# An SSVC tree turns a few named facts into one of four outcomes you can defend

PROGRAM GUIDE, read 10 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** SSVC replaces a score with a decision tree. CISA's version asks about exploitation status, technical impact, automatable exploitation, mission prevalence and public well-being impact, and returns Track, Track*, Attend or Act. Write your own tree, name every branch, and keep the version history.

## What CISA publishes

CISA's SSVC page lists five decision points: exploitation status, technical impact, automatable, mission prevalence and public well-being impact. The tree yields four decisions: Track, Track*, Attend and Act. The page describes Track* as a vulnerability with characteristics that may need closer monitoring, and Act as the most urgent, requiring leadership attention and prompt remediation.

BOD 26-04 states that its Table 1 is informed by SSVC, and its decision points are asset exposure, KEV status, automatable exploitation and technical impact. A federal reader will meet SSVC in the directive even if the program never adopted it.

## Start from the two facts you can get for free

Exploitation status can be read from the KEV catalog and, for weaker evidence, from EPSS. Technical impact can be read from the CVSS confidentiality, integrity and availability metrics in the vector. Automatable is a judgment you record once per CVE, with a note.

Mission prevalence and public well-being impact depend on the asset, so they come from your inventory, not from a feed. If asset tagging is incomplete, the tree will return the same answer for every asset. Fix the tags before you tune the branches.

## Write the tree as a table

List every combination of values and write the outcome beside it. A tree is auditable when a reviewer can find any CVE's row without running software. Keep it to the decision points you can populate reliably, since an unpopulated point is a silent default.

The sketch below uses four points and is an example of the format, not CISA's tree. Replace the outcomes with your own after review.

| Exploitation | Automatable | Technical impact | Asset mission role | Outcome |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Active (KEV listed) | Yes | Total | Essential | Act |
| Active (KEV listed) | No | Partial | Support | Attend |
| Public proof of concept | Yes | Total | Essential | Attend |
| None | No | Partial | Minimal | Track |

## Version it and test it against the ledger

Give the tree a version number and a date, and record who approved it. When a branch changes, rerun it on the open inventory and keep both outputs. A reviewer who sees Act become Attend needs the reason on file.

Test the tree on known cases. In the KEV Lag Ledger, 30 of 318 additions carry a CVSS base score of 10, and 33 score below 7. A tree that sends a KEV entry on an essential asset to Track fails the test. Run the 318 rows through the draft with an asset role assigned to each and read the exceptions.

## Where platforms stand

On the evidence read on 2026-11-10, the Signal Matrix shows SSVC exposed by 2 of 13 profiled platforms: Nucleus states SSVC prioritization on its federal page, and ServiceNow's documentation says its KEV integration shows SSVC values. For the other platforms the cell reads none found on 2026-11-10, which records the reach of the search and not a verdict.

If your platform does not expose SSVC, the tree can still live in a policy document and a spreadsheet keyed by CVE. The decision is the artifact, and the tool only has to carry the inputs.

## Governance of the tree

Assign one owner for the tree and one reviewer from outside the vulnerability team, such as the asset owner or risk function. Review it twice a year and after any directive change. A tree nobody reviews drifts into a score.

Keep the tree readable by the people who receive its output. System owners accept an outcome faster when they can see the branch that produced it, and the branch is the explanation. Print the branch beside the outcome in every ticket.

## From outcome to deadline

An outcome needs a deadline to be useful. Attach one to each: for example Act within days, Attend within weeks, Track at the next scheduled cycle. The numbers belong to your policy, since CISA's SSVC page names the outcomes and describes Act as requiring leadership attention and prompt remediation, but your service levels are yours to set. Where a federal directive applies, its own table governs the covered assets, and your tree handles everything else. Publish the mapping from outcome to deadline in the same document as the tree. Then measure it: count the open CVEs per outcome each month and the share closed inside the deadline. A tree whose Act list is never closed on time is a signal to change the deadline, the staffing or the tree, and the record should show which one you changed.

## Sources

- CISA, Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC): https://www.cisa.gov/stakeholder-specific-vulnerability-categorization-ssvc (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://epssvscvss.com/guides/writing-an-ssvc-decision-tree/
