 percent were below 0.1. A KEV listing is an observed event, EPSS is a forecast, and the two answer different questions. ## A sourced example FIRST's API returned an EPSS of 0.5585 for CVE-2026-33824 on 2026-08-18, the day CISA listed it, and 0.77054 on 2026-11-10. ## Related terms - [EPSS percentile](/glossary/epss-percentile/) - [EPSS model version](/glossary/epss-model-version/) - [KEV dateAdded](/glossary/kev-date-added/) ## Sources - Source for the example: EPSS probability: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/epss-probability/ --- # Exploit maturity GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Exploit maturity is the CVSS v4.0 threat metric (E) with values Attacked (A), Proof-of-Concept (P), Unreported (U) and Not Defined (X). Attacked means attacks have been reported or simplifying solutions exist. In scoring, X is treated as Attacked. In v3.1 the equivalent is Exploit Code Maturity. v3.1 Exploit Code Maturity multipliers are High 1, Functional 0.97, Proof of Concept 0.94 and Unproven 0.91. The v3.1 temporal score is the base score times these multipliers, which is why it can never exceed the base. KEV membership is the evidence for setting E to Attacked. Without it, the score stays at X, which is scored the same, so the practical effect is a worst-case default. ## A sourced example The CVSS:4.0 vector for CVE-2026-109618 (PHP) reads E:X in NVD, and CISA listed the CVE in KEV on 2026-10-26. ## Related terms - [CVSS threat metrics](/glossary/cvss-threat-metrics/) - [Proof-of-concept exploit](/glossary/proof-of-concept-exploit/) - [CVSS-BT](/glossary/cvss-bt/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Exploit maturity: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/exploit-maturity/ --- # KEV dateAdded GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The dateAdded field in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog records the day a CVE was listed. It is the event the KEV Lag Ledger measures against: the lag is dateAdded minus the NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. The catalog JSON carries cveID, vendorProject, product, dateAdded, dueDate, knownRansomwareCampaignUse, forensicTriage, requiredAction, notes and cwes. A program should store dateAdded and the catalog version it read, since the catalog is amended. The ledger covers 318 additions with dateAdded from 2025-11-10 through 2026-11-09, read from catalog version 2026.11.09. Monthly counts range from 9 (November 2025, partial) to 43 (September 2026). ## A sourced example CISA's catalog lists CVE-2026-33824 (Microsoft Internet Key Exchange service extensions) with dateAdded 2026-08-18, 126 days after NVD published it on 2026-04-14. ## Related terms - [KEV dueDate](/glossary/kev-due-date/) - [KEV lag](/glossary/kev-lag/) ## Sources - Source for the example: KEV dateAdded: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/kev-date-added/ --- # KEV dueDate GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** The dueDate field in the KEV catalog is the date by which federal civilian agencies must remediate the entry. In the KEV feed, dueDate minus dateAdded is 3 days for 124 of the 156 ledger entries added on or after 2026-06-10, when BOD 26-04 took effect, and 14 days for the other 32. Before 2026-06-10, under the earlier directive, the same feed shows a different spread for the 162 ledger entries: 66 at 21 days, 55 at 14 days, 31 at 3 days, 7 at 7 days, 2 at 2 days and 1 at 5 days. Compare a due date only with its own dateAdded. BOD 26-04 starts the clock at the earlier of KEV listing or the agency identifying the vulnerability on an asset, and says timelines are dynamic as facts change. A private program can borrow the structure, but the dueDate itself is a federal obligation. ## A sourced example CISA's catalog lists CVE-2026-33824 with dateAdded 2026-08-18 and dueDate 2026-08-21, a 3-day window. ## Related terms - [KEV dateAdded](/glossary/kev-date-added/) - [BOD 22-01](/glossary/bod-22-01/) - [Known ransomware campaign use](/glossary/known-ransomware-campaign-use/) ## Sources - Source for the example: KEV dueDate: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/kev-due-date/ --- # KEV lag GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** KEV lag is this site's measure: the days from the NVD published date to the CISA KEV dateAdded, in UTC calendar days. Across 318 additions from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09 the median is 10.5 days, 45.3 percent were listed within 7 days and 17.3 percent more than a year after publication. A negative or zero lag means the entry was listed before or on the day NVD published it: 8 additions were negative and 61 were zero, 69 in all (21.7 percent). Only 11 of those 69 had an EPSS score on listing day, which is part of why only 260 of 318 rows carry one. The lag is a property of the catalog, not of any one program. It is the reason a ranking cannot wait for a KEV listing alone: the middle entry waited 10.5 days, and the 75th percentile waited 146 days. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-33824 was published by NVD on 2026-04-14 and added to KEV on 2026-08-18, a KEV lag of 126 days, while CVE-2026-60004 (Gitea) was added on 2026-08-25, one day before NVD published it on 2026-08-26, a lag of -1. ## Related terms - [KEV dateAdded](/glossary/kev-date-added/) - [EPSS probability](/glossary/epss-probability/) ## Sources - Source for the example: KEV lag: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/kev-lag/ --- # Known ransomware campaign use GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Known ransomware campaign use is a KEV catalog field with the values Known and Unknown. Known means CISA has evidence the vulnerability was used in ransomware campaigns. Unknown means CISA has no such evidence recorded, not that none exists. The field can change after the listing. In the ledger, 29 of 318 additions (9.1%) were flagged Known when the catalog was read on 2026-11-09. Their CVSS base scores range from 5.3 to 10.0, and their median EPSS on listing day was 0.0114. Because the flag is amended later, store the date you read it. A flag that was Unknown on dateAdded may read Known months afterward. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-59310 (Broadcom VMware vCenter, dateAdded 2026-08-18, CVSS 9.8) is the most recent ledger entry flagged Known in the CISA catalog. ## Related terms - [KEV dateAdded](/glossary/kev-date-added/) - [EPSS percentile](/glossary/epss-percentile/) - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Known ransomware campaign use: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59310 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/known-ransomware-campaign-use/ --- # NVD analysis status GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** NVD analysis status (vulnStatus in the API) shows where a CVE sits in NVD's workflow. Values include Received, Awaiting Analysis, Undergoing Analysis, Analyzed, Modified, Deferred and Rejected. A KEV listing does not by itself mean the record has been analyzed, so check the status field. Analysis adds CPE configurations and NVD's own scores. Under the notice of 2026-04-15, CVEs in KEV are the first priority for enrichment, with a goal of one business day. Treat the status as a data-quality flag in your ranking pipeline. A record still Undergoing Analysis may lack product matches, so asset joins can silently return nothing. ## A sourced example On 2026-11-10 the NVD API shows CVE-2026-20320 (Cisco BroadWorks) as Undergoing Analysis, 83 days after its 2026-08-19 publication and on the day CISA listed it in KEV. ## Related terms - [CPE](/glossary/cpe/) - [CVE Numbering Authority](/glossary/cve-numbering-authority/) - [KEV lag](/glossary/kev-lag/) ## Sources - Source for the example: NVD analysis status: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20320 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/nvd-analysis-status/ --- # Privileges required GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Privileges required (PR) is a CVSS base metric for the access level an attacker needs before the attack: None, Low or High. In v3.1 the weights are None 0.85, Low 0.62 and High 0.27. When scope is changed, Low becomes 0.68 and High 0.5. PR:H pulls the base score down sharply. A flaw that needs an administrator account can score in the low single digits even when real attackers use it after a first foothold. This is the usual reason a KEV entry has a low CVSS. In the ledger, 33 of 318 additions (10.4%) have a base score below 7.0, and a high-privilege requirement is a common cause. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-41709 (Broadcom VMware ESX) is scored PR:H and 2.7 (Low) by security@vmware.com, and CISA added it to KEV on 2026-10-28, 90 days after NVD published it. ## Related terms - [CVSS base score](/glossary/cvss-base-score/) - [Attack vector](/glossary/attack-vector/) - [CVSS severity rating](/glossary/cvss-severity-rating/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Privileges required: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/privileges-required/ --- # Proof-of-concept exploit GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** A proof-of-concept exploit is public code or a demonstration showing a vulnerability can be triggered. In CVSS v4.0, Exploit Maturity P means PoC code is publicly available with no reported attacks. A public PoC is evidence of feasibility, not of attacks. CISA states that a public proof of concept is not required for KEV inclusion. A KEV entry rests on evidence of exploitation, which can come from sources that never publish code. BOD 26-04 sets automatable to yes when a public proof of concept reliably achieves remote code execution. That makes the PoC a direct input to a due date. ## A sourced example CISA's BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, last updated 2026-08-25, says a public proof of concept is not required for KEV inclusion. ## Related terms - [Exploit maturity](/glossary/exploit-maturity/) - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) - [KEV dateAdded](/glossary/kev-date-added/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Proof-of-concept exploit: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/proof-of-concept-exploit/ --- # SSVC automatable GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** SSVC automatable is a decision point asking whether an attacker can reliably automate the steps from reconnaissance to a working exploit across targets. Values are yes and no. BOD 26-04 sets it to yes when a public proof of concept reliably achieves remote code execution. It captures scale, which neither CVSS base nor EPSS records directly. A flaw that scans and exploits with a script reaches many targets at once. BOD 26-04 uses it as one of four inputs to the due date. Where it is missing for a CVE not in KEV, CISA treats it as no. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-41709 (Broadcom VMware ESX, KEV dateAdded 2026-10-28) carries automatable no and a 14-day due date, while CVE-2026-33824 carries automatable yes and a 3-day due date. ## Related terms - [SSVC technical impact](/glossary/ssvc-technical-impact/) - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/) - [BOD 22-01](/glossary/bod-22-01/) ## Sources - Source for the example: SSVC automatable: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/ssvc-automatable/ --- # SSVC decision outcomes (Track, Track*, Attend, Act) GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** CISA's SSVC decision tree ends in one of four outcomes. Track needs no action now. Track* has characteristics that may need closer monitoring. Attend needs supervisory attention and remediation sooner than standard timelines. Act needs supervisory and leadership attention and remediation as soon as possible. Track and Track* both remediate within standard update timelines. Attend and Act escalate in two steps: who must be involved, and how fast the fix lands. The outcome is a decision, not a score, so it does not sort a long list. Programs usually use it to set the queue a finding enters, then sort within the queue by another signal. ## A sourced example CISA's SSVC page, read on 2026-11-10, defines Act as needing attention from supervisory and leadership levels with remediation as soon as possible. ## Related terms - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/) - [SSVC mission and well-being](/glossary/ssvc-mission-and-well-being/) - [CISA Vulnrichment](/glossary/cisa-vulnrichment/) ## Sources - Source for the example: SSVC decision outcomes (Track, Track*, Attend, Act): https://www.cisa.gov/stakeholder-specific-vulnerability-categorization-ssvc (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/ssvc-decision-outcomes/ --- # SSVC exploitation GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** SSVC exploitation is a decision point recording the state of exploitation evidence: none, public proof of concept, or active. It is the input closest to what the KEV catalog records. Active means credible reporting of exploitation in the wild. None and public proof of concept are the lower levels. CISA publishes this value through Vulnrichment for CVEs it has analyzed. Exploitation is the point that moves an SSVC decision most, since the tree reaches Attend or Act only for higher exploitation values or impact. It is a state, not a prediction. EPSS gives a forecast, KEV gives a catalog event, and SSVC exploitation records the evidence level CISA assigned on its assessment date. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-118527 (Ivanti Connect Secure, KEV dateAdded 2026-10-30, CVSS 4.3) carries SSVC exploitation active, with timestamp 2026-11-03. ## Related terms - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) - [SSVC technical impact](/glossary/ssvc-technical-impact/) - [SSVC decision outcomes (Track, Track*, Attend, Act)](/glossary/ssvc-decision-outcomes/) ## Sources - Source for the example: SSVC exploitation: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/ --- # SSVC mission and well-being GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** Mission prevalence and public well-being impact are the two SSVC decision points that depend on the deploying organization, not on the vulnerability. CISA's SSVC page lists them with exploitation status, technical impact and automatable. Vulnrichment does not publish them, because they differ per stakeholder. This is the part of SSVC a program must supply itself: how central the affected system is to its mission, and what harm to public safety follows if it fails. The decision outcome cannot be computed without them. In an NVD record only exploitation, automatable and technical impact appear. A program that adopts SSVC records its own answers for these two points per asset class. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-33824, read on 2026-11-10, carries three SSVC options (exploitation, automatable, technicalImpact) and none for mission or well-being. ## Related terms - [SSVC decision outcomes (Track, Track*, Attend, Act)](/glossary/ssvc-decision-outcomes/) - [SSVC technical impact](/glossary/ssvc-technical-impact/) - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/) ## Sources - Source for the example: SSVC mission and well-being: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33824 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/ssvc-mission-and-well-being/ --- # SSVC technical impact GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** SSVC technical impact is a decision point with two values: partial or total. Total means the attacker gains control of the software's behavior or full access to its information. Partial is anything less. BOD 26-04 also treats high confidentiality and integrity CVSS impact together as total. The point is close to the impact side of CVSS but collapses it to one question. BOD 26-04 sets credential leaks to total. In the ledger window, the two KEV entries listed on 2026-10-28 differ on it: CVE-2026-46300 (Linux kernel) has a 3-day due date and CVE-2026-41709 (VMware ESX, partial) has 14 days. ## A sourced example The NVD record for CVE-2026-41709 (Broadcom VMware ESX, KEV dateAdded 2026-10-28, CVSS 2.7) carries SSVC technical impact partial, timestamp 2026-10-28. ## Related terms - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/) - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/) - [SSVC mission and well-being](/glossary/ssvc-mission-and-well-being/) ## Sources - Source for the example: SSVC technical impact: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/ssvc-technical-impact/ --- # User interaction GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** User interaction (UI) is a CVSS base metric stating whether a person other than the attacker must take part for the attack to succeed. Values are None and Required. In v3.1, None weighs 0.85 and Required weighs 0.62. In v4.0, UI has values None, Passive and Active. UI:R lowers the score modestly. It is common for browser, document and email-client flaws, which are also frequent in exploitation reports. Because UI sits inside the Exploitability product, a UI:R flaw with a changed scope and high confidentiality and integrity impact can still reach the Critical band, as the example shows. ## A sourced example CVE-2026-48356 (Adobe Commerce and Magento, KEV dateAdded 2026-10-27) is scored UI:R, scope changed, C:H/I:H/A:N and 9.3 by both Adobe and NVD, and its EPSS was 0.30582 on listing day. ## Related terms - [Privileges required](/glossary/privileges-required/) - [Attack vector](/glossary/attack-vector/) - [CVSS base score](/glossary/cvss-base-score/) ## Sources - Source for the example: User interaction: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/user-interaction/ --- # Vendor priority rating GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **Definition.** A vendor priority rating is the severity or urgency label a vendor assigns in its own advisory, such as a CNA-supplied CVSS score or the CVSS v4.0 Provider Urgency metric (Red, Amber, Green, Clear). It reflects the vendor's view, so label it as the vendor's. Vendor ratings are often the only score on a record, since NIST said on 2026-04-15 it would not routinely add its own score where a CNA already has. They can also understate real-world use. Keep the vendor rating and an exploitation signal as separate columns. The ledger shows why: a vendor can rate a flaw Low and attackers still use it. ## A sourced example Broadcom's CNA (security@vmware.com) scored CVE-2026-41709 (VMware ESX) at 2.7, Low, and CISA added it to KEV on 2026-10-28. ## Related terms - [CVSS severity rating](/glossary/cvss-severity-rating/) - [CVSS supplemental metrics](/glossary/cvss-supplemental-metrics/) - [CVE Numbering Authority](/glossary/cve-numbering-authority/) ## Sources - Source for the example: Vendor priority rating: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41709 (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/vendor-priority-rating/ --- # 35 terms, each with a sourced example GLOSSARY, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Every term is defined in plain words and carries one real example with its source and read date, so the definition can be checked rather than taken on trust. Terms are listed alphabetically; each page links to the related terms used alongside it. - [Attack complexity](/glossary/attack-complexity/): Attack complexity (AC) is a CVSS base metric rating the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist for the attack to work. - [Attack requirements](/glossary/attack-requirements/): Attack requirements (AT) is a CVSS v4.0 base metric, absent from v3.1. - [Attack vector](/glossary/attack-vector/): Attack vector (AV) is a CVSS base metric describing how close the attacker must be to the vulnerable component: Network, Adjacent, Local or Physical. - [BOD 22-01](/glossary/bod-22-01/): BOD 22-01, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, was issued by CISA on 2021-11-03 and established the KEV catalog. - [BOD 26-04](/glossary/bod-26-04/): BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, is the CISA directive issued on 2026-06-10 that supersedes and revokes BOD 22-01 and BOD 19-02. - [CISA Vulnrichment](/glossary/cisa-vulnrichment/): CISA Vulnrichment is a public GitHub program in which CISA acts as an Authorized Data Publisher and adds data to CVE records: SSVC decision points, CWE, sometimes a CVSS v3.1 block, and a KEV block with dateAdded. - [CPE](/glossary/cpe/): CPE, the Common Platform Enumeration, is the naming scheme NVD uses to say which product versions a CVE affects. - [CVE identifier](/glossary/cve-identifier/): A CVE identifier is the unique name of a publicly disclosed vulnerability in the form CVE-YYYY-N, where the year is the year of assignment or publication and N is a sequence of four or more digits. - [CVE Numbering Authority](/glossary/cve-numbering-authority/): A CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) is an organization authorized by the CVE Program to assign CVE identifiers and publish records for vulnerabilities within its scope. - [CVSS base score](/glossary/cvss-base-score/): The CVSS base score is a number from 0.0 to 10.0 computed from a vulnerability's intrinsic metrics: attack vector, complexity, privileges, user interaction, and the impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability. - [CVSS environmental metrics](/glossary/cvss-environmental-metrics/): CVSS environmental metrics let an organization restate a score for its own deployment. - [CVSS severity rating](/glossary/cvss-severity-rating/): The CVSS qualitative severity rating maps a score to a label: None is 0.0, Low is 0.1 to 3.9, Medium is 4.0 to 6.9, High is 7.0 to 8.9 and Critical is 9.0 to 10.0. - [CVSS supplemental metrics](/glossary/cvss-supplemental-metrics/): CVSS v4.0 supplemental metrics carry extra context that does not change the score: Safety, Automatable, Recovery, Value Density, Vulnerability Response Effort and Provider Urgency. - [CVSS threat metrics](/glossary/cvss-threat-metrics/): CVSS threat metrics adjust the base score for the current state of exploitation. - [CVSS vector string](/glossary/cvss-vector-string/): A CVSS vector string is the compact text that records every metric choice behind a score, such as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. - [CVSS-BT](/glossary/cvss-bt/): CVSS-BT is the v4.0 nomenclature for a score built from Base and Threat metrics. - [CWE](/glossary/cwe/): CWE, the Common Weakness Enumeration, is a catalog of software weakness types such as CWE-416 (use after free) or CWE-22 (path traversal). - [EPSS model version](/glossary/epss-model-version/): The EPSS model version identifies the trained model behind a day's scores. - [EPSS percentile](/glossary/epss-percentile/): The EPSS percentile ranks a CVE's probability against all scored CVEs on the same day. - [EPSS probability](/glossary/epss-probability/): The EPSS probability is a number from 0 to 1 published daily by FIRST for every CVE. - [Exploit maturity](/glossary/exploit-maturity/): Exploit maturity is the CVSS v4.0 threat metric (E) with values Attacked (A), Proof-of-Concept (P), Unreported (U) and Not Defined (X). - [KEV dateAdded](/glossary/kev-date-added/): The dateAdded field in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog records the day a CVE was listed. - [KEV dueDate](/glossary/kev-due-date/): The dueDate field in the KEV catalog is the date by which federal civilian agencies must remediate the entry. - [KEV lag](/glossary/kev-lag/): KEV lag is this site's measure: the days from the NVD published date to the CISA KEV dateAdded, in UTC calendar days. - [Known ransomware campaign use](/glossary/known-ransomware-campaign-use/): Known ransomware campaign use is a KEV catalog field with the values Known and Unknown. - [NVD analysis status](/glossary/nvd-analysis-status/): NVD analysis status (vulnStatus in the API) shows where a CVE sits in NVD's workflow. - [Privileges required](/glossary/privileges-required/): Privileges required (PR) is a CVSS base metric for the access level an attacker needs before the attack: None, Low or High. - [Proof-of-concept exploit](/glossary/proof-of-concept-exploit/): A proof-of-concept exploit is public code or a demonstration showing a vulnerability can be triggered. - [SSVC automatable](/glossary/ssvc-automatable/): SSVC automatable is a decision point asking whether an attacker can reliably automate the steps from reconnaissance to a working exploit across targets. - [SSVC decision outcomes (Track, Track*, Attend, Act)](/glossary/ssvc-decision-outcomes/): CISA's SSVC decision tree ends in one of four outcomes. - [SSVC exploitation](/glossary/ssvc-exploitation/): SSVC exploitation is a decision point recording the state of exploitation evidence: none, public proof of concept, or active. - [SSVC mission and well-being](/glossary/ssvc-mission-and-well-being/): Mission prevalence and public well-being impact are the two SSVC decision points that depend on the deploying organization, not on the vulnerability. - [SSVC technical impact](/glossary/ssvc-technical-impact/): SSVC technical impact is a decision point with two values: partial or total. - [User interaction](/glossary/user-interaction/): User interaction (UI) is a CVSS base metric stating whether a person other than the attacker must take part for the attack to succeed. - [Vendor priority rating](/glossary/vendor-priority-rating/): A vendor priority rating is the severity or urgency label a vendor assigns in its own advisory, such as a CNA-supplied CVSS score or the CVSS v4.0 Provider Urgency metric (Red, Amber, Green, Clear). Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/glossary/ --- # CISA adds six entries to the KEV catalog, two with forensic triage NEWS, 10 Nov 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** On 2026-11-10 CISA added six vulnerabilities to the KEV catalog: Google Chromium, Microsoft Outlook, Cisco BroadWorks, Openwave Webtop and two Barracuda products. The two Barracuda entries carry a forensic triage requirement and a 2026-11-13 due date. The other four are due 2026-11-24. The alert lists CVE-2026-125350 (Google Chromium), CVE-2026-124194 (Microsoft Office Outlook), CVE-2026-20320 (Cisco BroadWorks), CVE-2026-111793 (Openwave Messaging Webtop Media Transcoder), CVE-2026-111560 (Barracuda Networks, multiple products) and CVE-2026-116606 (Barracuda Email Security Gateway). In the KEV feed read on 2026-11-10 the two Barracuda entries show forensicTriage Yes and dueDate 2026-11-13, three days after listing. The other four show forensicTriage No and dueDate 2026-11-24, 14 days after listing. All six show known ransomware campaign use as Unknown. CVE-2026-20320 was published by NVD on 2026-08-19, so its lag is 83 days. NVD still showed it as Undergoing Analysis on 2026-11-10, and FIRST's API gave an EPSS of 0.00385 (33rd percentile) that day. ## Sources - CISA adds six entries to the KEV catalog, two with forensic triage: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/10/cisa-adds-six-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-11-10-six-additions/ --- # KEV lists an Ivanti Connect Secure flaw four days before NVD publishes it NEWS, 30 Oct 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added two Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities to KEV on 2026-10-30. CVE-2026-118527 has a CVSS base score of 4.3, and NVD published it on 2026-11-03, four days after the listing, giving a KEV lag of -4. CVE-2026-111357 has a score of 7.0 and a due date of 2026-11-02. The two entries are CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527, both Ivanti Connect Secure. In the KEV feed, CVE-2026-111357 has forensicTriage Yes and a due date of 2026-11-02. CVE-2026-118527 has forensicTriage No and a due date of 2026-11-13. In the KEV Lag Ledger, CVE-2026-118527 is one of 8 additions listed before NVD published them. Its CNA score is CVSS 3.1 4.3 (Medium), and the NVD record carries a CISA SSVC entry of exploitation active, automatable no, technical impact partial, timestamped 2026-11-03. CVE-2026-111357 was published on 2026-10-15, a lag of 15 days, and had an EPSS of 0.00316 on 2026-10-30. ## Sources - KEV lists an Ivanti Connect Secure flaw four days before NVD publishes it: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/30/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-10-30-ivanti-listed-before-nvd/ --- # KEV adds a VMware ESX flaw scored CVSS 2.7 and a Linux kernel flaw at EPSS 0.10 NEWS, 28 Oct 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** On 2026-10-28 CISA added CVE-2026-41709 (Broadcom VMware ESX) and CVE-2026-46300 (Linux kernel) to KEV. The VMware flaw has a CNA base score of 2.7 and an EPSS of 0.00297. The kernel flaw scores 7.8 with an EPSS of 0.10192 at the 95.7th percentile. CVE-2026-41709 is an insufficient logging flaw in VMware ESX. Its CNA, security@vmware.com, scored it CVSS 3.1 2.7 (PR:H). NVD published it on 2026-07-30, so the KEV lag is 90 days. The NVD record carries SSVC exploitation active, automatable no, technical impact partial, and the KEV due date is 2026-11-11, 14 days after listing. CVE-2026-46300 was published on 2026-05-23, a lag of 158 days. It has forensicTriage Yes and a due date of 2026-10-31. The pair shows the two signals disagreeing: the lowest CVSS in the window sits next to an entry whose EPSS crossed 0.1 on the listing day. ## Sources - KEV adds a VMware ESX flaw scored CVSS 2.7 and a Linux kernel flaw at EPSS 0.10: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/28/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-10-28-vmware-esx-low-cvss/ --- # KEV adds two PHP flaws with EPSS scores above 0.999 NEWS, 26 Oct 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (PHP) to KEV on 2026-10-26, five days after NVD published them. FIRST's EPSS on that day was 0.99981 and 0.99997. Both carry forensic triage and a due date of 2026-10-29. Their base scores are 9.8 and 8.1 in the ledger. Both entries have an NVD published date of 2026-10-21 and a KEV lag of 5 days. Their EPSS percentiles on 2026-10-26 were 0.99981 and 0.99989. They are two of 10 ledger entries with an EPSS of 0.9 or higher on listing day, out of 260 with a score. CVE-2026-109618 is scored CVSS 4.0 9.2 by its CNA, with AC:H and AT:P, and CVSS 3.1 9.8 in the ledger. High complexity did not slow exploitation. ## Sources - KEV adds two PHP flaws with EPSS scores above 0.999: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/26/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-10-26-php-epss-near-one/ --- # CISA adds four Plex Media Server flaws and two others in one alert NEWS, 20 Oct 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA's 2026-10-20 alert added six entries: four Plex Media Server CVEs, EG Secure Solutions SiteGuard and Siemens Software Center. Base scores range from 4.3 to 7.8 and every EPSS is below 0.01, the highest being 0.00662. Four of the six entries are Plex. The four Plex entries (CVE-2026-96652, CVE-2026-96654, CVE-2026-96655, CVE-2026-96656) were published by NVD on 2026-09-23, a lag of 27 days for each. Base scores are 4.3, 6.5, 4.3 and 7.2, and EPSS values are 0.00222, 0.00227, 0.00222 and 0.00396. The other two are CVE-2026-106931 (SiteGuard Server Edition, 7.8, lag 6) and CVE-2026-110936 (Siemens Software Center, 6.7, lag 5). Due dates in the KEV feed run from 2026-10-23, 3 days, to 2026-11-03, 14 days. All six show known ransomware campaign use as Unknown. ## Sources - CISA adds four Plex Media Server flaws and two others in one alert: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/20/cisa-adds-six-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-10-20-plex-four-entries/ --- # CISA publishes a whitepaper on moving the CVE Program to a quality era NEWS, 23 Sep 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** On 2026-09-23 CISA announced a whitepaper, CVE Program: Establishing a Quality Era Framework. It describes moving the CVE Program from a growth era to a quality era across four dimensions: governance, ecosystem participation, data infrastructure and record content that defenders and users can trust. CISA's release names the four dimensions as transparent and effective governance, broad and active global participation, data infrastructure that supports core operations, and CVE record content that defenders can trust. It links the work to a strategy published the previous year with six lines of effort, and says new CVE Numbering Authorities and AI-enabled technologies add pressure on the program. The release lists no specific recommendations. It asks the community to review the paper and give feedback. For a ranking program, record content is the input to CWE, CPE and CVSS fields, so the quality of a CNA's record carries into scores. ## Sources - CISA publishes a whitepaper on moving the CVE Program to a quality era: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-whitepaper-charts-path-establishing-and-maturing-cve-program-quality (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/cisa-cve-quality-era-whitepaper/ --- # KEV adds four entries, three listed the day NVD published them NEWS, 22 Sep 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added four vulnerabilities to KEV on 2026-09-22: Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator, F5 BIG-IP APM and two Check Point entries. Three were listed with a lag of 0 days, and two of those had no EPSS score yet. All four carry forensic triage and a due date of 2026-09-25. The entries are CVE-2026-93952 (Arista VeloCloud, CVSS 10.0), CVE-2026-94127 (F5 BIG-IP APM, 9.8), CVE-2026-93616 (Check Point, 9.8) and CVE-2026-85102 (Check Point, 9.8, published 2026-09-09, lag 13). FIRST had scored only CVE-2026-93952 on its listing day (0.00424) and CVE-2026-85102 (0.00329). CVE-2026-94127 and CVE-2026-93616 had no score that day. In the ledger, 58 of the 318 rows have no EPSS score on listing day, and all 58 have a lag of 0 or less. A ranking that waits for an EPSS value cannot place these entries on the day they are listed. ## Sources - KEV adds four entries, three listed the day NVD published them: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/22/cisa-adds-four-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-09-22-four-same-day/ --- # CISA adds seven entries to KEV, five with 3-day due dates NEWS, 2 Sep 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA's 2026-09-02 alert added seven vulnerabilities, the largest single-day count between 2026-08-12 and 2026-11-10. Five carry forensic triage and a due date of 2026-09-05. Two have 14-day due dates. Base scores run from 6.5 to 10.0, and no EPSS value reaches 0.03. The seven are CVE-2026-9586 (Sangoma Switchvox), CVE-2026-48710 (Starlette), CVE-2026-49869 (Kestra OSS), CVE-2026-59822 (LiteLLM), CVE-2026-82329 (JFrog Artifactory), CVE-2026-83548 and CVE-2026-83549 (SonicWall SMA1000). The two SonicWall entries were published on 2026-09-01 and listed the next day, a lag of 1 day, with CVSS 10.0 and 7.8. Starlette (CVSS 6.5, lag 99, EPSS 0.02099) and LiteLLM (8.2, lag 56) have 14-day due dates, to 2026-09-16. The highest EPSS on the day is 0.02099 for the Starlette entry. ## Sources - CISA adds seven entries to KEV, five with 3-day due dates: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/09/02/cisa-adds-seven-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-09-02-seven-additions/ --- # CISA adds five CVEs published between 2015 and 2022 to KEV in one alert NEWS, 26 Aug 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** On 2026-08-26 CISA added six entries, five of them published between 2015 and 2022. The oldest, CVE-2015-3246 (Red Hat Libuser), was published 4,033 days earlier. CVE-2021-23758 (Ajax.NET Professional) had an EPSS of 0.89096. The sixth was a 2026 Citrix NetScaler flaw. The legacy five are CVE-2015-3246 (lag 4,033 days), CVE-2015-5287 (3,915), CVE-2019-1068 Microsoft SQL Server (2,599), CVE-2021-23758 (1,727) and CVE-2022-0995 Linux kernel (1,615). The sixth, CVE-2026-8452 (Citrix NetScaler, CVSS 9.8), was published 2026-06-30, a lag of 57 days. Their EPSS values on 2026-08-26 were 0.07092, 0.03412, 0.44665, 0.89096 and 0.06344. Four have a base score from 7.4 to 8.8 and CVE-2021-23758 has 9.8. In the ledger, 55 of 318 additions (17.3%) were listed more than 365 days after publication, with a median EPSS of 0.34729 on listing day. ## Sources - CISA adds five CVEs published between 2015 and 2022 to KEV in one alert: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/08/26/cisa-adds-six-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-08-26-five-legacy-cves/ --- # NVD shows SSVC and affected-product data on the CVE detail page NEWS, 26 Aug 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** NVD announced a technical update on 2026-08-26: the CVE detail page now shows the affected list and the SSVC score, and the cvehistory feed carries a GitHub link to the CVE record instead of the full affected JSON. The /cves/ endpoint is unchanged. NVD says the affected list appears above Change History and SSVC data appears in the Metrics section when available. Each audit record now points to the CVE in the CVE Program's GitHub repository. The stated reason is payload size: moving the large, frequently changing affected lists to links reduces the bandwidth of the cvehistory feed for incremental consumers. The update follows the 2026-06-17 deployment that added SSVC v2.0.3 data from CISA-ADP and CVE affected data to NVD feeds and APIs. NVD said that deployment touched about 95 percent of existing records and made no change to vulnerability status levels. ## Sources - NVD shows SSVC and affected-product data on the CVE detail page: https://nvd.nist.gov/general/news (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/nvd-2026-08-26-ssvc-affected-detail-page/ --- # CISA updates the BOD 26-04 implementation guidance NEWS, 25 Aug 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA's BOD 26-04 implementation guidance shows a last-updated date of 2026-08-25. The directive, issued 2026-06-10, supersedes BOD 22-01 and BOD 19-02. The guidance explains how KEV due dates are computed from exposure, technical impact and automatable, and sets out forensic triage steps. The page says BOD 26-04 no longer requires CVSS for prioritization, that timelines are maximum durations, and that CISA grants no waivers. A public proof of concept is not required for KEV inclusion. Due dates come from the Vulnerability Response Timeline. Technical impact is total if an attacker can run arbitrary software, trigger all of the component's actions or gain full privileges, or when both confidentiality and integrity CVSS impacts are High. Automatable is yes when a public proof of concept reliably achieves remote code execution. One example read from the page: a publicly exposed asset with total technical impact that is automatable has a 3-day patching deadline. The recommended triage schedule runs from scoping in the first 2 hours to an escalation decision at 48 to 72 hours after the KEV addition. ## Sources - CISA updates the BOD 26-04 implementation guidance: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/cisa-bod-26-04-guidance-update/ --- # KEV adds a VMware vCenter flaw flagged for ransomware use, with three others NEWS, 18 Aug 2026, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA added four vulnerabilities to KEV on 2026-08-18: Microsoft IKE extensions, Microsoft SharePoint, Broadcom VMware vCenter and Apple macOS. The vCenter entry, CVE-2026-59310, is flagged Known for ransomware campaign use. All four have a due date of 2026-08-21, three days after listing. CVE-2026-33824 (Microsoft IKE, CVSS 9.8) had a lag of 126 days and an EPSS of 0.5585. CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter, 9.8) had a lag of 19 days and an EPSS of 0.0114 at the 63.9th percentile on listing day. CVE-2026-55040 (SharePoint, 9.1) had a lag of 35 and CVE-2026-65400 (macOS, 9.8) a lag of 12. On 2026-11-10 FIRST's API gave CVE-2026-59310 an EPSS of 0.61668. The 29 ledger entries flagged Known had a median listing-day EPSS of 0.0114, so the signal was low on the day for most of them. CVE-2026-59310 is the latest of the 29 flagged additions in the ledger. ## Sources - KEV adds a VMware vCenter flaw flagged for ransomware use, with three others: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/08/18/cisa-adds-four-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/kev-2026-08-18-vcenter-ransomware/ --- # Dated news from primary sources NEWS, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** 12 items from the last 90 days, each taken from the primary source (a vendor notice, a release note, a CISA or FIRST publication) and dated to the event, newest first. Each item links to the source it was read from, with the read date. - [CISA adds six entries to the KEV catalog, two with forensic triage](/news/kev-2026-11-10-six-additions/): 10 Nov 2026 - [KEV lists an Ivanti Connect Secure flaw four days before NVD publishes it](/news/kev-2026-10-30-ivanti-listed-before-nvd/): 30 Oct 2026 - [KEV adds a VMware ESX flaw scored CVSS 2.7 and a Linux kernel flaw at EPSS 0.10](/news/kev-2026-10-28-vmware-esx-low-cvss/): 28 Oct 2026 - [KEV adds two PHP flaws with EPSS scores above 0.999](/news/kev-2026-10-26-php-epss-near-one/): 26 Oct 2026 - [CISA adds four Plex Media Server flaws and two others in one alert](/news/kev-2026-10-20-plex-four-entries/): 20 Oct 2026 - [CISA publishes a whitepaper on moving the CVE Program to a quality era](/news/cisa-cve-quality-era-whitepaper/): 23 Sep 2026 - [KEV adds four entries, three listed the day NVD published them](/news/kev-2026-09-22-four-same-day/): 22 Sep 2026 - [CISA adds seven entries to KEV, five with 3-day due dates](/news/kev-2026-09-02-seven-additions/): 2 Sep 2026 - [CISA adds five CVEs published between 2015 and 2022 to KEV in one alert](/news/kev-2026-08-26-five-legacy-cves/): 26 Aug 2026 - [NVD shows SSVC and affected-product data on the CVE detail page](/news/nvd-2026-08-26-ssvc-affected-detail-page/): 26 Aug 2026 - [CISA updates the BOD 26-04 implementation guidance](/news/cisa-bod-26-04-guidance-update/): 25 Aug 2026 - [KEV adds a VMware vCenter flaw flagged for ransomware use, with three others](/news/kev-2026-08-18-vcenter-ransomware/): 18 Aug 2026 Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/news/ --- # Rank by evidence of exploitation first, then by severity and asset context PROGRAM GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Exploitation evidence ranks a vulnerability better than severity does. Start with the CISA KEV catalog, add the EPSS probability for the rest, and use CVSS to order what remains. The KEV Lag Ledger shows why: of 318 additions in the last year, 10.4% scored below 7 on CVSS. ## Order the evidence by how direct it is Three public signals answer three different questions. The CISA KEV catalog answers whether exploitation has been observed. EPSS answers how likely exploitation is in the next 30 days. CVSS answers how bad the flaw is if it is exploited. A ranking that mixes them without saying which question each answers cannot be defended. The order below goes from the most direct evidence to the least. Each tier is a rule you can write down and show to an auditor. A CVE moves up a tier when new evidence arrives and never moves down without a recorded reason. | Tier | Evidence | Source | Question it answers | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Listed in KEV | CISA KEV catalog | Has exploitation in the wild been observed | | 2 | EPSS at or above your threshold | FIRST EPSS, daily | How likely is exploitation in 30 days | | 3 | CVSS base 9.0 or above, internet-facing | NVD or vendor CVSS | How severe is the flaw on its face | | 4 | Everything else | Scanner output | Queue by SLA and asset criticality | ## Why the tiers start with KEV KEV is a list of facts. CISA's own FAQ gives three criteria for adding an entry: a CVE ID, clear remediation guidance and reliable evidence of exploitation in the wild. A listed CVE has been exploited. A CVSS 9.8 may never have been. The KEV Lag Ledger (318 additions, 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09) shows how the catalog behaves. The median time from NVD publication to KEV listing was 10.5 days, and 45.3% of additions were listed within 7 days. A tier 1 rule therefore fires quickly for most entries and late for a long tail: 17.3% were published more than a year before they were listed. ## Where EPSS fits EPSS covers the CVEs that KEV has not listed. FIRST describes it as the probability of exploitation in the wild within the next 30 days, published daily for every scored CVE. Use it to pull forward CVEs that have no KEV entry yet. Choose the threshold from your own capacity, not from a vendor. FIRST states there is no universal threshold and that 0.10 is commonly cited but carries no special authority from EPSS. Write the number in your policy and the date you chose it. ## What to do with CVSS CVSS orders the work inside a tier. It does not choose the tier. In the ledger, 45.9% of KEV additions scored 9.0 or above, so a CVSS-only cut would have caught those and missed the 10.4% that scored below 7. Keep the base score from NVD or the vendor and record which one you used. For a CVE with no exploitation evidence, a CVSS score of 9.0 or above on an internet-facing asset still belongs in tier 3 and gets a deadline. ## Write the rule so someone else can rerun it A prioritization rule is a function with inputs, a date and a result. Store the KEV flag, the EPSS probability and percentile with their score date, and the CVSS vector with its version. Rerun the rule on the same inputs and the same tier must come out. The Signal Matrix on this site lists which of 13 profiled platforms expose each signal. KEV is exposed by 8 of them and EPSS by 7 on the evidence read on 2026-11-10. If your platform exposes neither, ingest both feeds yourself and keep the dated copies. - Tier 1 SLA: set by policy, and by BOD 26-04 where it applies to you. - Tier 2 SLA: longer than tier 1, shorter than tier 3, reviewed monthly against the daily EPSS change. - Re-tier on every new KEV addition, since the catalog changes the answer for CVEs already in your backlog. ## Check the rule against a year of listings Before adopting the tiers, replay them on the ledger. Of the 318 additions, 45.9% scored 9.0 or above on CVSS, so a tier 3 rule alone would have caught nearly half on severity. The 10.4% below 7 would have reached the queue only through KEV, which is the argument for tier 1. Replay also tests the EPSS tier. With a threshold of 0.10, the listing-day scores select 63 of the 260 additions that had a score (24.2%). That means roughly three of four exploited CVEs were below the line on the day CISA listed them. Tier 2 is a way to bring forward CVEs before listing, and it will not catch most of them. ## Sources - FIRST, EPSS frequently asked questions: https://www.first.org/epss/faq (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 22-01 (revoked): https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3-1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/prioritize-vulnerabilities-by-exploitation/ --- # A CVSS vector string is the evidence and the score is only its summary NUMBERS GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Read the vector, not the number. Each abbreviation in a CVSS string records one fact about the flaw: how it is reached, what it needs, and what it damages. Two CVEs with the same 9.8 can differ in every fact that matters to your environment. This guide decodes v3.1 and v4.0. ## The v3.1 string, field by field A v3.1 vector begins with the version label, then lists the base metrics separated by slashes. FIRST's specification names eight: Attack Vector (AV), Attack Complexity (AC), Privileges Required (PR), User Interaction (UI), Scope (S), Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I) and Availability (A). Take CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Read it aloud: reachable over the network, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high impact on all three properties. Applying the specification's base equations gives 9.8 (Critical). The 9.8 adds nothing the string did not already say. | Metric | Common values | What it tells the analyst | | --- | --- | --- | | AV | N, A, L, P | How far from the target the attacker can be: network, adjacent, local, physical | | AC | L, H | Whether conditions outside the attacker's control must line up | | PR | N, L, H | The access the attacker needs before the attack | | UI | N, R | Whether a person must act | | S | U, C | Whether the impact crosses a security boundary | | C / I / A | N, L, H | Damage to confidentiality, integrity and availability | ## The severity bands FIRST's qualitative scale for v3.1 is None at 0.0, Low at 0.1 to 3.9, Medium at 4.0 to 6.9, High at 7.0 to 8.9 and Critical at 9.0 to 10.0. The bands are labels for ranges. A 6.9 and a 7.0 sit in different bands and are separated by one tenth of a point. Do not use the band as a deadline unless your policy says so. The ledger of KEV additions shows 33 of 318 below 7.0 and 146 at 9.0 or above, so both ends of the scale contain exploited CVEs. ## What v4.0 changes CVSS v4.0 keeps the idea and changes the shape. FIRST states that CVSS consists of four metric groups: Base, Threat, Environmental and Supplemental. Impact is split into the Vulnerable System and the Subsequent System, and a new base metric, Attack Requirements, captures prerequisite deployment and execution conditions. The specification also asks that a numeric value be labeled by what produced it: CVSS-B for Base only, CVSS-BT, CVSS-BE and CVSS-BTE as groups are added. A bare 9.3 with no label is ambiguous. Ask whether it is CVSS-B or CVSS-BT before comparing it with anything. ## The score you receive is usually base only Scanners and NVD mostly publish base scores. The v4.0 document states that consumers of CVSS should enrich the Base metrics with Threat and Environmental metric values, and that doing so is not required but is highly recommended for more meaningful results. In practice that means the Environmental group is yours to fill in: the modified base values that reflect your controls and the asset's role. If you do not fill it in, you are ranking by the vendor's view of the flaw in a generic environment. ## A reading routine for audits Record four things for every CVE a decision depends on: the version, the full vector, who scored it (NVD or the vendor) and the date you read it. The ledger takes the NVD base score in the order v3.1, v3.0, v4.0, then v2, with the NVD primary source first, and states that rule in its method. When two sources give different vectors for one CVE, keep both and name the one you ranked by. Disagreement between NVD and a vendor is common, and an auditor will ask which you chose. ## Common misreadings The first misreading is treating the band as the priority. A Critical label says the base metrics are severe. It does not say the flaw is reachable in your network or that anyone is using it. The second is comparing scores across versions. A v3.1 score of 9.8 and a v4.0 score of 9.3 are produced by different equations from different metrics and should not be sorted in one column without noting the version. The third is reading Scope or the v4.0 Subsequent System impact as an asset fact. They describe the flaw's reach across a security boundary in a generic deployment. Whether a boundary matters on your asset is an environmental question, and it belongs in your own modified values. ## Worked contrast Two CVEs can share a 9.8 and differ in the string. One has AV:N and PR:N, so any host that can reach the service can attack it. Another has AV:N, PR:L and UI:R, so the attacker needs an account and a person to click. The number matches and the exposure does not. Sort by vector fields when the question is reachability, and by score only when the question is a rough order of severity. In the ledger every one of the 318 KEV rows carries a v3.1, v3.0, v4.0 or v2 score, and the version is recorded per row for this reason. ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3-1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/reading-a-cvss-vector-string/ --- # EPSS is a daily probability, so store the date and the percentile with every score NUMBERS GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** EPSS gives each CVE a probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, recalculated daily. Read the probability and the percentile together, record the score date, and expect low numbers on exploited CVEs: the median EPSS on KEV listing day in the ledger was 0.0066. ## What the number is FIRST states that EPSS estimates the probability a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days, with a score between 0 and 1 for every publicly disclosed CVE, updated daily. The same FAQ states that CVSS and EPSS measure different things and that EPSS is not a complete risk score. It supplies the threat likelihood component only. An EPSS of 0.02 means about two chances in a hundred over 30 days. It does not mean the flaw is minor, and it says nothing about what happens on the asset. ## Probability and percentile are different statements FIRST's article on bins puts it directly: probabilities convey a global sense of the threat of exploitation, while percentiles provide a relative, localized measure. A probability of 0.10 sits at about the 88th percentile, so 88% of scored CVEs are lower. The same article recommends showing both, in a format such as 15.3% (92nd). Do the same in your tool and your reports. A percentile alone hides how small the underlying probability is, and a probability alone hides how rare it is. | Statistic from the KEV Lag Ledger | Value | | --- | --- | | KEV additions with an EPSS score on the listing day | 260 of 318 | | Median EPSS probability on listing day | 0.0066 (0.006555) | | Median EPSS percentile on listing day | 0.55 | | Share with probability below 0.10 | 75.8% (197 of 260) | | Share with probability at or above 0.50 | 13.1% (34 of 260) | ## Exploited CVEs often score low on the day they are listed The ledger pairs each KEV addition with the EPSS value published on its dateAdded. Three quarters of those with a score were below 0.10 that day, and the median was 0.0066. A CVE can be exploited and still carry a low daily probability, especially when the exploitation is new, targeted or reported late. This is not a defect to be fixed by choosing a lower threshold. It is the reason KEV sits above EPSS in the ranking: KEV records the event, and EPSS estimates the future. Use EPSS for CVEs with no confirmed exploitation, and expect it to miss some that will be listed next. ## The daily change Because scores are recalculated every day, the same CVE can move between runs. FIRST's FAQ says that in the CSV the first line is a comment that names the model the scores were produced under, so a model change is visible in the data you store. Store the score, the percentile, the score date and the model line at the time of each decision. When an auditor asks why a CVE was in the 30-day queue on a given Tuesday, the answer is the value you saved that Tuesday, not today's value. Alert on large day-over-day jumps rather than on a fixed level alone. ## A checklist before you trust a threshold FIRST says there is no universal threshold and that 0.10 is commonly cited but carries no special authority from EPSS. Set yours from the number of CVEs your team can remediate in a cycle. Check three things before adopting it. Count how many open CVEs it selects today. Count how many KEV additions in the ledger it would have selected on listing day. Record both counts next to the threshold. - At 0.10, the ledger's listing-day scores select 63 of 260 additions (24.2%). - At 0.01, they select 116 of 260 (44.6%). - Neither number is a recommendation. They show what each cut costs in missed KEV entries. ## Recording EPSS so it can be audited Save the probability to at least five decimal places. The ledger stores values such as 0.00017 and 0.00297, and rounding to two places would turn most listing-day scores into 0.00 and erase the differences between them. Write the fetch date beside the score date. FIRST publishes scores daily, and a score fetched late on a given day can differ from the file you pulled that morning. Both facts belong in the record so that the answer to an auditor is a lookup. ## Common errors Four errors recur. Reading the probability as a percentage chance of compromise on your asset. Comparing a score from one date with a score from another and calling the difference a trend without checking the model line. Sorting by percentile and treating the top 12% as 12% likely. Using EPSS as the only gate, which the ledger argues against because three in four KEV entries were below 0.10 on listing day. Write each as a line in your review checklist and tick it when you sign off the queue. ## Sources - FIRST, EPSS frequently asked questions: https://www.first.org/epss/faq (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS probability and percentile bins: https://www.first.org/epss/articles/prob_percentile_bins (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/using-epss-without-fooling-yourself/ --- # BOD 26-04 sets the KEV timelines now, and BOD 22-01 is revoked PROGRAM GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CISA's BOD 26-04, issued June 10, 2026, is the directive in force for KEV remediation. It supersedes and revokes BOD 22-01, which had set two-week and six-month dates, and keys timelines to exposure and exploitation. Check which directive your contract or policy cites before you quote a date. ## Which directive is in force CISA's BOD 26-04, titled Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, was issued on June 10, 2026. The directive states that it supersedes and revokes BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01. The BOD 22-01 page now carries a notice that it has been revoked and superseded by BOD 26-04. Federal agencies work to BOD 26-04. Contracts, policies and vendor materials written before June 2026 may still cite BOD 22-01 and its two-week dates. Update those references and record the date you did. ## What BOD 26-04 requires The directive phases in. Phase I applies immediately: update vulnerability policies, monitor KEV catalog updates and continue Cyber Hygiene scanning. Phase II is due within 60 days, when agencies update vulnerability management processes based on CVE and KEV data. Phase III is due within 180 days, when agencies must meet the Table 1 remediation timelines and tag internet-reachable assets. Table 1 uses four decision points: asset exposure, KEV status, automatable exploitation and technical impact. The remediation durations are published as an image on the directive page, so read them there and do not copy them from a secondary summary. Entries marked & forensic triage require remediation or mitigation within three days plus a forensic triage of the asset. CISA's page says Table 1 is informed by SSVC. | Item | BOD 22-01 (revoked) | BOD 26-04 (current) | | --- | --- | --- | | Timeline basis | Per-entry due date in the catalog: two weeks, or six months for CVE IDs assigned before 2021 | Table 1: exposure, KEV status, automatable exploitation, technical impact | | Fast lane | None found on 2026-11-10 | Entries marked & forensic triage: three days, plus forensic triage | | Clock starts | Catalog due date | When CISA adds the CVE to KEV or the agency identifies it on an asset, whichever is first | | Reporting | Report status of catalog vulnerabilities | Automated KEV status through the CDM Dashboard, or manual every two weeks if not fully automated | ## What the numbers mean for your queue Under either directive the clock depends on when the CVE enters the catalog. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 318 CVEs were added between 2025-11-10 and 2026-11-09, about 6 per week, and the monthly count ranged from 17 to 43 across full months. A program that reviews KEV weekly will see its backlog change weekly. Because 17.3% of additions were published more than a year before listing, a share of the CVEs that start a clock are old. They are in your asset data already. Match each new addition against the whole inventory the day it appears, not against new scan results only. ## Build the process, not the date BOD 26-04 states that timelines change as facts change. Removing an asset from the internet changes its exposure value and can lengthen its timeline. Keep the exposure tag on each asset current and dated, since it now decides the deadline. The directive asks agencies to report asset tags covering organization, environment, exposure and asset type. Record, per KEV entry, the date CISA listed it, the date you matched it to an asset, the timeline applied, the date of closure and the evidence. Those five fields answer most audit questions on a KEV deadline. Keep them in one table keyed by CVE ID and asset, so that a single filter returns every open item past its timeline. - Pull the KEV feed at least daily and diff it against yesterday's copy. - Match by CVE ID against every asset, including those scanned less often. - Tag internet-reachable assets and date the tag. - Non-federal organizations: state in your policy whether you adopt the directive's timelines by reference. ## Where BOD 22-01 still appears Older runbooks, audit findings and vendor datasheets may still describe the two-week rule. Treat those as historical. When an auditor quotes the old dates, answer with the current directive and its issue date, and show the change record. The catalog itself continues. CISA's FAQ criteria for adding an entry (a CVE ID, clear remediation guidance and reliable evidence of exploitation in the wild) were stated in the BOD 22-01 materials, and the KEV feed is still the input your tooling reads. Its release on 2026-11-09 was catalog version 2026.11.09, which is the version the ledger was built from. Record the catalog version beside every KEV match you report, so the match can be rerun against the same file. ## Sources - CISA, BOD 22-01 (revoked): https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/meeting-kev-due-dates-bod-22-01/ --- # An SSVC tree turns a few named facts into one of four outcomes you can defend PROGRAM GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** SSVC replaces a score with a decision tree. CISA's version asks about exploitation status, technical impact, automatable exploitation, mission prevalence and public well-being impact, and returns Track, Track*, Attend or Act. Write your own tree, name every branch, and keep the version history. ## What CISA publishes CISA's SSVC page lists five decision points: exploitation status, technical impact, automatable, mission prevalence and public well-being impact. The tree yields four decisions: Track, Track*, Attend and Act. The page describes Track* as a vulnerability with characteristics that may need closer monitoring, and Act as the most urgent, requiring leadership attention and prompt remediation. BOD 26-04 states that its Table 1 is informed by SSVC, and its decision points are asset exposure, KEV status, automatable exploitation and technical impact. A federal reader will meet SSVC in the directive even if the program never adopted it. ## Start from the two facts you can get for free Exploitation status can be read from the KEV catalog and, for weaker evidence, from EPSS. Technical impact can be read from the CVSS confidentiality, integrity and availability metrics in the vector. Automatable is a judgment you record once per CVE, with a note. Mission prevalence and public well-being impact depend on the asset, so they come from your inventory, not from a feed. If asset tagging is incomplete, the tree will return the same answer for every asset. Fix the tags before you tune the branches. ## Write the tree as a table List every combination of values and write the outcome beside it. A tree is auditable when a reviewer can find any CVE's row without running software. Keep it to the decision points you can populate reliably, since an unpopulated point is a silent default. The sketch below uses four points and is an example of the format, not CISA's tree. Replace the outcomes with your own after review. | Exploitation | Automatable | Technical impact | Asset mission role | Outcome | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Active (KEV listed) | Yes | Total | Essential | Act | | Active (KEV listed) | No | Partial | Support | Attend | | Public proof of concept | Yes | Total | Essential | Attend | | None | No | Partial | Minimal | Track | ## Version it and test it against the ledger Give the tree a version number and a date, and record who approved it. When a branch changes, rerun it on the open inventory and keep both outputs. A reviewer who sees Act become Attend needs the reason on file. Test the tree on known cases. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 30 of 318 additions carry a CVSS base score of 10, and 33 score below 7. A tree that sends a KEV entry on an essential asset to Track fails the test. Run the 318 rows through the draft with an asset role assigned to each and read the exceptions. ## Where platforms stand On the evidence read on 2026-11-10, the Signal Matrix shows SSVC exposed by 2 of 13 profiled platforms: Nucleus states SSVC prioritization on its federal page, and ServiceNow's documentation says its KEV integration shows SSVC values. For the other platforms the cell reads none found on 2026-11-10, which records the reach of the search and not a verdict. If your platform does not expose SSVC, the tree can still live in a policy document and a spreadsheet keyed by CVE. The decision is the artifact, and the tool only has to carry the inputs. ## Governance of the tree Assign one owner for the tree and one reviewer from outside the vulnerability team, such as the asset owner or risk function. Review it twice a year and after any directive change. A tree nobody reviews drifts into a score. Keep the tree readable by the people who receive its output. System owners accept an outcome faster when they can see the branch that produced it, and the branch is the explanation. Print the branch beside the outcome in every ticket. ## From outcome to deadline An outcome needs a deadline to be useful. Attach one to each: for example Act within days, Attend within weeks, Track at the next scheduled cycle. The numbers belong to your policy, since CISA's SSVC page names the outcomes and describes Act as requiring leadership attention and prompt remediation, but your service levels are yours to set. Where a federal directive applies, its own table governs the covered assets, and your tree handles everything else. Publish the mapping from outcome to deadline in the same document as the tree. Then measure it: count the open CVEs per outcome each month and the share closed inside the deadline. A tree whose Act list is never closed on time is a signal to change the deadline, the staffing or the tree, and the record should show which one you changed. ## Sources - CISA, Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC): https://www.cisa.gov/stakeholder-specific-vulnerability-categorization-ssvc (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/writing-an-ssvc-decision-tree/ --- # Show the inputs, the rule, the date and the exceptions, and the ranking explains itself AUDIT GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** An auditor wants to rerun your ranking, not admire it. Hand over the signals with their source and date, the written rule, the thresholds with who set them, and the exceptions with reasons. Every number in this guide comes from a named FIRST or CISA page or from the KEV Lag Ledger. ## What the auditor is checking The question behind most audit requests is whether the same input produces the same decision, and whether a person can override it with a reason. That means three artifacts: a written rule, dated inputs and an exception log. The rule can be short. It lists the signals, the order they are applied and the threshold for each. The inputs are the KEV flag, the EPSS probability and percentile with the score date, and the CVSS vector with its version and source. The exception log lists each override, the person and the date. ## Cite each signal to its source Name the owner of each number so the auditor can check it. CVSS is maintained by FIRST, and the specification defines the metrics and the severity bands. EPSS is published by FIRST daily, and its FAQ defines the score as a 30-day probability. KEV is maintained by CISA, whose FAQ gives the three listing criteria. Where a platform computes its own rating, label it as the vendor's. Describe it as the vendor's rating, with the vendor's stated scale, and keep a copy of the vendor page you read. Do not present a vendor rating as an industry standard. | Signal | Owner | Defines | Store with each decision | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVSS | FIRST | Technical severity, 0.0 to 10.0 | Version, full vector, scorer, read date | | EPSS | FIRST | 30-day exploitation probability | Probability, percentile, score date, model line | | KEV | CISA | Observed exploitation in the wild | Listing date, due date, ransomware field | | SSVC | CISA (reference tree) | Decision outcome | Tree version, branch taken | ## Show the rule failing safely An auditor will ask what the rule misses. Answer with data. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 10.4% of additions (33 of 318) had a CVSS base score below 7, so a severity-only rule would have placed them outside the high band. Among the 260 additions with an EPSS score on listing day, 75.8% were below 0.10, so a probability-only rule at 0.10 would have missed most on that day. The written rule should therefore say that KEV listing overrides the other two. State this as a design choice made because each single signal misses a share of exploited CVEs, and cite the ledger with its date range, 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09. ## Keep the evidence package small A package that fits in four files gets read. Include the rule document, a dated export of the scored inventory, the exception log and the change history of the thresholds. Add the source pages with the date you read them. If a federal directive applies, add the directive's reference. BOD 22-01 has been revoked and superseded by BOD 26-04, issued June 10, 2026, so cite the current one and record the date you changed over. - Inputs: dated exports of KEV, EPSS and CVSS for the review period. - Rule: version, approver, effective date. - Thresholds: who set each, when, and the count of CVEs it selected. - Exceptions: CVE, reason, owner, expiry date. - Samples: five CVEs traced from input to outcome. ## What not to say Do not tell the auditor the platform decides. The platform computes, and your rule decides. If the platform's score is part of the rule, record the platform's version and the date, since a vendor can change a model without telling you. Do not quote a threshold you cannot justify. FIRST states there is no universal EPSS threshold, so your number is a policy choice, and the record should say so. ## A short script for the meeting Open with the rule in one sentence: KEV-listed CVEs first, then CVEs at or above the EPSS threshold, then CVSS 9.0 and above on internet-facing assets, then the rest by SLA. Follow with the date range of the evidence behind each step. Then ask which CVEs the auditor wants traced. Pick the trace yourself if you are asked to. Choose one KEV entry, one EPSS-selected CVE and one CVSS-only CVE, and walk each from the saved input to the outcome and the closure ticket. Three clean traces are better evidence than a dashboard. ## Handling vendor scores If your platform shows a proprietary rating, ask three questions and record the answers: what inputs the vendor says it uses, how often it is recalculated, and whether you can export the history. A platform that cannot export the history cannot support a question about last quarter. The Signal Matrix on this site marks whether each of 13 platforms documents customer weighting. A cell that reads none found on 2026-11-10 is a prompt for you to ask the vendor, since it records the reach of one search on one date. ## Sources - FIRST, EPSS frequently asked questions: https://www.first.org/epss/faq (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3-1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/explaining-the-ranking-to-an-auditor/ --- # CVSS measures severity, so ranking by it alone puts exploited CVEs in the wrong place LEDGER FINDING, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** CVSS describes how severe a flaw is, not whether anyone is exploiting it. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 10.4% of 318 CISA KEV additions scored below 7, and the median EPSS on listing day was 0.0066. Each signal misses a share of exploited CVEs, which is why the signals must be combined. ## What CVSS was built to say FIRST's specification describes the base score as reflecting the severity of a vulnerability according to its intrinsic characteristics, and places factors such as monetary losses due to a breach outside the scope of CVSS. A score of 9.8 describes the flaw. It does not describe your asset, your controls or the attackers' interest. The v4.0 document asks consumers to enrich Base with Threat and Environmental metrics. Most published scores are base only, so the number you receive is the least informed version. ## What the ledger shows The KEV Lag Ledger covers every KEV addition from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09: 318 CVEs, each with an NVD base score. The headline figures are below, each computed from the rows in data/kev/ledger.json. Read them together. Almost half of the exploited CVEs would top a CVSS ranking. About one in ten would sit below the High band. The probability signal, on the day of listing, was low for most. No single column reliably flags the exploited set. | Measure | Value | Count | | --- | --- | --- | | KEV additions in the window | 318 | 318 | | CVSS base score below 7 | 10.4% | 33 of 318 | | CVSS base score 9.0 or above | 45.9% | 146 of 318 | | CVSS base score of 10 | 9.4% | 30 of 318 | | EPSS below 0.10 on listing day | 75.8% | 197 of 260 | | Median EPSS on listing day | 0.0066 | 260 with a score | | Median days, NVD publication to listing | 10.5 | 318 | | Listed within 7 days of publication | 45.3% | 144 of 318 | ## Two examples from the rows CVE-2026-41709 (Broadcom VMware ESX) was added on 2026-10-28 with an NVD base score of 2.7 and an EPSS of 0.00297 on that day. A CVSS ranking places it near the bottom. CISA listed it on evidence of exploitation. CVE-2026-9082 (Drupal Core) was added on 2026-05-22 with a base score of 9.8 and an EPSS of 0.00017 on listing day. High on CVSS, near the floor on EPSS, and in KEV two days after NVD published it. Only the KEV flag ranks it correctly on that day. ## The other direction Severity-only ranking also overfills the top. Of the 123 additions with a CVSS of 9.0 or above and an EPSS score that day, 88 had an EPSS below 0.10. In a backlog that is not limited to KEV entries, the number of unlisted 9.0-and-above CVEs is far larger, and the ledger cannot count them because it contains only listed entries. That limit matters. The ledger measures how exploited CVEs look on each signal. It does not measure how many unexploited CVEs look the same, so it supports a claim that CVSS misses exploited CVEs, not a claim about precision. ## What to change in the ranking Put the exploitation evidence first, then use probability for what is not yet listed, then use severity to order within a tier. The guide on building a weighted priority score shows one way to write that down with real CVEs. Record the 58 additions with no EPSS score on listing day as unscored rather than as zero. Treating a missing value as zero would push them down for a reason unrelated to risk. ## How to repeat this check on your own data Export your closed and open findings with CVSS, the KEV flag and the EPSS probability on a dated snapshot. Count the KEV-listed findings below 7.0, as the ledger does with its 10.4%. If your share is much lower, check whether your scanner reports vendor scores that differ from NVD. Then count the KEV-listed findings with an EPSS below 0.10. The ledger found 75.8% of 260 on listing day. Your numbers will differ with the age of your findings, since EPSS rises and falls after listing. Keep the snapshot date with the result. ## A note on the median The median EPSS on listing day was 0.006555. The median percentile on the same day was 0.55, which places a typical newly listed CVE in the middle of all scored CVEs. Both figures say the same thing from two angles: most KEV entries do not look unusual to the model on the day CISA lists them. That is a limit on EPSS as an early warning for the entries that are listed shortly after publication, and 45.3% were listed within 7 days. It is also a reason to read KEV the day it changes. ## Sources - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3-1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v4.0 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, EPSS frequently asked questions: https://www.first.org/epss/faq (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/why-cvss-alone-misranks/ --- # A weighted score of 30 points for CVSS, 40 for EPSS and 30 for KEV ranks real CVEs sensibly WORKED EXAMPLE, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** A weighted score is arithmetic you can show. This guide scores five CVEs from the KEV Lag Ledger with 30 points for CVSS, 40 for EPSS and 30 for KEV listing, then shows where the ranking differs from CVSS alone and where the weights need a floor or a gate. ## The formula Score = 30 x (CVSS base / 10) + 40 x EPSS probability + 30 x KEV flag, where the KEV flag is 1 if the CVE is in the CISA catalog on the scoring date and 0 otherwise. The range is 0 to 100. These weights are an example chosen for clarity, not a standard from FIRST or CISA. Each input has a source and a date. CVSS is the NVD base score (v3.1 for all five CVEs below). EPSS is the probability published for the KEV dateAdded, taken from the ledger. KEV status comes from the catalog entry. ## Five CVEs from the ledger The rows are from data/kev/ledger.json. All five are KEV entries, so the KEV term adds 30 to each and the ranking is decided by the other two terms. The ledger contains only listed entries, so it has no example of a CVE scoring 0 on the KEV term. The ProFTPD and SmarterMail entries combine high CVSS with high EPSS and rank first. TeamCity ranks above Drupal even though its CVSS is lower, because its listing-day EPSS is 0.82. The VMware ESX entry sits last on every term. | CVE | Product | KEV added | CVSS | EPSS that day | CVSS pts | EPSS pts | KEV pts | Score | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVE-2015-3306 | ProFTPD | 2026-10-08 | 10.0 | 0.96752 | 30.0 | 38.7 | 30 | 98.7 | | CVE-2025-52691 | SmarterTools SmarterMail | 2026-01-26 | 10.0 | 0.73587 | 30.0 | 29.4 | 30 | 89.4 | | CVE-2024-27199 | JetBrains TeamCity | 2026-04-20 | 7.3 | 0.82472 | 21.9 | 33.0 | 30 | 84.9 | | CVE-2026-9082 | Drupal Core | 2026-05-22 | 9.8 | 0.00017 | 29.4 | 0.0 | 30 | 59.4 | | CVE-2026-41709 | Broadcom VMware ESX | 2026-10-28 | 2.7 | 0.00297 | 8.1 | 0.1 | 30 | 38.2 | ## Where it differs from CVSS alone Ranked by CVSS, the order is ProFTPD and SmarterMail at 10.0, Drupal at 9.8, TeamCity at 7.3 and VMware ESX at 2.7. The weighted order swaps Drupal and TeamCity. TeamCity (CVE-2024-27199) carries the ledger's ransomware flag, and its EPSS says exploitation is likely, so the swap matches the evidence. The weighted score does not fix the Drupal entry's EPSS of 0.00017. That value is tiny, and the entry was listed two days after NVD published it. The 30 KEV points hold it at 59.4. Without the KEV term it would have scored 29.4, below TeamCity's 54.9. ## Add a floor and a gate Two rules close the gaps. A floor: any KEV-listed CVE on an internet-facing asset goes to the top band regardless of score. A gate: a CVE that is not in KEV cannot score above 70 under these weights (30 + 40), so it cannot outrank a listed CVE on points alone, which suits a program that treats observed exploitation as decisive. The VMware ESX entry shows the floor at work. At 38.2 it would be in the low band by score, yet CISA listed it on 2026-10-28 on evidence of exploitation. The floor lifts it to the top band and the log records why. ## Weights and where platforms allow them Choose the weights from the question you are answering and write them in the policy with the date. If you set EPSS at 40 points, an EPSS of 0.10 contributes 4 points. Check that the points your threshold implies match what you intend. On the evidence read on 2026-11-10, the Signal Matrix shows customer weighting of the score documented for 5 of 13 profiled platforms. The cells for the others read none found on 2026-11-10. If your platform does not let you set weights, compute this score yourself from the exported fields and keep the formula under version control. - Inputs per row: CVE, CVSS version and base score, EPSS probability and date, KEV flag and date. - Output per row: points by term, total, band, and the rule that applied (score, floor or gate). - Review weights every quarter and record the change. ## Sensitivity of the weights Change the weights and the order moves. With 50 points for CVSS, 20 for EPSS and 30 for KEV, TeamCity scores 36.5 + 16.5 + 30 = 83.0, and Drupal scores 49.0 + 0.0 + 30 = 79.0, so TeamCity still leads. With 70 for CVSS, 0 for EPSS and 30 for KEV, Drupal scores 98.6 against TeamCity's 81.1. The swap depends on giving EPSS real weight. Run that check on any weights you adopt. Pick five CVEs where you already know the right order, score them, and confirm the formula agrees. A formula that disagrees with the cases you are sure about will disagree on the ones you are not. ## Sources - FIRST, EPSS frequently asked questions: https://www.first.org/epss/faq (read 10 Nov 2026) - FIRST, CVSS v3.1 Specification Document: https://www.first.org/cvss/v3-1/specification-document (read 10 Nov 2026) - CISA, BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026) Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/building-a-weighted-priority-score/ --- # Guides to ranking by exploitation, with the arithmetic shown GUIDES, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Eight guides: prioritizing by exploitation, reading a CVSS vector, using EPSS without fooling yourself, meeting KEV due dates under BOD 26-04, writing an SSVC tree, explaining a ranking to an auditor, why CVSS alone misranks, and building a weighted score from real ledger CVEs. - [How to prioritize vulnerabilities by exploitation](/guides/prioritize-vulnerabilities-by-exploitation/): Exploitation evidence ranks a vulnerability better than severity does. - [Reading a CVSS vector string, metric by metric](/guides/reading-a-cvss-vector-string/): Read the vector, not the number. - [Using EPSS without fooling yourself](/guides/using-epss-without-fooling-yourself/): EPSS gives each CVE a probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, recalculated daily. - [Meeting KEV due dates: BOD 22-01 and BOD 26-04](/guides/meeting-kev-due-dates-bod-22-01/): CISA's BOD 26-04, issued June 10, 2026, is the directive in force for KEV remediation. - [Writing an SSVC decision tree for your organization](/guides/writing-an-ssvc-decision-tree/): SSVC replaces a score with a decision tree. - [Explaining the ranking to an auditor](/guides/explaining-the-ranking-to-an-auditor/): An auditor wants to rerun your ranking, not admire it. - [Why CVSS alone misranks exploited vulnerabilities](/guides/why-cvss-alone-misranks/): CVSS describes how severe a flaw is, not whether anyone is exploiting it. - [Building a weighted priority score from CVSS, EPSS and KEV](/guides/building-a-weighted-priority-score/): A weighted score is arithmetic you can show. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/ --- # 30 questions, answered with the numbers FAQ, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Thirty questions analysts and auditors ask about CVSS, EPSS, the KEV catalog and SSVC, answered with formulas, dates and the ledger. Of 318 KEV additions in the twelve months to 9 Nov 2026, the median was listed 10.5 days after NVD publication, and 75.8 percent had an EPSS score under 0.1 on the day. **What is the difference between CVSS and EPSS?** CVSS scores technical severity from fixed metrics, on a 0.0 to 10.0 scale, and does not change when exploitation starts. EPSS is a daily model from FIRST that estimates the probability that a published CVE is exploited in the next 30 days, on a 0 to 1 scale. One describes the flaw, the other forecasts activity. **How is a CVSS v3.1 base score calculated?** Exploitability is 8.22 x AV x AC x PR x UI. ISS is 1 - [(1 - C) x (1 - I) x (1 - A)], and Impact is 6.42 x ISS when scope is unchanged. The score is Roundup(Minimum(Impact + Exploitability, 10)). With scope changed, the sum is multiplied by 1.08. CVE-2026-33824 works out to 9.76, rounded up to 9.8. **How does CVSS v4.0 differ from v3.1?** CVSS v4.0 adds the Attack Requirements metric (AT), splits impact into vulnerable-system (VC, VI, VA) and subsequent-system (SC, SI, SA) metrics, replaces the temporal group with a single Exploit Maturity threat metric, and adds supplemental metrics such as Safety, Automatable and Provider Urgency. Scores are named CVSS-B, CVSS-BT, CVSS-BE or CVSS-BTE by the inputs used. **Which CVSS version does the KEV Lag Ledger use?** The ledger takes the NVD primary score first, preferring v3.1, then v3.0, v4.0 and v2. Of 318 additions, 313 use v3.1 and 5 use v3.0, so no v4.0 score is in the figures. NVD's own source supplied 130 rows. The rest come from CNA or CISA-ADP records such as secure@microsoft.com. **How many KEV additions had a CVSS base score below 7?** In the ledger, 33 of 318 additions (10.4 percent) had a base score below 7.0, and 285 (89.6 percent) had 7.0 or higher. Only one was below 4.0. A policy that patches only High and Critical findings first would have ranked about one KEV addition in ten below its cutoff when CISA listed it. **How many KEV additions are Critical on CVSS?** 146 of 318 additions (45.9 percent) scored 9.0 or higher, and 30 scored exactly 10.0. The most common single score is 9.8, with 103 additions. The median base score is 8.8. A Critical cutoff therefore captures under half of what CISA listed in the window from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09. **What share of KEV additions had an EPSS of 0.1 or higher on listing day?** Of the 260 additions with an EPSS score on the KEV dateAdded, 63 (24.2 percent) were at 0.1 or higher and 197 (75.8 percent) were below it. At 0.5 or higher it was 34 (13.1 percent), and at 0.9 or higher it was 10 (3.8 percent). The 10 percent threshold alone would have missed three in four. **Why is the median EPSS on KEV listing day only 0.0066?** Most entries are listed soon after publication, before EPSS has seen exploitation. Among 86 scored entries listed within 7 days, the median EPSS is 0.003875. Among 55 listed more than 365 days after publication, it is 0.34729. The overall median of 0.006555 across 260 scored entries mixes these two groups. **Why do 58 KEV additions have no EPSS score on listing day?** All 58 were listed on the day NVD published them or before it, with a lag of 0 or less, so FIRST had not yet scored the CVE. The ledger therefore carries EPSS for 260 of 318 rows. For these entries a ranking that requires an EPSS value cannot place them on listing day. **What is the EPSS percentile and how should it be read?** The percentile is the proportion of all scored CVEs with a probability at or below the current one. FIRST suggests showing the probability first, for example 15.3% (92nd). FIRST's article puts a probability of 0.10 at about the 88th percentile (March 2022 data). The ledger's median listing-day percentile is 0.5507. **Which EPSS model version is current?** FIRST's daily score file downloaded on 2026-11-10 carries the header model_version:v2026.06.15. FIRST's EPSS research page describes Version 5 as current. Scores from different model versions are not strictly comparable, so store the version and the score date beside each value you rank on. **How often does EPSS change for a CVE?** FIRST publishes a score for every CVE daily. CVE-2026-33824 was 0.5585 on 2026-08-18 and 0.77054 on 2026-11-10. CVE-2026-59310 moved from 0.0114 on 2026-08-18 to 0.61668 on 2026-11-10. A ranking built on a stored EPSS value goes stale unless it records the score date. **What is KEV lag and how is it measured?** KEV lag is the KEV dateAdded minus the NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. For the 318 additions from 2025-11-10 to 2026-11-09 the median is 10.5 days, the quartiles are 1, 10.5 and 146.25, and the maximum is 6,507. CVE-2026-33824 shows 126 days: published 2026-04-14, listed 2026-08-18. **How quickly are CVEs added to KEV after publication?** In the ledger, 144 of 318 additions (45.3 percent) were listed within 7 days of NVD publication and 192 (60.4 percent) within 30 days. 126 were listed more than 30 days after publication, and 55 (17.3 percent) more than 365 days after. The distribution has a long tail, with a mean of 450.9 days. **Can a CVE be added to KEV before NVD publishes it?** Yes. In the ledger, 8 additions have a negative lag, from -1 to -6 days, and 61 have a lag of exactly 0, 69 together (21.7 percent). CVE-2026-118527 (Ivanti Connect Secure) was listed on 2026-10-30 and published by NVD on 2026-11-03. A ranking keyed to NVD publication would not see it first. **Does a CVE need a public proof of concept to enter KEV?** No. CISA's BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, last updated 2026-08-25, states that a public proof of concept is not required for KEV inclusion. Evidence of exploitation is the basis. A public PoC does matter for the automatable input, which BOD 26-04 sets to yes when a PoC reliably achieves remote code execution. **What replaced BOD 22-01?** BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, issued by CISA on 2026-06-10. It supersedes and revokes BOD 22-01 (2021-11-03) and BOD 19-02 (2019-04-29). The KEV catalog continues. BOD 26-04 bases timelines on exposure, KEV status, automatable and technical impact, and says CVSS is no longer required for prioritization. **How are KEV due dates set now?** Under BOD 26-04, CISA computes the date from asset exposure, KEV status, exploit automation and technical impact. The guidance gives one example: a publicly exposed asset with total technical impact and an automatable flaw gets a 3-day deadline. In the feed, 124 of 156 ledger entries added since 2026-06-10 have a 3-day dueDate and 32 have 14 days. **What does the forensicTriage field in the KEV feed mean?** It marks entries for which BOD 26-04 requires agencies to remediate or mitigate and also carry out a forensic triage of the asset to assess whether it is compromised. In the feed, 101 of the 318 ledger entries show forensicTriage Yes. The guidance recommends scoping within 2 hours and an escalation decision at 48 to 72 hours. **What does the known ransomware campaign use field tell an analyst?** Known means CISA has evidence of use in ransomware campaigns. Unknown means no such evidence is recorded. In the ledger, 29 of 318 entries (9.1 percent) read Known on 2026-11-09. Their median EPSS on listing day was 0.0114, and base scores ran from 5.3 to 10.0. The flag can change after listing, so store the read date. **What is SSVC and what are its decision outcomes?** SSVC is the Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization method. CISA's tree ends in Track, Track*, Attend or Act. Track needs no action now, Track* needs closer monitoring, Attend needs supervisory attention and sooner remediation, and Act needs supervisory and leadership attention and remediation as soon as possible. **Which SSVC decision points does CISA publish for each CVE?** Vulnrichment publishes three: exploitation, automatable and technical impact, using the CISA Coordinator tree (SSVC 2.0, tree version 3). CISA's SSVC page also names mission prevalence and public well-being impact, which depend on the deploying organization and are not published per CVE. A program records those two itself. **Does NVD publish SSVC data?** Yes. NVD announced on 2026-05-28 and deployed on 2026-06-17 an update that adds SSVC data from CISA-ADP, schema version 2.0.3, to its feeds and API. On 2026-08-26 NVD began displaying SSVC and the affected list on the CVE detail page. The change touched about 95 percent of existing NVD records. **Does NVD still add its own severity score to every CVE?** No. On 2026-04-15 NIST said it would no longer routinely provide a separate score where the CNA already gave one, and that it would enrich CVEs in KEV first, aiming for one business day. In the ledger, 130 of 318 rows use an NVD score and 188 use a CNA or CISA-ADP score. **What went wrong with NVD CVSS v4.0 scores in 2026?** NIST reported on 2026-04-28 that about 4,500 CVE records, 19 percent of those with a v4.0 score, had a numerical score higher than the correctly calculated value, and fewer than 30 had a lower one. NVD ran a correction script that evening and updated the modified dates. API users who sync by lastModified received the fix automatically. **Why does the CVSS score differ between NVD and the vendor?** Both can publish a score. NVD labels its own as Primary and a CNA's as Secondary. The two can use different CVSS versions or judge a metric differently. Since 2026-04-15 NVD no longer routinely scores CVEs a CNA has scored. Record the score source with the vector string, as the ledger does. **What is the difference between CVSS-B, CVSS-BT, CVSS-BE and CVSS-BTE?** These are the v4.0 labels for the metric groups behind a score: Base, Base and Threat, Base and Environmental, and Base, Threat and Environmental. Most published scores are CVSS-B. In v4.0, Exploit Maturity Not Defined (X) is scored as Attacked, so a CVSS-BT for a KEV-listed flaw can equal its CVSS-B. **Should a program rank by KEV, EPSS or CVSS?** Use each for what it measures. KEV is an observed event, with 318 additions in 365 days. EPSS is a 30-day forecast, and 24.2 percent of scored additions were at 0.1 or higher on listing day. CVSS is severity: 89.6 percent were 7.0 or higher. A common design puts KEV first, then orders the rest by EPSS and CVSS. **What does an auditor need to see to accept a ranking built on these scores?** The formula or rule, and for every input the source, version and date: CVSS vector string and source, EPSS score date and model version, KEV catalog version and read date, SSVC schema version. The ledger records KEV catalog version 2026.11.09. Without dates, a score cannot be reproduced the next day. **Why not wait for a KEV listing before patching?** The lag is long for much of the catalog. The median is 10.5 days and the 75th percentile is 146.25 days. 55 additions (17.3 percent) were listed more than a year after publication. An organization that acts only on listing has already waited that long, which is why EPSS and exposure data are used alongside it. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/faq/ --- # Every dataset, as CSV and JSON DATASETS, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** 3 datasets back the pages on this site. Each is published as CSV and JSON under CC BY 4.0, with the read date and a line to cite it by. The ranked views file holds every ranking exactly as the pages print it, for anyone who wants to check the order. ## KEV Lag Ledger Every KEV entry with dateAdded in the trailing 365 days of the catalog release. NVD published date and CVSS base score (v3.1, else v3.0, else v4.0, else v2; NVD Primary first). EPSS score and percentile on the KEV dateAdded from the FIRST API. days_publication_to_kev = dateAdded minus NVD published date, in UTC calendar days. - [kev-lag-ledger.csv](/datasets/kev-lag-ledger.csv): 318 rows - [kev-lag-ledger.json](/datasets/kev-lag-ledger.json): same rows, with the cite line **Cite this.** KEV Lag Ledger, EPSS vs CVSS, CISA KEV 2026.11.09, fetched 2026-11-10. https://epssvscvss.com/ledger/ ## Signal Matrix Each cell comes first from the sourced facts files in the evidence files, then from vendor documentation pages fetched on 2026-11-10. A cell is yes when a vendor page or document names the signal as exposed in the product, partial when the page names it only in part, and none found when the facts files and the pages read did not show it. None found records the reach of the search on one date. It is not a statement that the signal is absent. The vendor's words are labelled as the vendor's. Vulcan Cyber cells rest on archived pages dated 1 January 2025. - [signal-matrix.csv](/datasets/signal-matrix.csv): 117 rows - [signal-matrix.json](/datasets/signal-matrix.json): same rows, with the cite line **Cite this.** Signal Matrix, EPSS vs CVSS, read 10 Nov 2026. https://epssvscvss.com/signals/ ## Platforms by exploitation evidence The ranked view, evidence weighted 40. - [evidence-ranking.csv](/datasets/evidence-ranking.csv): 13 rows - [evidence-ranking.json](/datasets/evidence-ranking.json): same rows, with the cite line **Cite this.** Exploitation evidence ranking, EPSS vs CVSS, read 10 Nov 2026. ## Ranked views as published - [ranked-views.json](/datasets/ranked-views.json): every ranked view, its weights and its order Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/datasets/ --- # About EPSS vs CVSS ABOUT, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** EPSS vs CVSS is a reference for the analyst who has to defend a vulnerability ranking and the auditor who asks about it. It explains CVSS, EPSS, the CISA KEV catalog and SSVC with the formula or source beside every statement, and publishes the KEV Lag Ledger, computed from public data. EPSS vs CVSS is a reference publication about the numbers a vulnerability management program ranks by: CVSS v3.1 and v4.0, EPSS, the CISA KEV catalog, SSVC, the NVD, and the ratings that vendors publish. It is written for the analyst who has to defend a ranking and the auditor who asks how it was made. Each page states what the number measures, who maintains it, how it is computed or where its specification is, and what its documented limits are. Every statement is tied to a source that was fetched and read on 2026-11-10, and each page lists its sources with the read date. Formulas are quoted from the FIRST specifications. EPSS facts come from the FIRST EPSS pages and the daily CSV. KEV facts come from the CISA JSON feed and from the binding operational directives, BOD 26-04 (in force since 2026-06-10) and BOD 22-01 (the original KEV directive, now superseded). Vendor ratings are described only as the vendor describes them, and where no numeric scale or method is published the page records that none was found on 2026-11-10. The publication also keeps two data sets of its own. The KEV Lag Ledger is computed from public sources and published as JSON and CSV so that anyone can rerun it. The platform index scores 13 vulnerability management platforms on seven criteria, weighted 40 for how a platform turns exploitation evidence into a priority. The weights were committed before any score, a second reviewer checked the scores before the vendors' identities were revealed, and every position, ties included, is published as scored. On the evidence index two platforms tie at 6.90, and the committed tie-break, the higher evidence score, places Brinqa first. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/about/ --- # How a fact gets onto a page EDITORIAL POLICY, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Every fact on EPSS vs CVSS carries a source URL and the date it was read. Vendor claims are labelled as the vendor's. A capability that could not be found is written as none found with the date. Scores change only when a sourced fact changes, and the change is logged. Sources come first. A statement about a product is taken from the vendor's own documentation, its marketing pages, a government record such as the FedRAMP Marketplace data, or a third party, and the page says which. Marketing pages are held to a lower ceiling than technical documentation when they support a score. Weights come before scores. The criteria and weights for every ranked view were committed to the repository before any platform was scored, and they are published on the Method page. No weight or criterion changes after the first score. Scoring is blind. The scorer received the rubric and the evidence with vendor names replaced by codes, and was not told which vendor any code stood for. A second reviewer checked every score against its evidence in the same blind conditions before the codes were opened. What the scores say is what the pages say. Every ranked view, head-to-head and alternatives list is published in the order the scores give it. A page that ranks Nucleus first also says in one sentence where it is behind. Writing: plain words, short sentences, numbers with dates. Each page ends with its sources and the date it was last reviewed. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/editorial-policy/ --- # Corrections and score changes CORRECTIONS, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** A factual error is corrected on the page and listed here with the date, the old text and the new text. A score changes only when a sourced fact changes; the fact, the old score and the new score are logged. As of 10 Nov 2026 no correction has been published. Corrections log: none as of 10 Nov 2026. Score changes since publication: none. The thirteen changes made in the blind review stage, before publication, are listed with their reasons on the Method page. To report an error, write to editor@epssvscvss.com with the page address, the statement and the source that shows it is wrong. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/corrections/ --- # Contact EPSS vs CVSS CONTACT, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** Write to editor@epssvscvss.com with factual corrections, a newer source, or a vendor fact we have missed. Include the page address and the source. Corrections are published on the corrections page with the date and on the page itself, and a changed score is logged with the fact that changed it. Email: editor@epssvscvss.com. Vendors: send the documentation page, not a deck. A fact enters a score only from a public page we can cite with a read date. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/contact/ --- # Privacy PRIVACY, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** EPSS vs CVSS sets no cookies, runs no analytics script and loads nothing from a third party. The host keeps standard request logs (address, time, page, user agent), which are used to count page views and crawler visits in aggregate and are deleted after 90 days. The site sets no cookies and uses no tracking pixels. It loads no third-party scripts, and its fonts are served from this site. Request logs are kept by the content delivery network in a storage bucket for this site only, read by a nightly job that counts human page views and AI crawler fetches, and deleted after 90 days. Questions about data: editor@epssvscvss.com. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/privacy/ --- # Terms of use TERMS, read 10 Nov 2026 **The short answer.** The text on EPSS vs CVSS may be quoted with a link to the page. The datasets are published under CC BY 4.0: use them with credit to EPSS vs CVSS and the read date. Scores and facts describe public sources on the date shown; check the vendor before you buy. Text: quote with attribution and a link to the page. Datasets: CC BY 4.0, cite the dataset name, the site and the read date. Product names and trademarks belong to their owners and are used to identify the products described. Facts are as read on the date shown on each page. Products change; confirm a capability with the vendor before relying on it. Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/terms/